The concept of measurement plays both a central and a problematic role in quantum mechanics. First of all, and unusually, the word ‘measurement’ figures in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics - in principle (3) of Chapter 2 for example - and in this quantum physics is quite unlike classical physics as a whole. For though a measurement made on a classical system naturally involves an interaction between the system and a measuring apparatus, there is nothing special according to classical physics about measurement interactions. Describing the measuring process is a straightforward problem of applied classical physics. The classical laws of motion do not break down during the measuring process. For example, suppose you observe a classical particle using light bounced off it. In the classical account you can make the disturbance on the observed system as small as you like and, ‘in principle', you can observe the system with arbitrary accuracy. ‘In principle’ - a favorite expression of the philosopher of physics - means what it always means in physics. The contrast is with ‘in practice'. Of course, in practice there are all sorts of limitations on measurement. There are also some theoretical limitations, like those due to thermodynamics. But these are not the limitations imposed by the theory we are considering, namely classical mechanics. Such limitations as there are are imposed by some other theory. (The expression ‘in principle’ tends to be used when we are discussing the principles of a particular theory and, theoretically but not in practice, physics is a collection of disjoint theories.)
The concept of measurement plays both a central and a problematic role in quantum mechanics. First of all, and unusually, the word ‘measurement’ figures in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics - in principle (3) of Chapter 2 for example - and in this quantum physics is quite unlike classical physics as a whole. For though a measurement made on a classical system naturally involves an interaction between the system and a measuring apparatus, there is nothing special according to classical physics about measurement interactions. Describing the measuring process is a straightforward problem of applied classical physics. The classical laws of motion do not break down during the measuring process. For example, suppose you observe a classical particle using light bounced off it. In the classical account you can make the disturbance on the observed system as small as you like and, ‘in principle', you can observe the system with arbitrary accuracy. ‘In principle’ - a favorite expression of the philosopher of physics - means what it always means in physics. The contrast is with ‘in practice'. Of course, in practice there are all sorts of limitations on measurement. There are also some theoretical limitations, like those due to thermodynamics. But these are not the limitations imposed by the theory we are considering, namely classical mechanics. Such limitations as there are are imposed by some other theory. (The expression ‘in principle’ tends to be used when we are discussing the principles of a particular theory and, theoretically but not in practice, physics is a collection of disjoint theories.)
Measurement in classical physics Measurements in classical physics are the means by which we come to know the current state of a mechanical system without appreciably disturbing it. The laws of classical mechanics imply that we may interact with the system in such a way that this ideal may be approached arbitrarily closely, at least in principle (i.e., in theory, ignoring practical problems). The aim of this chapter is to examine how far we must revise this programme in the quantum theory of measurement. Did the classical physicist believe in the objective existence of material systems with well-defined position and momentum just because these quantities could be empirically determined with arbitrary precision at the same time? It seems she made a stronger assumption than this; that two successive observations of an apple, first in a tree and then on the ground, are connected to one another by virtue of the fact that the apple actually has a definite position and momentum at each instant, whether it is observed or not. Thus, the programme of classical physics was not merely to predict the results of future experiments by inserting data from previous ones into the laws of motion, but to show how the observations are a function of a causally connected sequence of unique processes undergone by the system of interest, which possesses properties independently of measurements. Measurement was then something of a secondary affair and indeed, prior to quantum mechanics, the theory of measurement as a distinct branch of theoretical physics did not exist.
THE PROBLEM Within classical physics the relation between physical theory and ordinary experience was conceived in the following way: ordinary experience is something that can be described and understood in terms of physics. Such a description involves, apart from physical theory, certain approximations. But the conditons under which those approximations apply (they correspond to the initial conditions of, say, celestial mechanics), taken together with the theory, are supposed to be sufficient for giving a full account of ordinary experience. Consequently, classical theory of measurement (which, like any other theory of measurement, links together terms of ordinary experience and theoretical terms), is a piece of applied physics and all processes which happen during measurement can be analysed on the basis of the equations of motion only. When we enter quantum mechanics (QM), we are apparently presented with a completely different picture. For according to the current interpretation of elementary quantum mechanics, ordinary experience – and this now means classical physics – and physical theory (and this now means QM), belong to two completely different levels and it is impossible to give an account of the first in terms of the second. Any transition from the quantum level to the level of classical physics must be taken, not as a transition within QM from the general to the particular, but as an essentially new element which is incapable of further analysis.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is acknowledged as the fundamental theory on which the whole fabric of physics is supposed to rely. And yet, the features of quantum measurements, processes that provide information about microscopic objects, seem to contradict the principles of quantum mechanics. We make a qualitative presentation of this long standing problem and give an idea of recent progress in the elucidation of the paradox. Although governed solely by the quantum equations of motion, the dynamical process involving the tested system and the measuring apparatus veils the quantum oddities that oppose our standard logic and gives rise to the expected properties of measurements. In spite of the irreducibly probabilistic nature of the underlying quantum physics, classical concepts emerge, such as standard probabilities, ordinary correlations, disappearance of quantum fluctuations, and the possibility of making statements about individual systems.
Standard quantum mechanics—the theory that is made use of in practice and is, because of this, taught in university courses— is a theory that is weakly objective only. For this reason it is most conveniently and neatly expressed by means of a set of basic rules of calculation that enable physicists to make predictions concerning what will be observed. Classical and quantum physics both make considerable use of the expressions "physical system" and "state of a physical system." Quantum mechanics is essentially a probabilistic theory. Except in special cases it makes no predictions that bear on individual systems. Rather, it predicts statistical frequencies. In other words, it predicts, as a rule, the number n of times that a given event will be observed when a large number N of physical systems of the same type and satisfying specified conditions are subjected to a measurement process.
The quantum mechanical measurement process is analysed in detail, especially from the group theoretical point of view. The first three chapters review the results obtained before briefly. In §1, the classical theory of measurement, originated by von Neumann, is birefly described. The importance of considering more general schemes of measurements than the original one is, however, emphasized. In §2, the role of conservation laws, in imposing limitations on the possibility of measurements, is discussed. Accurately measurable quantities are defined in this context. In §3, the role of conservation laws is further analysed. It is shown that the conserved quantity of the apparatus cannot be used for a “pointer reading.” The following two chapters discuss the nature of the exactly measurable quantities. In §4, exactly measurable quantities are explicitly determined. It is shown that the measurement of projection operators in the Hilbert space of the object which commute with the operators of the restricted Poincaré group give all the information on the states of the object that can be obtained by accurate measurements. In §5, the measurement on objects which are composed of more than one particle is discussed. The last chapter, §6, deals with approximately measurable quantities, but no complete estimate of the unavoidable inaccuracy of the measurement of these is obtained. It also contains some concluding remarks.
Abstract Measurement lies at the core of the quantum formalism. This may seem a statement of the intuitively obvious for any theoretical structure with a pretension to predict the outcomes of observations made or experiments performed on objects in the real world. But classical mechanics is a theorys of the physical properties of objects and their behaviour when exposed to different kinds of forces, and there is no particularly significant role for measurement other than a passive role involving the recording of those properties or behaviour. In contrast, measurement in quantum theory takes on a far deeper, almost ominous, significance