In Chapter 6 I presented a proposal for how and why grotesque states do not occur in Nature. In subsequent chapters I explored consequences and found subsidiary requirements, such as Cauchy distributed kicks. To find out whether all or part of our scheme is the way Nature works, we turn to experiment. How to turn to experiment is not so obvious, since the basic dynamical law, ψ → exp(− iHt/ħ )ψ, is the same as for most other theories. Our basic assertion concerns not the dynamical law but the selection of states. Therefore it is that assertion that must be tested. For example, one way is to set up a situation where the states we demand, the ‘special’ states, cannot occur. Then what happens? Another part of our theory is the probability postulate, and this deals not only with the existence of special states but with their abundance. It enters in the recovery of standard probabilities but has far reaching consequences that may well lead to the best tests of the theory. Such tests arise in the context of EPR situations. The experimental tests fall into the following categories. Precluding a class of special states . This should prevent a class of outcomes. If the changes in the system (due to precluding the class of special states) do not change the predictions of the Copenhagen interpretation, then this provides a test. In particular, with a class of special states precluded, our theory forbids the associated outcome.
In Chapter 6 I presented a proposal for how and why grotesque states do not occur in Nature. In subsequent chapters I explored consequences and found subsidiary requirements, such as Cauchy distributed kicks. To find out whether all or part of our scheme is the way Nature works, we turn to experiment. How to turn to experiment is not so obvious, since the basic dynamical law, ψ → exp(− iHt/ħ )ψ, is the same as for most other theories. Our basic assertion concerns not the dynamical law but the selection of states. Therefore it is that assertion that must be tested. For example, one way is to set up a situation where the states we demand, the ‘special’ states, cannot occur. Then what happens? Another part of our theory is the probability postulate, and this deals not only with the existence of special states but with their abundance. It enters in the recovery of standard probabilities but has far reaching consequences that may well lead to the best tests of the theory. Such tests arise in the context of EPR situations. The experimental tests fall into the following categories. Precluding a class of special states . This should prevent a class of outcomes. If the changes in the system (due to precluding the class of special states) do not change the predictions of the Copenhagen interpretation, then this provides a test. In particular, with a class of special states precluded, our theory forbids the associated outcome.
Introduction In spite of its wonderful agreement with every experiment performed so far, standard quantum theory (SQT) fails to describe events and to define the circumstances under which such events occur [171]. It is the linearity of Schrödinger evolution that lies, as we have seen, at the root of the problem. A state vector always evolves to become a linear superposition of the states corresponding to several possible outcomes of a measurement, and it is only when an experiment is actually done that one of these possible outcomes is realized at a particular instant. Thereupon the state has to be changed to the one corresponding to the particular outcome in order to follow its subsequent evolution. This additional information is not contained in the theory and has to be obtained from outside . This means that the theory is unable to predict when an event will occur. All it can predict is that if an event occurs, the possible outcomes and their probabilities are such and such. Since events do occur in every experiment, there is something missing from the theory. Since a state vector can be written as the linear sum of a complete set of basis states and these basis states can be chosen in a number of ways, each of which corresponds to a different set of outcomes, the theory also fails to tell us how to choose the preferred basis .
Why should special states occur as initial conditions in every physical situation in which they are needed? Half this book has been devoted to making the points that initial conditions may not be as controllable as they seem; that there may be constraints on microscopic initial conditions; that this would not have been noticed; that such constraints can arise from two-time or future conditioning; that in our universe such future conditioning may well be present, although, as remarked, cryptic . In this chapter I will take up more detailed questions: what future conditions could give rise to the need for our ‘special’ states, and why should those particular future conditions be imposed. Before going into this there is a point that needs to be made. Everything in the present chapter could be wrong and the thesis of Chapter 6 nevertheless correct. It is one thing to avoid grotesque states (and solve the quantum measurement problem) by means of special states and it is another provide a rationale for their occurrence. I say this not only to highlight the conceptual dependencies of the theses in this book, but also because there is a good deal of hand waving in the coming chapter and I don't want it to reflect unfavorably on the basic proposal. As pointed out earlier, the usual thermodynamic arrow of time can be phrased as follows: initial states are arbitrary, final states special.
The existence of ‘special’ states can be established with ordinary quantum mechanics. We seek particular microscopic states of large systems that have the property that they evolve to only one or another macroscopic outcome, when other microstates of a more common sort (having the same initial macrostate) would have given grotesque states. Justifying the hypothesis that Nature chooses these special states as initial conditions is another matter. In this chapter we stick to the narrower issue of whether there exist states that can do the job, irrespective of whether they occur in practice. In Section 7.1 we give several explicit examples. In Section 6.2 we exhibited an apparatus model and its special states. Here we look at the decay of an unstable quantum state, not as a single degree of freedom in a potential, but with elements of the environment taken into account as well. We also study another popular many-body system, the spin boson model. This has extensive physical applications and especially with respect to Josephson junctions has been used to address quantum measurement questions. A single degree of freedom in a potential, by the way, does not generally lend itself to ‘specializing,’ and an example is shown below. In recent years, exotic non-local effects of quantum mechanics have been exhibited experimentally. Behind many of these lies entanglement , the property of a wave function of several variables that it does not factor into a product of functions of these variables separately.
Pure quantum evolution is deterministic, ψ → exp (—iHt/ħ)ψ , but as for classical mechanics probability enters because a given macroscopic initial condition contains microscopic states that lead to different outcomes; the relative probability of those outcomes equals the relative abundance of the microscopic states for each outcome. This is the postulated basis for the recovery of the usual quantum probabilities, as discussed in Chapter 6. In this chapter we take up the question of whether the allowable microstates (the ‘special’ states) do indeed come with the correct abundance. To recap: ‘special’ states are microstates not leading to superpositions of macroscopically different states (‘grotesque’ states). For a given experiment and for each macroscopically distinct outcome of that experiment these states form a subspace. We wish to show that the dimension of that subspace is the relative probability of that outcome. This is an ambitious goal, especially considering the effort needed to establish that there are any special states—the subject of Chapter 7. As remarked there, the special states exhibited are likely to be only a small and atypical fraction of all special states in the physical apparatus being modeled (e.g., the cloud chamber). In one example (the decay model) there is a remarkable matching of dimension and conventional probability, but I would not make too much of that. What is especially challenging about the present task is that we seek a universal distribution.
Basic scientific theories usually start with a set of hypotheses or “postulates.” There is generally no logical reason, apart from internal consistency, that can be given to justify such postulates absolutely. They come from ‘revelations’ in the minds of ‘geniuses,’ most likely with hints from Nature based on extensive careful observations. Their general validity can only be established through experimental verification. If numerous rigorously derived logical consequences of a very small set of postulates all agree with experimental observations without exception, one is inclined to accept these postulates as correct descriptions of the laws of Nature and use them confidently to explain and predict other natural phenomena. Quantum mechanics is no exception. It is based on a few postulates. For the purpose of the present discussion, we begin with three basic postulates involving: the “state functions,” “operators,” and “equations of motion.” In this chapter, this set of basic postulates and some of the corollaries and related definitions of terms are introduced and discussed. We will first simply state these postulates and introduce some of the related mathematical tools and concepts that are needed to arrive at their logical consequences later. To those who have not been exposed to the subject of quantum mechanics before, each of these postulates taken by itself may appear puzzling and meaningless at first. It should be borne in mind, however, that it is the collection of these postulates as a whole that forms the foundations of quantum mechanics.
We now have under our belts several interpretations of quantum mechanics, each requiring, or anyhow advocating, some understanding of quantum probabilities. In the next two chapters, I will consider some connections among various interpretations of quantum probabilities and non-locality. I do so in the context of the well-known EPR–Bohm experiment, though it is worth emphasizing at the start that non-locality is very likely the rule rather than the exception for quantum-mechanical systems. Entanglement of systems occurs not only in the confines of a laboratory, but also in the course of quite typical interactions among quantum-mechanical systems. Nonetheless, the EPR-Bohm experiment shines a bright light on the phenomenon of non-locality, and is therefore the most useful context in which to explore the relation between probability and non-locality. In this chapter, I consider models of the EPR–Bohm experiment that deliver probabilities for the various outcomes given the initial state of the pair of particles. In the next chapter, I consider fully dynamical models, i.e., ones that provide a dynamics for the complete state of the pair of particles as well as probabilities for various outcomes based on these complete states. The EPR–Bohm experiment The EPR–Bohm experiment is well known, but some observations about it are important for later.