The Projection Postulate Examined

Sheldon Goldstein

L. E. Ballentine

P. Van Esch

Proponents of the Everett interpretation of Quantum Theory have made efforts to show that to an observer in a branch, everything happens as if the projection postulate were true without postulating it. In this paper, we will indicate that it is only possible to deduce this rule if one introduces another postulate that is logically equivalent to introducing the projection postulate as an extra assumption. We do this by examining the consequences of changing the projection postulate into an alternative one, while keeping the unitary part of quantum theory, and indicate that this is a consistent (although strange) physical theory.

Anthony Sudbery

The projection postulate is a description of the effect on a quantum system, assumed to be in a pure state, of a measurement of an observable with a discrete spectrum, in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. It is often called "von Neumann's projection postulate" or "the Lüders rule". This paper is an examination of the versions of this postulate due to Dirac, von Neumann and Lüders. It is shown that Dirac, in 1930, proposed what is now generally known as the projection postulate. Von Neumann, in 1932, gave a different theory which only applies in special and rather unusual cases. Lüders, in 1951, rejected this theory and presented one which is the same as Dirac's. Treatments of observables with continuous spectra by both Dirac and von Neumann are criticised, and the possibility of a generalised version of the projection postulate for this case is considered. The paper concludes with a discussion of the status of the projection postulate (in its various forms) as a separate postulate (independent of the other postulates of quantum mechanics) and as a separate form of time development (in addition to the time-dependent Schrödinger equation).

R. Shankar

Geoffrey Paul Hellman

This paper explores the status of the von Neumann-Lüders state transition rule (the “projection postulate”) within “real-logic” quantum logic. The entire discussion proceeds from a reading of the Lüders rule according to which, although idealized in applying only to “minimally disturbing” measurements, it nevertheless makes empirical claims and is not a purely mathematical theorem. An argument (due to Friedman and Putnam) is examined to the effect that QL has an explanatory advantage over Copenhagen and other interpretations which relativize truth-value assignments to experimental arrangements. Two versions of QL, the lattice-theoretic (LT) and partial-Boolean-algebra (PBA), are considered. It turns out that the projection postulate is intimately connected with the choice of conditional connective for QL. The effect of the projection postulate is obtained with the Sasaki conditional. However, this choice is found to require extra assumptions, on both the LT and PBA versions, which are either just as ad hoc as the projection postulate itself or indefensible from within the real-logic QL framework.