Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

Measurement and the Interpretation of States

Published Sep 8, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A typical experimental run consists of state preparation followed by measurement. The former of these operations was analyzed in the preceding chapter, and the latter will now be treated. An analysis of measurement is required for completeness, but even more important, it turns out to be very useful in elucidating the correct interpretation of the concept of a state in quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1142/9789814578592_0009

Related papers

Measurement and the Interpretation of States

A typical experimental run consists of state preparation followed by measurement. The former of these operations was analyzed in the preceding chapter, and the latter will now be treated. An analysis of measurement is required for completeness, but even more important, it turns out to be very useful in elucidating the correct interpretation of the concept of a state in quantum mechanics.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Mar 1, 1998•0 citations

The measurement problem in quantum mechanics

Gennaro Auletta, Mauro Fortunato, Giorgio Parisi A

In most textbooks, measurement does not receive the full attention it deserves and sometimes is even not treated at all, apart a brief and cryptic mention of the “reduction of the wave packet.” However, in the last decades, the situation has profoundly changed and it is time to consider measurement a fundamental part of quantum mechanics, even, to a certain extent, an important generalization of the traditional theory (see also Chs. 14–15). This chapter consists of three major parts. In the first block (Secs. 9.1–9.4) we develop the main physical features of the measurement process: the heart of the argument is here represented by the aspects related to the interpretation. In the second part (Secs. 9.5–9.8) we discuss several special (and partly interdependent) topics of measurement: the heart here is represented by experimental aspects. In the third part (Secs. 9.9–9.12) we deal with the measurement process on a more formal plane, making use, in particular, of the generalization represented by the concepts of effect and positive operator valued measure (POVM). As we have said, the measurement problem is one of the most fundamental issues in the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics (as described in Sec. 9.1) and has a long history that will be examined in Sec. 9.2. In this context, the existence of apparently paradoxical quantum states comes about: the so-called Schrödinger cat states (see Sec. 9.3).

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 16, 2009•1 citation

Measurements and Quantum States: Part I

Henry Margenau

Although there is a complete consensus among working physicists with respect to the practical and operational meanings of quantum states, and also a rather loosely formulated general philosophic view called the Copenhagen interpretation, a great deal of confusion and divergence of opinions exist as to the details of the measurement process and its effects upon quantum states. This paper reviews the current expositions of the measurement problem, limiting itself for lack of space primarily to the writings of physicists; it calls attention to inconsistencies and proposes resolutions. Except for a summary of the properties of statistical matrices which are needed in Part II, the first part is non-mathematical and deals largely with two kinds of probability, reducible and irreducible probabilities, which need to be distinguished for a proper understanding of the measurement act.

Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 1963•109 citations

Change without time. Relationalism and field quantization

Johannes Simon

The nature of time has long been debated in human history and nowadays is considered of central importance for understanding quantum gravity. We focus on and advocate the relational concept of time, which was put forward in the 17th century in opposition to Newton's absolute time, and only in 1990 explored in a quantum mechanical framework by Carlo Rovelli. After a historical introduction the mathematical models of time are carefully analyzed in chapter 1, followed by a discussion of the role of time played in fundamental theories. Using as an example nonrelativistic mechanics, the process of parametrization is explained, leading to a separation of a 'canonical time coordinate' from an arbitrary evolution parameter. The discussion of the role of time in special and general relativity as well as in quantum mechanics shows that more fundamental theories use less structure of time. This is followed by an exposition of the history of the relational concept of time, which negates the existence of an absolute duration and therefore often is called "timeless". Next it is shown how fundamental theories can be formulated and re-interpreted using this concept. We put emphasis on the hitherto neglected connection between relationalism and non-extensibility, while absolute time is shown to be unproblematic in classical mechanics just because of the possibility to extend the system without changing its nature. We conclude chapter 1 with a new axiomatic basis for the construction of time observables based on a simultaneity relation between 'observations', which are treated as a primitive concept and intuitively correspond to measurement events, but without knowing 'when' these events occur. There is no fundamental time observable; any observable qualifies as a time observable, if it allows to separate all instants. Chapter 2 gives a brief account of three main problems connected with time: a) The problem of the arrow of time. This has to be disentangled from the problem of irreversibility: a solution of the latter essentially excludes cyclic motions and is required for a solution of the former, which consists in showing that a fundamental direction between any two non-identical instants is physically meaningful. We give a formal definition of the arrow of time. This classical analysis is followed by a review of the problem of the arrow of time in quantum theory, where the situation becomes more complicated because of indeterminism. The discussion shows that there is no experimental evidence for a fundamental arrow of time, so that no contradiction with the relational concept of time arises. b) The problem of time measurement, which is of particular importance for the relational approach, in which time has no reality except if measured by a clock. In quantum theory useful time operators seem to be possible only within the more general formalism of positive operator valued measures (POVM). Clocks based on an oscillation mechanism do however require phase measurements; quantum phase operators can be defined as certain POVMs. Phase difference operators do also exist in the traditional Hilbert space formalism, if another quantization is used, as is done with relational quantization. c) The problem of quantum gravity is sketched only briefly. Chapter 3 introduces and discusses a model of Rovelli consisting of two oscillators with no external time. In this model one oscillator is considered as a clock and defines a relational time for the other one. In the first section we introduce this model and generalize it to a free massless scalar field in one dimension. We establish the relation between a single field mode and the infrared behaviour of the field through constants of motion. In the second section after a short review of canonical quantization we review Rovelli's quantization and generalize it to the free field. We could not prove the existence of the quantization map, but calculations using computer algebra indicate that the quantization does exist. For an enlarged algebra we are able to prove the nonexistence of a quantization map similar to a proof by Groenewold and van Hove. In chapter 4 we observe that a clock time always requires infinitely many degrees of freedom, and we make the hypothesis that a time observable is given by the infrared behaviour of quantum fields, leading to a classical notion of time when using algebraic quantum mechanics. This does however not solve the main problem of quantum relationalism: Which conditions determine a particular evolution?

•Jan 1, 2005•1 citation

Measurement and Quantum States

Yorick Hardy, Willi-Hans Steeb

The interpretation of measurements in quantum mechanics is still under discussion (Healey [84], Bell [9], Redhead [136]). Besides the Copenhagen interpretation we have the many-worlds interpretations (Everett interpretations), the modal interpretations, the decoherence interpretations, the interpretations in terms of (nonlocal) hidden variables, the quantum logical interpretations. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Birkhäuser Basel eBooks•Jan 1, 2001•0 citations

The Case for Quantum State Realism

Morgan C. Tait

I argue for a realist interpretation of the quantum state. I begin by reviewing and critically evaluating two arguments for an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, the first derived from the so-called ‘measurement problem’, and the second from the concept of local causality. I argue that existing antirealist interpretations do not solve the measurement problem. Furthermore, I argue that it is possible to construct a local, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, using methods borrowed from quantum field theory and based on John S. Bell’s concept of ‘local beables’.\nIf the quantum state is interpreted subjectively, then the probabilities it associates with experimental outcomes are themselves subjective. I address the prospects for developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities based on the Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem. Epistemic interpretations of the quantum state can be divided into those that are epistemic with respect to underlying ontic states, and those that are epistemic with respect to measurement outcomes. The Pusey Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places serious constraints on the former family of interpretations. I identify an important explanatory gap in the latter sort of interpretation. In particular, if the quantum state is a subjective representation of beliefs about future experimental outcomes, then it is not clear why those experimenters who use quantum mechanics should be better able to negotiate the world than those who do not.\nI then turn to the task of articulating a positive argument for the thesis of quantum state realism. I begin by articulating a minimal set of conditions that any realist interpretation must meet. One assumption built into the PBR result is that systems prepared in a given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties, which may be completely or incompletely described by the quantum state. Antirealist interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with the PBR result. A compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be made on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of phenomena described by quantum mechanics that strongly suggest that the quantum state is genuinely representational in character.

•Jan 1, 2012•3 citations
A typical experimental run consists of state preparation followed by measurement. The former of these operations was analyzed in the preceding chapter, and the latter will now be treated. An analysis of measurement is required for completeness, but even more important, it turns out to be very useful in elucidating the correct interpretation of the concept of a state in quantum mechanics.
In most textbooks, measurement does not receive the full attention it deserves and sometimes is even not treated at all, apart a brief and cryptic mention of the “reduction of the wave packet.” However, in the last decades, the situation has profoundly changed and it is time to consider measurement a fundamental part of quantum mechanics, even, to a certain extent, an important generalization of the traditional theory (see also Chs. 14–15). This chapter consists of three major parts. In the first block (Secs. 9.1–9.4) we develop the main physical features of the measurement process: the heart of the argument is here represented by the aspects related to the interpretation. In the second part (Secs. 9.5–9.8) we discuss several special (and partly interdependent) topics of measurement: the heart here is represented by experimental aspects. In the third part (Secs. 9.9–9.12) we deal with the measurement process on a more formal plane, making use, in particular, of the generalization represented by the concepts of effect and positive operator valued measure (POVM). As we have said, the measurement problem is one of the most fundamental issues in the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics (as described in Sec. 9.1) and has a long history that will be examined in Sec. 9.2. In this context, the existence of apparently paradoxical quantum states comes about: the so-called Schrödinger cat states (see Sec. 9.3).
Although there is a complete consensus among working physicists with respect to the practical and operational meanings of quantum states, and also a rather loosely formulated general philosophic view called the Copenhagen interpretation, a great deal of confusion and divergence of opinions exist as to the details of the measurement process and its effects upon quantum states. This paper reviews the current expositions of the measurement problem, limiting itself for lack of space primarily to the writings of physicists; it calls attention to inconsistencies and proposes resolutions. Except for a summary of the properties of statistical matrices which are needed in Part II, the first part is non-mathematical and deals largely with two kinds of probability, reducible and irreducible probabilities, which need to be distinguished for a proper understanding of the measurement act.
The nature of time has long been debated in human history and nowadays is considered of central importance for understanding quantum gravity. We focus on and advocate the relational concept of time, which was put forward in the 17th century in opposition to Newton's absolute time, and only in 1990 explored in a quantum mechanical framework by Carlo Rovelli. After a historical introduction the mathematical models of time are carefully analyzed in chapter 1, followed by a discussion of the role of time played in fundamental theories. Using as an example nonrelativistic mechanics, the process of parametrization is explained, leading to a separation of a 'canonical time coordinate' from an arbitrary evolution parameter. The discussion of the role of time in special and general relativity as well as in quantum mechanics shows that more fundamental theories use less structure of time. This is followed by an exposition of the history of the relational concept of time, which negates the existence of an absolute duration and therefore often is called "timeless". Next it is shown how fundamental theories can be formulated and re-interpreted using this concept. We put emphasis on the hitherto neglected connection between relationalism and non-extensibility, while absolute time is shown to be unproblematic in classical mechanics just because of the possibility to extend the system without changing its nature. We conclude chapter 1 with a new axiomatic basis for the construction of time observables based on a simultaneity relation between 'observations', which are treated as a primitive concept and intuitively correspond to measurement events, but without knowing 'when' these events occur. There is no fundamental time observable; any observable qualifies as a time observable, if it allows to separate all instants. Chapter 2 gives a brief account of three main problems connected with time: a) The problem of the arrow of time. This has to be disentangled from the problem of irreversibility: a solution of the latter essentially excludes cyclic motions and is required for a solution of the former, which consists in showing that a fundamental direction between any two non-identical instants is physically meaningful. We give a formal definition of the arrow of time. This classical analysis is followed by a review of the problem of the arrow of time in quantum theory, where the situation becomes more complicated because of indeterminism. The discussion shows that there is no experimental evidence for a fundamental arrow of time, so that no contradiction with the relational concept of time arises. b) The problem of time measurement, which is of particular importance for the relational approach, in which time has no reality except if measured by a clock. In quantum theory useful time operators seem to be possible only within the more general formalism of positive operator valued measures (POVM). Clocks based on an oscillation mechanism do however require phase measurements; quantum phase operators can be defined as certain POVMs. Phase difference operators do also exist in the traditional Hilbert space formalism, if another quantization is used, as is done with relational quantization. c) The problem of quantum gravity is sketched only briefly. Chapter 3 introduces and discusses a model of Rovelli consisting of two oscillators with no external time. In this model one oscillator is considered as a clock and defines a relational time for the other one. In the first section we introduce this model and generalize it to a free massless scalar field in one dimension. We establish the relation between a single field mode and the infrared behaviour of the field through constants of motion. In the second section after a short review of canonical quantization we review Rovelli's quantization and generalize it to the free field. We could not prove the existence of the quantization map, but calculations using computer algebra indicate that the quantization does exist. For an enlarged algebra we are able to prove the nonexistence of a quantization map similar to a proof by Groenewold and van Hove. In chapter 4 we observe that a clock time always requires infinitely many degrees of freedom, and we make the hypothesis that a time observable is given by the infrared behaviour of quantum fields, leading to a classical notion of time when using algebraic quantum mechanics. This does however not solve the main problem of quantum relationalism: Which conditions determine a particular evolution?
The interpretation of measurements in quantum mechanics is still under discussion (Healey [84], Bell [9], Redhead [136]). Besides the Copenhagen interpretation we have the many-worlds interpretations (Everett interpretations), the modal interpretations, the decoherence interpretations, the interpretations in terms of (nonlocal) hidden variables, the quantum logical interpretations. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
I argue for a realist interpretation of the quantum state. I begin by reviewing and critically evaluating two arguments for an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, the first derived from the so-called ‘measurement problem’, and the second from the concept of local causality. I argue that existing antirealist interpretations do not solve the measurement problem. Furthermore, I argue that it is possible to construct a local, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, using methods borrowed from quantum field theory and based on John S. Bell’s concept of ‘local beables’.\nIf the quantum state is interpreted subjectively, then the probabilities it associates with experimental outcomes are themselves subjective. I address the prospects for developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities based on the Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem. Epistemic interpretations of the quantum state can be divided into those that are epistemic with respect to underlying ontic states, and those that are epistemic with respect to measurement outcomes. The Pusey Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places serious constraints on the former family of interpretations. I identify an important explanatory gap in the latter sort of interpretation. In particular, if the quantum state is a subjective representation of beliefs about future experimental outcomes, then it is not clear why those experimenters who use quantum mechanics should be better able to negotiate the world than those who do not.\nI then turn to the task of articulating a positive argument for the thesis of quantum state realism. I begin by articulating a minimal set of conditions that any realist interpretation must meet. One assumption built into the PBR result is that systems prepared in a given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties, which may be completely or incompletely described by the quantum state. Antirealist interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with the PBR result. A compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be made on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of phenomena described by quantum mechanics that strongly suggest that the quantum state is genuinely representational in character.