Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Cambridge University Press eBooks

Quantum Mind and Social Science

Alexander E. Wendt

Published Apr 20, 2015• 528 citations
Publisher

Abstract

There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book, Alexander Wendt challenges this assumption by proposing that consciousness is, in fact, a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon. In the first half of the book, Wendt justifies the insertion of quantum theory into social scientific debates, introduces social scientists to quantum theory and the philosophical controversy about its interpretation, and then defends the quantum consciousness hypothesis against the orthodox, classical approach to the mind-body problem. In the second half, he develops the implications of this metaphysical perspective for the nature of language and the agent-structure problem in social ontology. Wendt's argument is a revolutionary development which raises fundamental questions about the nature of social life and the work of those who study it.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781316005163

Related papers

Challenges to a Quantum-Theoretic Social Theory

Badredine Arfi

A key claim that Alexander Wendt makes in his book Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology is that he is not using the 'quantum' as a metaphor.Nor is he drawing analogies either.He argues that he is constructing a quantum theory of the human subject and social structures through a quantum-theoretic explanation of consciousness undergirded by a panpsychist hypothesis of primitive protoconsciousness.In this article I show how Wendt's insistence that he is developing a literally-speaking quantum-theoretic approach presents him with a number of must-notignore challenges that originate in quantum theory.I specifically discuss three challenges

Millennium Journal of International Studies•Jul 13, 2018•7 citations

Entangling the social: Comments on Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science

Daniel Little

Abstract Alexander Wendt suggests that an emerging field of research on quantum consciousness may have important implications for our understanding of the social world as well. He wants us to consider that the operations of the brain are not “classical” but rather quantum‐mechanical, and that this sheds light on the social worker as well. This article casts doubt on these claims. First, the idea of panpsychism (all physical things possess features of consciousness) is implausible on its face. Second, the findings of “quantum decision theory” are much more limited than Wendt recognizes. Third, the biological quantum effects currently subject to investigation are limited in their application to brains and persons by unavoidable limits of time and space scale on quantum effects. The “brain as quantum computer” or “brain as wave function” theory is very implausible given current knowledge.

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour•Apr 11, 2018•16 citations

Quantum consciousness and life

Alexander E. Wendt

Introduction We saw in Part I that in addition to explaining consciousness there is another hard problem for the modern scientific worldview – understanding what quantum physics is telling us about reality. And if anything this one is harder. In philosophy of mind there is at least consensus enough for an orthodox position to exist (materialism), and a widespread expectation that it will be vindicated by future neuroscience. By contrast, in philosophy of physics all sides understand that quantum theory is compatible with a variety of metaphysical interpretations, and have little hope that new empirical discoveries will settle the matter. But both problems are “hard” in the sense that, despite tremendous intellectual effort over many decades, no clear progress has been made toward solving them. The basic idea of quantum consciousness theory is that bringing the two problems into contact may be the key to solving both (though I will be addressing only the mind–body problem in what follows). That this could be a novel idea attests to the fact that their philosophical discussions have evolved quite separately. While philosophers of physics have long been interested in the role of consciousness in the measurement process, they have engaged little with the mind–body problem per se; and philosophers of mind have been almost unanimous in dismissing the suggestion that consciousness has anything interesting to do with quantum physics. Social scientists might echo such skepticism, wondering how adding the problem of interpreting quantum theory to the problem of consciousness will help them . Besides piling up jargon and arcane debates, in moving to the sub-atomic level we are now even farther removed from the human world, and seemingly poised to engage in the most vulgar reductionism. Yet, naïvely one might expect the two problems to be related, for two reasons. The first is the intriguing analogies mentioned in Chapter 1 between the mental and quantum domains.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 20, 2015•0 citations

Panpsychism and neutral monism

Alexander E. Wendt

Although this book is about the implications for social science of a quantum approach to the mind, much of that potential stems from its ability to integrate consciousness – a particular aspect of the mind – into a naturalistic worldview. And when it comes to the hard problem, quantum brain theory is only a necessary condition for such integration, not sufficient. Necessary, because it would enable the body to exploit for macro-level purposes a physical but non- material space for consciousness at the quantum level – collapse of the wave function – that does not exist in classical physics. Insufficient, however, because quantum brain theory embodies an objective, third-person standpoint and as such can tell us no more than classical brain theory can about why brains have a subjective, first-person point of view in the first place. The explanatory gap is still there, in other words, only now pushed down into quantum theory. To cross this gap, therefore, in addition to a new physics of the brain we will need a new meta -physics as well. As I argue in this chapter, it is this metaphysics that does the real work in solving the mind–body problem. Most social scientists have an instinctive aversion to ‘metaphysics,’ which in our world connotes wooly-headed and speculative thinking that has no place in science. Yet in moving onto this terrain the situation is both worse and better than that. It is worse because we have no choice. The Neuron Doctrine itself is based on a metaphysic, materialism, which looks increasingly unlikely to ever explain consciousness; and in thinking about the meaning of quantum theory metaphysical debate can hardly be avoided, precisely because physics provides little guidance for choosing among its interpretations. So the only question is whether to change our metaphysics of the brain from classical to quantum.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 20, 2015•0 citations

Our place in the universe: Alexander Wendt and quantum mechanics

Andrew H. Kydd

Abstract Alexander Wendt claims that quantum physics explains deep mysteries about human consciousness and offers a radical new understanding of human behavior and social interaction. However, the claims rest on flawed interpretations of quantum theory, fringe literatures and metaphorical, almost mystical uses of quantum concepts and buzzwords. He fails to provide any account of human conflict, and defends an almost theological view of the importance of humanity in the universe that is incompatible with a scientific perspective.

International Theory•Feb 14, 2022•27 citations

We are not walking wave functions. A response to “Quantum Mind and Social Science” by Alexander Wendt

Matthew J. Donald

Abstract Alexander Wendt raises many interesting questions in this book, but to get to the answers he wants, he relies on a misunderstanding of the nature of the quantum states of macroscopic objects.

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour•Mar 30, 2018•11 citations
There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book, Alexander Wendt challenges this assumption by proposing that consciousness is, in fact, a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon. In the first half of the book, Wendt justifies the insertion of quantum theory into social scientific debates, introduces social scientists to quantum theory and the philosophical controversy about its interpretation, and then defends the quantum consciousness hypothesis against the orthodox, classical approach to the mind-body problem. In the second half, he develops the implications of this metaphysical perspective for the nature of language and the agent-structure problem in social ontology. Wendt's argument is a revolutionary development which raises fundamental questions about the nature of social life and the work of those who study it.
A key claim that Alexander Wendt makes in his book Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology is that he is not using the 'quantum' as a metaphor.Nor is he drawing analogies either.He argues that he is constructing a quantum theory of the human subject and social structures through a quantum-theoretic explanation of consciousness undergirded by a panpsychist hypothesis of primitive protoconsciousness.In this article I show how Wendt's insistence that he is developing a literally-speaking quantum-theoretic approach presents him with a number of must-notignore challenges that originate in quantum theory.I specifically discuss three challenges
Abstract Alexander Wendt suggests that an emerging field of research on quantum consciousness may have important implications for our understanding of the social world as well. He wants us to consider that the operations of the brain are not “classical” but rather quantum‐mechanical, and that this sheds light on the social worker as well. This article casts doubt on these claims. First, the idea of panpsychism (all physical things possess features of consciousness) is implausible on its face. Second, the findings of “quantum decision theory” are much more limited than Wendt recognizes. Third, the biological quantum effects currently subject to investigation are limited in their application to brains and persons by unavoidable limits of time and space scale on quantum effects. The “brain as quantum computer” or “brain as wave function” theory is very implausible given current knowledge.
Introduction We saw in Part I that in addition to explaining consciousness there is another hard problem for the modern scientific worldview – understanding what quantum physics is telling us about reality. And if anything this one is harder. In philosophy of mind there is at least consensus enough for an orthodox position to exist (materialism), and a widespread expectation that it will be vindicated by future neuroscience. By contrast, in philosophy of physics all sides understand that quantum theory is compatible with a variety of metaphysical interpretations, and have little hope that new empirical discoveries will settle the matter. But both problems are “hard” in the sense that, despite tremendous intellectual effort over many decades, no clear progress has been made toward solving them. The basic idea of quantum consciousness theory is that bringing the two problems into contact may be the key to solving both (though I will be addressing only the mind–body problem in what follows). That this could be a novel idea attests to the fact that their philosophical discussions have evolved quite separately. While philosophers of physics have long been interested in the role of consciousness in the measurement process, they have engaged little with the mind–body problem per se; and philosophers of mind have been almost unanimous in dismissing the suggestion that consciousness has anything interesting to do with quantum physics. Social scientists might echo such skepticism, wondering how adding the problem of interpreting quantum theory to the problem of consciousness will help them . Besides piling up jargon and arcane debates, in moving to the sub-atomic level we are now even farther removed from the human world, and seemingly poised to engage in the most vulgar reductionism. Yet, naïvely one might expect the two problems to be related, for two reasons. The first is the intriguing analogies mentioned in Chapter 1 between the mental and quantum domains.
Although this book is about the implications for social science of a quantum approach to the mind, much of that potential stems from its ability to integrate consciousness – a particular aspect of the mind – into a naturalistic worldview. And when it comes to the hard problem, quantum brain theory is only a necessary condition for such integration, not sufficient. Necessary, because it would enable the body to exploit for macro-level purposes a physical but non- material space for consciousness at the quantum level – collapse of the wave function – that does not exist in classical physics. Insufficient, however, because quantum brain theory embodies an objective, third-person standpoint and as such can tell us no more than classical brain theory can about why brains have a subjective, first-person point of view in the first place. The explanatory gap is still there, in other words, only now pushed down into quantum theory. To cross this gap, therefore, in addition to a new physics of the brain we will need a new meta -physics as well. As I argue in this chapter, it is this metaphysics that does the real work in solving the mind–body problem. Most social scientists have an instinctive aversion to ‘metaphysics,’ which in our world connotes wooly-headed and speculative thinking that has no place in science. Yet in moving onto this terrain the situation is both worse and better than that. It is worse because we have no choice. The Neuron Doctrine itself is based on a metaphysic, materialism, which looks increasingly unlikely to ever explain consciousness; and in thinking about the meaning of quantum theory metaphysical debate can hardly be avoided, precisely because physics provides little guidance for choosing among its interpretations. So the only question is whether to change our metaphysics of the brain from classical to quantum.
Abstract Alexander Wendt claims that quantum physics explains deep mysteries about human consciousness and offers a radical new understanding of human behavior and social interaction. However, the claims rest on flawed interpretations of quantum theory, fringe literatures and metaphorical, almost mystical uses of quantum concepts and buzzwords. He fails to provide any account of human conflict, and defends an almost theological view of the importance of humanity in the universe that is incompatible with a scientific perspective.