As it has been recently proven that the public key-based RSA algorithms that are currently used in encryption can be unlocked by Shor’s algorithm of quantum computers in a short time, conventional security systems are facing new threats, and accordingly, studies have been actively conducted on new security systems. They are classified into two typical methods: Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). PQC aims to design conventional cryptography systems in a more robust way so that they will not be decrypted by a quantum computer in a short time whereas QKD aims to make data tapping and interception physically impossible by using quantum mechanical characteristics. In this paper, we design a quantum key management system, which is most crucial for constructing a QKD network and analyze the design requirements to apply them to Korea Research Environment Open NETwork (KREONET). The quantum key management system not only manages the lifecycle, such as storage, management, derivation, allocation, and deletion of the symmetric key generated in QKD but also enables many-to-many communication in QKD communication based on the key relay function and P2P communication to overcome the limitation of distance, which is a disadvantage of QKD. We have validated the designed quantum key management system through simulations to supplement the parts that were not considered during the initial design.
As it has been recently proven that the public key-based RSA algorithms that are currently used in encryption can be unlocked by Shor’s algorithm of quantum computers in a short time, conventional security systems are facing new threats, and accordingly, studies have been actively conducted on new security systems. They are classified into two typical methods: Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). PQC aims to design conventional cryptography systems in a more robust way so that they will not be decrypted by a quantum computer in a short time whereas QKD aims to make data tapping and interception physically impossible by using quantum mechanical characteristics. In this paper, we design a quantum key management system, which is most crucial for constructing a QKD network and analyze the design requirements to apply them to Korea Research Environment Open NETwork (KREONET). The quantum key management system not only manages the lifecycle, such as storage, management, derivation, allocation, and deletion of the symmetric key generated in QKD but also enables many-to-many communication in QKD communication based on the key relay function and P2P communication to overcome the limitation of distance, which is a disadvantage of QKD. We have validated the designed quantum key management system through simulations to supplement the parts that were not considered during the initial design.
Existing network cryptography systems are threatened by recent developments in quantum computing. For example, the Shor algorithm, which can be run on a quantum computer, is capable of overriding public key-based network cryptography systems in a short time. Therefore, research on new cryptography systems is actively being conducted. The most powerful cryptography systems are quantum key distribution (QKD) and post quantum cryptograph (PQC) systems; in this study, a network based on both QKD and PQC is proposed, along with a quantum key management system (QKMS) and a Q-controller to efficiently operate the network. The proposed quantum cryptography communication network uses QKD as its backbone, and replaces QKD with PQC at the user end to overcome the shortcomings of QKD. This paper presents the functional requirements of QKMS and Q-Controller, which can be utilized to perform efficient network resource management.
The exponential development in Quantum Computing is becoming a threat to the existing asymmetric cryptographic algorithms like RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman). A threat to these public key cryptographic algorithms is a threat to the entire Internet itself, as algorithms like RSA are the basic building blocks of existing secure Internet communication. Thus, a new area of quantum cryptography emerged, that lead to the development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms and Quantum-safe Internet protocol Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). These systems, which are generally known as Quantum Cryptographic Systems, have many practical limitations that make them complex and expensive to be implemented or even experimented with, in a real-life scenario. Therefore, to develop new protocols and analyze the feasibility of the existing protocols in a cost-effective manner, we need efficient simulation frameworks. So, in this paper, we are profiling some of the recent Quantum Cryptographic based networks and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) simulation frameworks and conducting a systematic and thorough analysis of the implementation and functionalities of these experimental platforms, with an aim to build a universal quantum testbed in the future.
The potential of the swift development of quantum computing is an extreme danger to the traditional cryptographic programs, and they are the foundation of the modern communication infrastructure. RSA and ECC are classical public-key algorithms that can be successfully quantum-attacked, in particular, Shor's algorithm can easily factor large integers and calculate discrete logarithms (Bernstein et al., 2017). The Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has become the key to secure the next-generation communication networks against these threats, which relies on lattice problem-based algorithms, hash-based based algorithms, multivariate polynomials-based algorithms, and code-based cryptography. The paper examines the concepts, design, and implementation issues of PQC within current network infrastructure focusing on the secure transmission of data, authentication, and key management in the upcoming 5G and 6G networks. The approach will include the survey of existing algorithms of PQC, model the integration of protocol in the communication systems and test computational efficiency, security strength, and scalability. It has been found that PQC is suitable to protect network communications against quantum attackers, and achieves reasonable performance, though trade-offs can be seen in terms of computation overhead, key size, and latency. The research offers understanding to the researcher, network engineers and policy makers in order to adopt quantum resistant cryptography protocols to secure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information in the future communication networks.
Quantum key distribution is an innovative technique to distribute encryption keys without compromise. This paper focuses on the application of this technique to achieve reliable communication in an ever-evolving and increasingly vulnerable environment. Designers of cryptosystems have three basic objectives; designing cryptographic algorithms that adequately scramble the target data, developing strong encryption keys to lock and unlock the algorithm, and securely distributing the keys between communicating devices. The advance of quantum computing technologies threatens to expose the world's most prolific key method overnight. Though quantum computing is not yet a reality, the basic principles have been proven in laboratories. Furthermore, quantum computing has been shown to be especially suited for computations of complex mathematic equations; such as distilling the private keys from the public keys used in public key infrastructures (PKI). In this environment, it's comforting to know that the most advanced technology in the broad field of quantum communications just happens to be a new method of creating and distributing encryption keys. This technology is referred to as quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD technologies shift the current paradigm on two plains. The first is that it uses quantum principles, rather than conventional means, for distributing keys between devices. The quantum principles guarantee the key can not be intercepted during transmission without alerting the users of a compromise. The second shift is derived from the fact that encrypted data can not be intercepted today and decrypted at a later date when the computing power exists to crack the code. This shift is dependant on the use of a combination of QKD and one-time pad. Because of the quantum principles that QKD relies on, when a key is successfully created and shared, it can not be cracked using intercepted data. The keys are derived from a convergence of random operations conducted at the sender and receiver stations. Indeed, neither the sender nor the receiver can determine what the key will be until the entire process is completed. As a piece of our security infrastructure, QKD significantly raises our security posture. This paper explains the application of quantum principals used to enable QKD systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), a cryptography technology providing information theoretic security based on physical laws, has moved from the research stage to the engineering stage. Although the communication distance is subject to a limitation attributable to the QKD fundamentals, recent research and development of “key relaying” over a “QKD network” is overcoming this limitation. However, there are still barriers to widespread use of QKD integrated with conventional information systems: applicability and development cost. In order to break down these barriers, this paper proposes a new solution for developing secure network infrastructure based on QKD technology to accommodate multiple applications. The proposed solution introduces 3 functions: (1) a directory mechanism to manage multiple applications hosted on the QKD network, (2) a key management method to share and to allocate the keys for multiple applications, and (3) a cryptography communication library enabling existing cryptographic communication software to be ported to the QKD network easily. The proposed solution allows the QKD network to accommodate multiple applications of various types, and moreover, realizes applicability to conventional information systems easily. It also contributes to a reduction in the development cost per information system, since the development cost of the QKD network can be shared between the multiple applications. The proposed solution was implemented with a network emulating QKD technology and evaluated. The evaluation results show that the proposed solution enables the infrastructure of a single QKD network to host multiple applications concurrently, fairly, and effectively through a conventional application programming interface, OpenSSL API. In addition, the overhead of secure session establishment by the proposed solution was quantitatively evaluated and compared.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide information theoretically secure key exchange even in the era of quantum computer. However, QKD requires the classical channel to be authenticated, and the current method is pre-sharing symmetric keys. For a QKD network of n users, this method requires Cn2=n(n−1)/2 pairs of symmetric keys to realize pairwise interconnection. In contrast, with the help of mature public key infrastructure (PKI) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum resistant security, each user only needs to apply for a digital certificate from certificate authority (CA) to achieve efficient and secure authentication for QKD. We only need to assume the short-term security of the PQC algorithm to achieve the long-term security of the distributed keys. Here, we experimentally verified the feasibility, efficiency and stability of the PQC algorithm in QKD authentication, and demonstrated the advantages when new users join the QKD network. Using PQC authentication we only need to believe the CA is safe, rather than all trusted relays. QKD combined with PQC authentication will greatly promote and extend the application prospects of quantum safe communication.