The perhaps most important lesson of brain theory is constructivism: reality is a pseudoreality because the "intuitive forms of perception" implicit in the dynamics of the brain constrain reality's properties. A cold lizard sees the world differently than a warm lizard does. Radical constructivism has so far been confined to the macroscopic realm. A "microscopic" version is proposed here. In it, the reversible micro dynamics which underlies the irreversible macro dynamics of the brain is focused on. For simplicity, a classical kinetic universe is presupposed. As in macro constructivism, an "interface" is formed which depends both on the observer-external dynamics and on the dynamics that goes on within the observer. Owing to the microscopic nature of the dynamics in question, the effects it exerts on the interface are by definition incorrigible by macroscopic means. That is, the effects cannot be recognized under ordinary circumstances by the observer in question. Specifically, the micro dynamics in the observer is subject to "effective time reversals" on a very short time scale. This is tantamount to the existence of a rapid "vacillation" of external causality. Hence the spatiotemporal properties of the environment are distorted in the interface in a highly nonlinear fashion. The predictions made by microconstructivism (or, synonymously, endophysics) include known and unknown features. Two features familiar from quantum mechanics fall in the first class (a unit-action noise and nonlocality). The unexpected predictions include a "double" nonlocality. The main implication — existence of an "observer-relative objective reality" — is, therefore, falsifiable.
The perhaps most important lesson of brain theory is constructivism: reality is a pseudoreality because the "intuitive forms of perception" implicit in the dynamics of the brain constrain reality's properties. A cold lizard sees the world differently than a warm lizard does. Radical constructivism has so far been confined to the macroscopic realm. A "microscopic" version is proposed here. In it, the reversible micro dynamics which underlies the irreversible macro dynamics of the brain is focused on. For simplicity, a classical kinetic universe is presupposed. As in macro constructivism, an "interface" is formed which depends both on the observer-external dynamics and on the dynamics that goes on within the observer. Owing to the microscopic nature of the dynamics in question, the effects it exerts on the interface are by definition incorrigible by macroscopic means. That is, the effects cannot be recognized under ordinary circumstances by the observer in question. Specifically, the micro dynamics in the observer is subject to "effective time reversals" on a very short time scale. This is tantamount to the existence of a rapid "vacillation" of external causality. Hence the spatiotemporal properties of the environment are distorted in the interface in a highly nonlinear fashion. The predictions made by microconstructivism (or, synonymously, endophysics) include known and unknown features. Two features familiar from quantum mechanics fall in the first class (a unit-action noise and nonlocality). The unexpected predictions include a "double" nonlocality. The main implication — existence of an "observer-relative objective reality" — is, therefore, falsifiable.
A new science, endophysics, is introduced. Only if one is outside a nontrivial universe is a complete description of the latter possible — when you have it in your computer, for example. The laws that apply when you are an inside part are in general different: Endophysics is different from exophysics. Gödel's proof is the first example, in mathematics. In physics, it is desirable to have explicit observers included in the model world. Brain models are a case in point. Macroscopic brain models, however, are nonexplicit in general. Therefore an explicit microscopic universe is introduced. It is based on a one-dimensional Hamiltonian of the classical type in which "formal brains" can arise as explicit dissipative structures in the sense of Prigogine. The pertinent endophysics is still largely unknown. As a first step, the implications of the fact that the observer contains indistinguishable particles (Gibbs symmetry) are considered. Campbell's postulate — a fast back-and-forth vacillation of the time's axis on the micro level — is obtained as an implication. Nelson's postulate and hence the Schrödinger equation follow as corollaries. Thus, a "nonlocal" interface can be generated by a local theory. Microscopic observer properties "percolate up" to affect the macroscopic spatiotomporal appearance of the world. Physics becomes dependent on brain theory.
An objective physics must keep the observer at bay. The goal of keeping the observer outside can, paradoxically, be achieved only if the observer is explicitly included in a larger picture — which then is observer-independent again. When proceeding in this way, one realizes that the world is necessarily defined only on the interface between the observer and the rest of the universe. Since this interface is inaccessible as an object, there seems to be no solution left for internal observers like us. We cannot step out of our own world in order to adopt the role of a "superobserver." Hence we cannot understand the world. Unexpectedly, there is a loophole: "model universes" can be set up which contain an explicit (microscopically specified) internal observer. As an example, it is possible to set up a classical molecular dynamics simulation of an excitable system which would act as a simplified "observer" in a larger artificial universe simulated in the same manner. One then, in addition to the observer, needs a "measuring apparatus" and an "object." The former could be a fluidic amplifier that acts like a power brake; the latter could be an ordinary particle in the universe in question that acts on the input piston of the pressure amplifier. (Three "reservoirs" would also be needed as an initial condition: "food" for the observer, a high pressure compartment to power the amplifier, and a set of "cool" particles allowing one to keep the first amplifier of the measuring chain sensitive for a while.) In such a scenario, the "interface" can be studied by us since we are on the outside. While it is still too early to do this explicitly in detail, it perhaps already makes sense to think about it and look at simplified cases. We may for example assume that all micromotions in the observer fall into two equivalence classes — backward and forward motion — that are pairwise identical under time reversal. This would occur, for example, if the observer consisted of many equal pendulums of the same period. Such an idealization is admissible for starters. Then, while in reality it is the observer who alternates between black and white time slices — in the sense that every motion in the observer repeats itself in the opposite direction — to the observer it is the rest of the universe which alternates between being time-inverted or not. That is, relative to the observer, the external reality is subject to a succession of rapid causality reversals. This impression will be incorrigible. The incorrigibility goes so far that even macroscopic records cannot correct for the "hallucinatory" impressions generated in the internal observer by the behavior of a micro-object. This is counterintuitive. At first sight there is no reason apparent why an "objectively presenting machinery" should not be able to overcome the limitation. However, a causality vacillation is "too deep" a property of the interface to be overridden by any auxiliary machinery in the universe in question. From this fact it follows that many objective features of the world (including macroscopic ones) which appear on the interface are only "observer-objective" but not really (exo) objective. Collectively, these properties form a set undetectable to the observer since the fact that they exist only for him is nowhere represented. In the absence of a "tag" they represent what could be called the "Kafkaesque part of physics." A cure for this disability is impossible to obtain from the inside of the universe in question. Nevertheless the inhabitants can embark on an endophysical program of their own in principle — if we assume they are sophisticated enough on the macro level (consisting, for example, of many excitable systems as an advanced neuronal network). That is, they can build a still lower level universe themselves. Endophysics therefore becomes "level invariant" science. In this way the inhabitants can begin to doubt the exo-objective nature of certain phenomena. In particular, "observer-centered" phenomena are likely to kindle their suspicion. Does it make sense in our own world to mark observer-centered phenomena with an "exophysical question mark" as well? At least five types of phenomena in our own world are "observer-centered." They each arise from a privilege, viz.: • Bohr's privilege ("Which reality am I to create by deciding to measure either the position or the momentum?") • Heisenberg's privilege ("Where in the chain am I to place the cut?") • Wheeler's privilege. ("For how long am I to wait before choosing what to measure?") • Bell's privilege ("Which nonlocal correlations at a distance am I to generate?") • Everett's privilege ("What choice of world am I happy with?") Analogs of all these suspicion-generating privileges exist in the model universe. The possibility of doing "meta-experiments" (as one would advise the inhabitants of the lower world to perform) therefore arises as an option for the inhabitants — as well as us. A glimpse of what lies behind the curtain is therefore accessible in principle, it appears.
Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.
Any limit to observer self-knowledge implies an uncertainty of external observation. It is proposed that for "homogeneous" observers made up of only a few types of mathematically equal particles, the external world suffers a distortion. The underlying reason is that the observer is effectively replaced by an "observers' ensemble" since he does not know his own state exactly. Between the elements of the ensemble the observer jumps back and forth with a finite rate of "self-permutation." Since the elements of the ensemble are pairwise identical under time reversal, "micro-time-reversals" exist. The consequence is that all measuring chains become "effectively reversible" for the observer. Hence all external objects are subject to "pseudodiffusion." The latter resembles the diffusion postulated as an axiom in stochastic mechanics. This axiom (Nelson's axiom) implies a version of quantum mechanics, as is well known. In consequence a version of quantum mechanics can be derived from classical-deterministic first principles. The question arises of whether a "bootstrap principle" (fixed point theorem) is needed in addition, fixing the value of the diffusion coefficient and hence "Planck's constant" in a universal fashion. However, a fixed value of Planck's constant exists already — in the world of the observer. Other properties of quantum mechanics (like Wheeler's "delayed choice" and Bell's "nonlocality") appear to be implicit, too. Thus, a deterministic local explanation of quantum mechanics is accessible in principle under one condition: that a distinction between two levels of reality (exo and endo), one valid externally and the other only for the internal observer, is introduced. In this case an external reality can, paradoxically, be chosen again, which is not unfamiliar since J. Willard Gibbs made serious use of it almost a century ago. A new principle of parsimony of the world would thereby become visible: The "fancy" things would be true only on the endo level. Quantum mechanics would become an observer-specific endo reality.
A new approach to the brain and the world is attempted. A chaotic Hamiltonian universe is set up in one dimension so that an internal observer — an excitable system — becomes amenable to complete understanding. The Gibbs symmetry and the Wigner symmetry, when taken into consideration explicitly, imply that to this observer, the world appears different from what holds good objectively — such as if one is doing a molecular dynamics simulation of the same system, and looking at it from the outside. Specifically, both stochastic mechanics and the quantum nonlocality turn out to be formal implications of the present artificial universe — which thereby qualifies as a local-deterministic hidden-variables approach to quantum mechanics at the same time. Bell's well-known impossibility theorem is circumvented because all quantum effects arising are nonexistent objectively. They are valid only within the "interface" that develops internally between the observer and the rest of the universe. Hence for the first time the Kantian notion that the world is objectively different from the way we perceive it can be demonstrated — not for our own world but for a lower level universe as it presents itself to an artificial observer living inside.
In this chapter, we're going to consider some traditional philosophical questions about the nature of reality, and see how the transactional picture can shed new light on these questions. So far, we've considered the distinction between the macroscopic world and the microscopic world. We've seen that classical physics describes the macroscopic world quite well, but that it fails to adequately describe the microscopic world of atoms and other fundamental components of matter. We've also noted that the world of appearance corresponds to the macroscopic realm describable by classical physics, while the underlying, hidden reality can be seen as corresponding to the quantum level. It turns out that this distinction between the macroscopic and microscopic realms, and the need for different physical theories to describe them, is directly relevant to some longstanding philosophical puzzles.