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Nanosystems Physics Chemistry Mathematics

Overview of device-independent continuous-variable quantum key distribution

R. Goncharov, E. A. Bolychev, Irina O. Vorontsova, E.O. Samsonov, V. I. Egorov

Published Jun 30, 2022• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The objects of study of this paper are quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols and systems, in particular, continuous variable (CV) ones with untrusted devices (measurement devices or light sources).The present work is devoted to the consideration of such systems, namely, device-indepentent CV-QKD, and to the discussion of their performance.

DOI
10.17586/2220-8054-2022-13-3-290-298

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The objects of study of this paper are quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols and systems, in particular, continuous variable (CV) ones with untrusted devices (measurement devices or light sources).The present work is devoted to the consideration of such systems, namely, device-indepentent CV-QKD, and to the discussion of their performance.
As quantum key distribution (QKD) emerges as a robust defence against quantum computer threats, significant advancements have been realised by researchers. A pivotal focus has been the development of protocols that not only simplify hardware implementation, such as the use of continuous-variable (CV) systems, but also eliminate the necessity for trusted nodes, as seen with the measurement-device-independent (MDI) approach. This paper delves into the integration of these methodologies in the CV-MDI-QKD protocol, offering an in-depth exploration of its evolution, primary characteristics, and the latest advancements in both theory and experiment.
We propose a continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) protocol, in which detection is conducted by an untrusted third party. Our protocol can defend all detector side channels, which seriously threaten the security of a practical CV QKD system. Its security analysis against arbitrary collective attacks is derived based on the fact that the entanglement-based scheme of CV-MDI QKD is equivalent to the conventional CV QKD with coherent states and heterodyne detection. We find that the maximal total transmission distance is achieved by setting the untrusted third party close to one of the legitimate users. Furthermore, an alternate detection scheme, a special application of CV-MDI QKD, is proposed to enhance the security of the standard CV QKD system.
As the development of quantum computers advances, the need for quantum-resistant cryptography becomes urgent and the adoption of quantum key distribution systems is a reality. Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) is attracting considerable attention due to its seamless compatibility with classical optical communication systems. In this paper, we review the key features of CV-QKD protocols, discuss how they distinguish from DV-QKD protocols and present some of the challenges that need to be overcome for widespread adoption.
In the evolving field of Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CV-QKD), notable for its synergistic potential with existing optical communication infrastructures, a high channel capacity, and an anticipated surge in secret rates, the Measurement Device Independent (MDI) framework stands as a bulwark against side-channel vulnerabilities at the measurement juncture [1] –[4]. Recent years have witnessed quantum photonics technology leapfrogging into a realm that promises the realization of fully integrated CV-MDI-QKD transmitter terminals, a cornerstone for large-scale CV-MDI-QKD networks. However, integrating high-efficiency on-chip light sources while effectively navigating the treacherous waters of practical security challenges remains a formidable task [5], [6]. This study is pioneering in its focus on the practical security intricacies stemming from imperfections in on-chip light sources within CV-MDI-QKD systems. We propose defense mechanisms tailored to shield against the risks associated with source defects, thereby laying a robust foundation for secure, reliable on-chip CV-MDI-QKD transmission terminals. This advancement is a critical enabler for the widespread adoption of CV-MDI-QKD, signaling a paradigm shift in secure communications.
This article describes the current technical level of developments in the field of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD). Various classifications are described, the criteria are analyzed, and the optimal protocol is selected. The analysis is focused around device-dependent schemes with a theoretical emphasis, and therefore, a detailed analysis of device-independent CV-QKD and side-channel attacks is out of the scope of the work. However, the latter, one way or another, is taken into account when describing possible classifications. The choice of the optimal protocol was carried out, first of all, from the potential possibility of integration into existing network telecommunication infrastructures. Predominantly, the general classification is carried out in such a way that it is possible to draw up a specific protocol, depending on the task of implementation.
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) is immune to all detector side channel attacks, however its security requires trusted sources. We investigate the effects of source intensity errors, the most crucial source error, on the security of CV-MDI-QKD protocol with Gaussian-modulated coherent states. We establish a general source intensity errors model and derive the secret key rate based on different assumptions on the abilities of legal parties Alice and Bob. To avoid the adverse effects of the sources' intensity errors on CV-MDI-QKD, we present different data-processing schemes. We also assess the security of the protocol against collective Gaussian attacks in the finite-size scenario with composable security. Taking source intensity errors into consideration, we achieve improved security compared to previous demonstrations. Our results will provide a useful reference for practical implementations of CV-MDI-QKD.