Why should special states occur as initial conditions in every physical situation in which they are needed? Half this book has been devoted to making the points that initial conditions may not be as controllable as they seem; that there may be constraints on microscopic initial conditions; that this would not have been noticed; that such constraints can arise from two-time or future conditioning; that in our universe such future conditioning may well be present, although, as remarked, cryptic . In this chapter I will take up more detailed questions: what future conditions could give rise to the need for our ‘special’ states, and why should those particular future conditions be imposed. Before going into this there is a point that needs to be made. Everything in the present chapter could be wrong and the thesis of Chapter 6 nevertheless correct. It is one thing to avoid grotesque states (and solve the quantum measurement problem) by means of special states and it is another provide a rationale for their occurrence. I say this not only to highlight the conceptual dependencies of the theses in this book, but also because there is a good deal of hand waving in the coming chapter and I don't want it to reflect unfavorably on the basic proposal. As pointed out earlier, the usual thermodynamic arrow of time can be phrased as follows: initial states are arbitrary, final states special.
Why should special states occur as initial conditions in every physical situation in which they are needed? Half this book has been devoted to making the points that initial conditions may not be as controllable as they seem; that there may be constraints on microscopic initial conditions; that this would not have been noticed; that such constraints can arise from two-time or future conditioning; that in our universe such future conditioning may well be present, although, as remarked, cryptic . In this chapter I will take up more detailed questions: what future conditions could give rise to the need for our ‘special’ states, and why should those particular future conditions be imposed. Before going into this there is a point that needs to be made. Everything in the present chapter could be wrong and the thesis of Chapter 6 nevertheless correct. It is one thing to avoid grotesque states (and solve the quantum measurement problem) by means of special states and it is another provide a rationale for their occurrence. I say this not only to highlight the conceptual dependencies of the theses in this book, but also because there is a good deal of hand waving in the coming chapter and I don't want it to reflect unfavorably on the basic proposal. As pointed out earlier, the usual thermodynamic arrow of time can be phrased as follows: initial states are arbitrary, final states special.
The existence of ‘special’ states can be established with ordinary quantum mechanics. We seek particular microscopic states of large systems that have the property that they evolve to only one or another macroscopic outcome, when other microstates of a more common sort (having the same initial macrostate) would have given grotesque states. Justifying the hypothesis that Nature chooses these special states as initial conditions is another matter. In this chapter we stick to the narrower issue of whether there exist states that can do the job, irrespective of whether they occur in practice. In Section 7.1 we give several explicit examples. In Section 6.2 we exhibited an apparatus model and its special states. Here we look at the decay of an unstable quantum state, not as a single degree of freedom in a potential, but with elements of the environment taken into account as well. We also study another popular many-body system, the spin boson model. This has extensive physical applications and especially with respect to Josephson junctions has been used to address quantum measurement questions. A single degree of freedom in a potential, by the way, does not generally lend itself to ‘specializing,’ and an example is shown below. In recent years, exotic non-local effects of quantum mechanics have been exhibited experimentally. Behind many of these lies entanglement , the property of a wave function of several variables that it does not factor into a product of functions of these variables separately.
Less than meets the eye If even some of the ideas presented here are correct, the world is different from what it seems. The major theses of the book, on time's arrows and on quantum measurement theory, are unified by the notion of cryptic constraints . We see, sense, specify, macroscopic states, but what we predict about these states depends on an important assumption concerning their microscopic situation. The assumption is that the actual microstate is equally likely to be any of those consistent with the macrostate. And I say, not so. For various reasons, both classical and quantum, many otherwise-possible microstates are eliminated. As presented in detail in previous chapters, such elimination impacts many areas of physics, from the cosmos to the atom. But we also make the point that this elimination can be difficult to notice and in particular there is no experimental evidence that confirms the usual assumption. By an explicit example on a model (Fig. 4.3.2), we show that a future constraint eliminating 98% of the microstates can go completely unnoticed. My expectation is that this fundamental change in the foundations of statistical mechanics is needed. Whether or not it takes the forms I've proposed will be determined by future investigations. In the next section I will review open problems for the program implicit in this book. The tone will be that used in speaking with colleagues: an attempt to be frank about difficulties and a willingness to be wildly speculative.
Although the variational principles of classical mechanics lead to two-time boundary value problems, when dealing with the real world everyone knows you should use initial conditions. Not surprisingly, the eighteenth-century statements of classical variational principles were invested with religious notions of teleology: guidance from future paths not taken could only be divine. The Feynman path integral formulation of quantum mechanics makes it less preposterous that a particle can explore non-extremal paths; moreover, it is most naturally formulated using information at two times. In the previous chapter, use of the two-time boundary value problem was proposed as a logical prerequisite for considering arrow-of-time questions. Perhaps this is no less teleological than Maupertuis's principle, except that we remain neutral on how and why those conditions are imposed. In this chapter we deal with the technical aspects of solving two-time boundary value problems. In classical mechanics you get into rich existence questions—sometimes there is no solution, sometimes many. For stochastic dynamics the formulation is perhaps easiest, which is odd considering that this is the language most suited to irreversible behavior. Our ultimate interest is the quantum two-time problem and this is nearly intractable. Later in the book I will propose that the universe is most simply described as the solution of a two-time boundary value problem. A natural reaction is to wonder whether this is too constraining. Given that our (lower entropy) past already cuts down the number of possible microstates, are there sufficient microstates to meet a future condition as well?
There are several theories or processes which may underlie quantum mechanics and make it deterministic. Some references are given in the main text. Any such theory, plus a number of reasonable assumptions, implies the existence of what I have called ``special" states. The assumptions are conservation laws, obedience (up to a point) of Schrodinger's equation, and a single world, in the sense of the many worlds interpretation (the last one a consequence of any deterministic theory). This article also, for clarity, gives an example of a ``special" state. There is an experimental test of the ``special" state theory.
Pure quantum evolution is deterministic, ψ → exp (—iHt/ħ)ψ , but as for classical mechanics probability enters because a given macroscopic initial condition contains microscopic states that lead to different outcomes; the relative probability of those outcomes equals the relative abundance of the microscopic states for each outcome. This is the postulated basis for the recovery of the usual quantum probabilities, as discussed in Chapter 6. In this chapter we take up the question of whether the allowable microstates (the ‘special’ states) do indeed come with the correct abundance. To recap: ‘special’ states are microstates not leading to superpositions of macroscopically different states (‘grotesque’ states). For a given experiment and for each macroscopically distinct outcome of that experiment these states form a subspace. We wish to show that the dimension of that subspace is the relative probability of that outcome. This is an ambitious goal, especially considering the effort needed to establish that there are any special states—the subject of Chapter 7. As remarked there, the special states exhibited are likely to be only a small and atypical fraction of all special states in the physical apparatus being modeled (e.g., the cloud chamber). In one example (the decay model) there is a remarkable matching of dimension and conventional probability, but I would not make too much of that. What is especially challenging about the present task is that we seek a universal distribution.
Mature theories of physical science associate states with systems, for instance with particles or waves in classical physics. The quantities whose values comprise states in classical mechanics, namely position and momentum, are chosen, first of all, for predictive purposes. Everything that one would want to say about classical systems can, it seems, be said in terms of properties: specification of the properties of a system gives a complete specification of its state, and conversely. Quantum mechanics associates states with physical systems; whatever else these might be, systems are the particulars which bear physical properties. The former is non-reduced state, the quantum state proper, while the latter is the reduced state, the class of quantitative properties possessed by the system. The state therefore determines which quantities and which properties are instantiated. The non-reductive account of states was initially appealing because it seemed to promise some additional explanatory scope.