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Millennium Journal of International Studies

Challenges to a Quantum-Theoretic Social Theory

Badredine Arfi

Published Jul 13, 2018• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A key claim that Alexander Wendt makes in his book Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology is that he is not using the 'quantum' as a metaphor.Nor is he drawing analogies either.He argues that he is constructing a quantum theory of the human subject and social structures through a quantum-theoretic explanation of consciousness undergirded by a panpsychist hypothesis of primitive protoconsciousness.In this article I show how Wendt's insistence that he is developing a literally-speaking quantum-theoretic approach presents him with a number of must-notignore challenges that originate in quantum theory.I specifically discuss three challenges

DOI
10.1177/0305829818781691

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A key claim that Alexander Wendt makes in his book Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology is that he is not using the 'quantum' as a metaphor.Nor is he drawing analogies either.He argues that he is constructing a quantum theory of the human subject and social structures through a quantum-theoretic explanation of consciousness undergirded by a panpsychist hypothesis of primitive protoconsciousness.In this article I show how Wendt's insistence that he is developing a literally-speaking quantum-theoretic approach presents him with a number of must-notignore challenges that originate in quantum theory.I specifically discuss three challenges
There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book, Alexander Wendt challenges this assumption by proposing that consciousness is, in fact, a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon. In the first half of the book, Wendt justifies the insertion of quantum theory into social scientific debates, introduces social scientists to quantum theory and the philosophical controversy about its interpretation, and then defends the quantum consciousness hypothesis against the orthodox, classical approach to the mind-body problem. In the second half, he develops the implications of this metaphysical perspective for the nature of language and the agent-structure problem in social ontology. Wendt's argument is a revolutionary development which raises fundamental questions about the nature of social life and the work of those who study it.
Abstract Alexander Wendt suggests that an emerging field of research on quantum consciousness may have important implications for our understanding of the social world as well. He wants us to consider that the operations of the brain are not “classical” but rather quantum‐mechanical, and that this sheds light on the social worker as well. This article casts doubt on these claims. First, the idea of panpsychism (all physical things possess features of consciousness) is implausible on its face. Second, the findings of “quantum decision theory” are much more limited than Wendt recognizes. Third, the biological quantum effects currently subject to investigation are limited in their application to brains and persons by unavoidable limits of time and space scale on quantum effects. The “brain as quantum computer” or “brain as wave function” theory is very implausible given current knowledge.
Abstract Alexander Wendt claims that quantum physics explains deep mysteries about human consciousness and offers a radical new understanding of human behavior and social interaction. However, the claims rest on flawed interpretations of quantum theory, fringe literatures and metaphorical, almost mystical uses of quantum concepts and buzzwords. He fails to provide any account of human conflict, and defends an almost theological view of the importance of humanity in the universe that is incompatible with a scientific perspective.
Abstract I discuss the revolutionary implications of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science for social theory. These center on the significance given to society as a possibility space in which observable social reality amounts to quantum decoherent states in the system. I discuss how Wendt radicalises social constructivism and goes considerably beyond Bourdieu's conceptions of society as a field. A signature feature in Wendt's theory, the state as a hologram, comports well with the implied view of the social order in much public opinion and market research. In this respect, Wendt's theory is very attuned to the spirit of our times.
Introduction The central claim of this book is that all intentional phenomena are quantum mechanical. That goes both for the private thoughts inside our heads and for public or collective intentions like norms, culture, and language, which we might generically call institutions. I suggested in Chapter 1 that by virtue of their dependence on consciousness, a classical, materialist ontology cannot explain these phenomena, and as such from that perspective they must be epiphenomenal or illusions. In the rest of this book I show that a quantum, panpsychist ontology can provide a physical basis for what we all know to be true, which is that both private and collective intentions are part of the natural order. The elementary parts of social ontology are human beings in their biological individuality, which in this Part I consider in abstraction from their lived social contexts. By taking humans out of their natural habitat I aim to focus attention on what we bring to the social table simply by virtue of being organisms of a certain kind. The abstract individual is a common enough starting point in classical social theory (think Hobbes and the state of nature). However, it might seem an odd place to begin a quantum social theory, given the holism of quantum phenomena, both “all the way down” in having no elementary parts, and “all the way across” in universal non-locality. What look like separate organisms are just local decoherence effects of quantum fields; everything really is related to everything else. In that light the abstract individual appears not just as an abstraction, but as positively occluding what “the individual” really is. However, there is a difference between what is true of a universal ontology and what is practically relevant to specifically socialontologies, which are constrained by the properties of their constituent organisms. Unlike some organisms, humans live in highly interdependent societies, and most of what is interesting about us is socially constituted as well.