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CRC Press eBooks

Philosophical background

E.J Squires

Published Jan 1, 1990• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A spirited and provocative defence of realism, Is realism a dirty word?, is given by Gardner (1989); more serious readers might prefer that given in the book Computational Philosophy of Science (Thagard, 1988). Unfortunately neither of these authors give sufficient attention to the real problems presented by quantum theory. For this one should consult the detailed discussion of d'Espagnat (1989) in Reality and the Physicist.

DOI
10.1201/9781482268423-11

Related papers

Introduction

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This chapter previews the contributions to this volume and lays out the broader context and motivations for engaging in the scientific realism debate specifically in relation to quantum physics.

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While philosophy of science is the study of problems of knowledge concerning science in general, there also exists - or should exist - a '' philosophy in science'' directed at finding out in what ways our actual scientific knowledge may validly contribute to the basic philosophical quest. Contrary to philosophy of science, which is a subject for philosophers, philosophy in science calls on the services of physicists. When, in its spirit, quantum theory and Bell's theorem are used as touchstones, the two main traditional philosophical approaches, realism and idealism, are found wanting. A more suitable conception seems to be an intermediate one, in which the mere postulated existence of a holistic and hardly knowable Mind-Independent Reality is found to have an explaining power. Some corrections to comments by Schins of a previous work on the same subject are incorporated.

arXiv:quant-ph/9802046•Feb 17, 1998•8 citations

Scientific Realism and the Quantum

French, Steven, Saatsi, Juha

Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?

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An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory

David J. Toms

It is very likely that most readers and authors of articles appearing in Classical and Quantum Gravity are interested in what might loosely be termed the philosophy of science. It is equally likely, with perhaps a few exceptions, that the research of these same readers and authors has not been influenced in the least by the work of professional philosophers of science. This is certainly the case for those of us who work in quantum field theory. One must therefore ask who the intended audience is for a book which purports to discuss the philosophical implications of quantum field theory. In the preface, the author states that there are two intended audiences for his book. The first is `other interested interpreters of physics' who wish to learn something about quantum field theory in as painless a way as possible. The second is for students of physics who are bogged down in the details of learning quantum field theory and cannot see the overall picture. I am not convinced that either audience will find this book to be of much use. There are two basic problems with this book. The first is that the quantum field theory in it is of the old-fashioned kind, and is not really representative of the way the subject is either taught or thought of today. The second is that there is not sufficient background material present to make this book suitable for a novice reader. For example, I wonder how much a reader who has not studied quantum mechanics in any depth will get out of a treatment which launches into Hilbert space and a discussion of states without much in the way of proper introduction. Any reader who is familiar with the workings of quantum field theory will find much to disagree with in this book. For example, the author tries to make a case that a Fock space description is better than talking about particle labels and restricting to symmetric or antisymmetric states. The reason claimed for this is that there are states in Fock space which are neither symmetric nor antisymmetric under particle interchange which must be discarded. (In the author's words, this introduces `surplus formal structure'.) However, in Fock space an equally arbitrary choice is made by focusing on relations among the creation and annihilation operators which involve only commutation or anticommutation relations. Although this is acknowledged by Teller, no satisfactory explanation is given as to why one procedure is any less arbitrary than the other. The book is incomplete in many ways, with many interesting points mentioned just in passing. For example, the discussion around the Newton--Wigner position operator would have been greatly enhanced by including more details, such as an explanation as to why quanta described by Newton--Wigner states seem to propagate at superluminal speeds. It is hard to believe that a reader who has not met the Rindler vacuum before would find Teller's discussion to be very informative. After being so critical of this book, I should mention a part which I did enjoy and would recommend to students of physics. This is the last chapter of the book which contains a discussion of renormalization theory. It is my experience that students often find renormalization theory confusing, and may find Teller's semiqualitative discussion illuminating.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Jul 1, 1996•11 citations

What is ‘real’: A brief comparison

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Steven French’s review of Bernard d’Espagnat’s 500-page tome On Physics and Philosophy (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 60 6 2007 66 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2754610. June 2007, page 66 ) got my attention, with its repeated discussion of something d’Espagnat calls “the Real.” I must confess I have not seen d’Espagnat’s book, but the more I read about this Real in French’s review, the more I thought I’d heard of it somewhere before. In the true scientific spirit of bringing to the attention of a researcher the results of prior research bearing on his work, I have interspersed citations from the Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) between passages from French’s review of d’Espagnat’s book.French states that the Real “nevertheless exerts an influence on the phenomena.”Aquinas wrote, “As there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government” (part 1, question 103, article 5).French writes, “The grand laws of physics are ‘highly distorted reflections … of the great structures of “the Real”’ (page 455)…. The Real, although impossible to conceive, is nonseparable; from it, both consciousness and empirical reality ‘co-emerge.’”Aquinas wrote, “From the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God whether He exists, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him” (part 1, question 12, article 12).Aquinas maintained that there cannot ultimately be any disagreement between faith and reason because both come from an infinitely faithful and infinitely reasonable God. It is amusing that an apparently secular philosopher such as d’Espagnat, writing for a modern audience of physicists and philosophers and basing his thought on the latest results of quantum mechanics, has nevertheless arrived at conclusions in harmony with the greatest philosopher of the Middle Ages.© 2008 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Jun 1, 2008•0 citations

Realism and quantum mechanics

Peter Edward Hodgson

Scientific realism is discussed in a variety of quantum mechanical settings, and defended against rival views on a number of scores. The search for the hidden is the source of much scientific creativity.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science•Mar 1, 1997•2 citations
A spirited and provocative defence of realism, Is realism a dirty word?, is given by Gardner (1989); more serious readers might prefer that given in the book Computational Philosophy of Science (Thagard, 1988). Unfortunately neither of these authors give sufficient attention to the real problems presented by quantum theory. For this one should consult the detailed discussion of d'Espagnat (1989) in Reality and the Physicist.
While philosophy of science is the study of problems of knowledge concerning science in general, there also exists - or should exist - a '' philosophy in science'' directed at finding out in what ways our actual scientific knowledge may validly contribute to the basic philosophical quest. Contrary to philosophy of science, which is a subject for philosophers, philosophy in science calls on the services of physicists. When, in its spirit, quantum theory and Bell's theorem are used as touchstones, the two main traditional philosophical approaches, realism and idealism, are found wanting. A more suitable conception seems to be an intermediate one, in which the mere postulated existence of a holistic and hardly knowable Mind-Independent Reality is found to have an explaining power. Some corrections to comments by Schins of a previous work on the same subject are incorporated.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
It is very likely that most readers and authors of articles appearing in Classical and Quantum Gravity are interested in what might loosely be termed the philosophy of science. It is equally likely, with perhaps a few exceptions, that the research of these same readers and authors has not been influenced in the least by the work of professional philosophers of science. This is certainly the case for those of us who work in quantum field theory. One must therefore ask who the intended audience is for a book which purports to discuss the philosophical implications of quantum field theory. In the preface, the author states that there are two intended audiences for his book. The first is `other interested interpreters of physics' who wish to learn something about quantum field theory in as painless a way as possible. The second is for students of physics who are bogged down in the details of learning quantum field theory and cannot see the overall picture. I am not convinced that either audience will find this book to be of much use. There are two basic problems with this book. The first is that the quantum field theory in it is of the old-fashioned kind, and is not really representative of the way the subject is either taught or thought of today. The second is that there is not sufficient background material present to make this book suitable for a novice reader. For example, I wonder how much a reader who has not studied quantum mechanics in any depth will get out of a treatment which launches into Hilbert space and a discussion of states without much in the way of proper introduction. Any reader who is familiar with the workings of quantum field theory will find much to disagree with in this book. For example, the author tries to make a case that a Fock space description is better than talking about particle labels and restricting to symmetric or antisymmetric states. The reason claimed for this is that there are states in Fock space which are neither symmetric nor antisymmetric under particle interchange which must be discarded. (In the author's words, this introduces `surplus formal structure'.) However, in Fock space an equally arbitrary choice is made by focusing on relations among the creation and annihilation operators which involve only commutation or anticommutation relations. Although this is acknowledged by Teller, no satisfactory explanation is given as to why one procedure is any less arbitrary than the other. The book is incomplete in many ways, with many interesting points mentioned just in passing. For example, the discussion around the Newton--Wigner position operator would have been greatly enhanced by including more details, such as an explanation as to why quanta described by Newton--Wigner states seem to propagate at superluminal speeds. It is hard to believe that a reader who has not met the Rindler vacuum before would find Teller's discussion to be very informative. After being so critical of this book, I should mention a part which I did enjoy and would recommend to students of physics. This is the last chapter of the book which contains a discussion of renormalization theory. It is my experience that students often find renormalization theory confusing, and may find Teller's semiqualitative discussion illuminating.
Steven French’s review of Bernard d’Espagnat’s 500-page tome On Physics and Philosophy (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 60 6 2007 66 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2754610. June 2007, page 66 ) got my attention, with its repeated discussion of something d’Espagnat calls “the Real.” I must confess I have not seen d’Espagnat’s book, but the more I read about this Real in French’s review, the more I thought I’d heard of it somewhere before. In the true scientific spirit of bringing to the attention of a researcher the results of prior research bearing on his work, I have interspersed citations from the Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) between passages from French’s review of d’Espagnat’s book.French states that the Real “nevertheless exerts an influence on the phenomena.”Aquinas wrote, “As there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government” (part 1, question 103, article 5).French writes, “The grand laws of physics are ‘highly distorted reflections … of the great structures of “the Real”’ (page 455)…. The Real, although impossible to conceive, is nonseparable; from it, both consciousness and empirical reality ‘co-emerge.’”Aquinas wrote, “From the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God whether He exists, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him” (part 1, question 12, article 12).Aquinas maintained that there cannot ultimately be any disagreement between faith and reason because both come from an infinitely faithful and infinitely reasonable God. It is amusing that an apparently secular philosopher such as d’Espagnat, writing for a modern audience of physicists and philosophers and basing his thought on the latest results of quantum mechanics, has nevertheless arrived at conclusions in harmony with the greatest philosopher of the Middle Ages.© 2008 American Institute of Physics.