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Quantum Reports

Learning Mixed Strategies in Quantum Games with Imperfect Information

Agustin Silva, Omar Gustavo Zabaleta, Constancio Miguel Arizmendi

Published Oct 29, 2022• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The quantization of games expand the players strategy space, allowing the emergence of more equilibriums. However, finding these equilibriums is difficult, especially if players are allowed to use mixed strategies. The size of the exploration space expands so much for quantum games that makes far harder to find the player’s best strategy. In this work, we propose a method to learn and visualize mixed quantum strategies and compare them with their classical counterpart. In our model, players do not know in advance which game they are playing (pay-off matrix) neither the action selected nor the reward obtained by their competitors at each step, they only learn from an individual feedback reward signal. In addition, we study both the influence of entanglement and noise on the performance of various quantum games.

DOI
10.3390/quantum4040033

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The quantization of games expand the players strategy space, allowing the emergence of more equilibriums. However, finding these equilibriums is difficult, especially if players are allowed to use mixed strategies. The size of the exploration space expands so much for quantum games that makes far harder to find the player’s best strategy. In this work, we propose a method to learn and visualize mixed quantum strategies and compare them with their classical counterpart. In our model, players do not know in advance which game they are playing (pay-off matrix) neither the action selected nor the reward obtained by their competitors at each step, they only learn from an individual feedback reward signal. In addition, we study both the influence of entanglement and noise on the performance of various quantum games.
We study a quantum game played by two players with restricted multiple strategies. It is found that in quantum game Nash equilibrium does not always exist which is totally different from that in classical game. This happens only when the initial state is in entangled state. At the same time, we find that when Nash equilibrium exists the pay off function is usually different from that in the classical counterpart except in some special cases. This presents an explicit example where quantum game and classical game differ fundamentally.
A version of the Monty Hall problem is presented where the players are permitted to select quantum strategies. If the initial state involves no entanglement the Nash equilibrium in the quantum game offers the players nothing more than that obtained with a classical mixed strategy. However, if the initial state involves entanglement of the qutrits of the two players, it is advantageous for one player to have access to a quantum strategy while the other does not. Where both players have access to quantum strategies there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, however, there is a Nash equilibrium in quantum mixed strategies that gives the same average payoff as the classical game.
Abstract A novel unified learning algorithm that seamlessly applies to both classical and quantum non-zero sum games is presented. Building upon the exploring selfish reinforcement learning (ESRL) framework previously proposed in the context of classical games, we extend this approach to handle quantum games with imperfect information. A comparison is made between performance and fairness among agents learning using plain QRL vs. QESRL. The latter enables agents to explore and learn periodic policy strategies in quantum games, leveraging the quantization of games to uncover fairer results. By addressing the challenges posed by the expanded strategy space in quantum games, we test the algorithm’s scalability by increasing the number of agents. Empirical evidence is provided to showcase its performance and to compare classical and quantum game scenarios. The proposed learning algorithm represents a significant step towards understanding the convergence and optimality of strategies in non-zero sum games across classical and quantum settings, bringing us closer to harnessing the potential of independent reinforcement learning and quantum computing in game theory applications.
This work concentrates on simultaneous move non-cooperating quantum games. Part of it is evidently not new, but it is included for the sake self consistence, as it is devoted to introduction of the mathematical and physical grounds of the pertinent topics, and the way in which a simple classical game is modified to become a quantum game (a procedure referred to as a quantization of a classical game). The connection between game theory and information science is briefly stressed, and the role of quantum entanglement (that plays a central role in the theory of quantum games), is exposed. Armed with these tools, we investigate some basic concepts like the existence (or absence) of a pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and its relation with the degree of entanglement. The main results of this work are as follows: 1) Construction of a numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in quantum games. The formalism is based on the discretization of a continuous variable into a mesh of points, and can be applied to quantum games that are built upon two-players two-strategies classical games, based on the method of best response functions. 2) Application of this algorithm to study the question of how the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is related to the degree of entanglement (specified by a continuous parameter γ ). It is shown that when the classical game GC has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient, then the quantum game GQ with maximal entanglement (γ = π/2) has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. By studying a non-symmetric prisoner dilemma game, it is found that there is a critical value 0γc such that for γγc there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and for γ≥γc there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The behavior of the two payoffs as function of γ starts at that of the classical ones at (D, D) and approaches the cooperative classical ones at (C, C) (C = confess, D = don’t confess). 3) We then study Bayesian quantum games and show that under certain conditions, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such games even when entanglement is maximal. 4) We define the basic ingredients of a quantum game based on a two-player three strategies classical game. This requires the introduction of trits (instead of bits) and quantum trits (instead of quantum bits). It is proved that in this quantum game, there is no classical commensurability in the sense that the classical strategies are not obtained as a special case of the quantum strategies.
We study a quantum game played by two players with restricted multiple strategies. It is found that in this restricted quantum game Nash equilibrium does not always exist when the initial state is entangled. At the same time, we find that when Nash equilibrium exists the payoff function is usually different from that in the classical counterpart except in some special cases. This presents an explicit example showing quantum game and classical game may differ. When designing a quantum game with limited strategies, the allowed strategy should be carefully chosen according to the type of initial state.
In classical (standard) game theory, a useful algorithm for searching Nash equilibrium in games of two players, is to determine the best response functions. For each strategy S1 of player 1 player 2 finds a best response function F2(S1), and vice versa. If the two response functions intersect, the intersection point (S1*, S2*) is a candidate for Nash equilibrium. This method is especially useful when the strategy space of each player is determined by a single variable (discrete or continuous). In the last decade, the concept of quantum games has been developed (hence we distinguish between classical and quantum games). In a quantum game with two players the strategy space of each player is composed of 2 × 2 complex unitary matrices with unit determinant. That is the group SU(2). The corresponding strategy space is characterized by three continuous variables represented by angles: 0 ≤ α ≤ 2π, 0 ≤ β ≤ 2π, 0 ≤ θ ≤ π. That turns the use of response functions impractical. In the present contribution we suggest a method for alleviating this problem by discretizing the variables as: {αi, βj, θk}, i= 1, 2, ..., I; j = 1, 2, ..., J; k = 1, 2, ... K. This enables the representation of every such triple by a single discrete variable, (αi, βj, θk) → xijk. Thereby, the strategy space is characterized by a single discrete variable taking I × J × K values and the method of response functions is feasible. We use it to show the following two results: 1) A two players quantum game with partially entangled initial state has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 2) A two player quantum Bayesian game with fully entangled initial state has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.