In relation to this debate perhaps the greatest significance and contribution of Bohm's causal interpretation of quantum mechanics 3 is that it not only exposes the arbitrary philosophical assumptions underlying the claims of the Copenhagen interpretation but also brings into relief the essentially new content of quantum mechanics, which is reflected in different ways in Bohr's interpretation. Indeed the claim that the quantum formalism itself requires us not only to abandon the quest for explanation of quantum phenomena but also the concepts of causality, continuity and the objective reality of individual micro-objects, is shown to be false. However the existence of the single counter-interpretation proposed by Bohm constitutes sufficient grounds for rejecting the absolute and final necessity of complementary description and indeterminacy, along with the inherent unanalysable and closed nature of quantum phenomena.
In relation to this debate perhaps the greatest significance and contribution of Bohm's causal interpretation of quantum mechanics 3 is that it not only exposes the arbitrary philosophical assumptions underlying the claims of the Copenhagen interpretation but also brings into relief the essentially new content of quantum mechanics, which is reflected in different ways in Bohr's interpretation. Indeed the claim that the quantum formalism itself requires us not only to abandon the quest for explanation of quantum phenomena but also the concepts of causality, continuity and the objective reality of individual micro-objects, is shown to be false. However the existence of the single counter-interpretation proposed by Bohm constitutes sufficient grounds for rejecting the absolute and final necessity of complementary description and indeterminacy, along with the inherent unanalysable and closed nature of quantum phenomena.
In previous chapters we presented and discussed the standard, generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which there exists in nature at the most fundamental level an irreducible and ineliminable indeterminism. Although we saw that what historically constituted the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is difficult to specify with precision, three central commitments do characterize it. (1) In general, no particle trajectories can exist in a space–time background. (2) No deterministic description of fundamental physical phenomena is possible. (3) There exists in the laws of the fundamental physical phenomena of nature an essential and ineliminable indeterminism or probability (unlike the probability of classical physics, that there reflects our ignorance of the finer details of complex physical phenomena). A flavor of these features of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can be gotten from the quotations at the beginning of Part VIII ( Some philosophical lessons from quantum mechanics ). On this view, it is in principle impossible to predict, say, the exact future behavior of an electron (that is, to give its position and velocity as functions of the time). According to the Copenhagen school, there can be no causal description of microphenomena in terms of a continuous space–time background (as there is in classical physics). It is generally believed that a causal interpretation of quantum mechanics is impossible, although no proof of this exists.
A brief account of the world view of classical physics is given first. We then recapitulate as to why the Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum mechanics had to renounce most of the attractive features of the clasical world view such as a causal description, locality, scientific realism and introduce a fundamental distinction between system and apparatus. The crucial role is played in this by the Bohr's insistence on the wavefunction providing the most complete description possible for an even individual system. The alternative of introducing extra dynamical variables, called hidden variables, in addition to the wavefunction of the system so as to be able to retain at least some of the desirable features of classical physics, is then explored. The first such successful attempt was that of Bohm in 1952 who showed that a realistic interpretation of the quantum mechanics can be given which maintains a causal description as well as does not treat systems and measuring appeartus differently. We begin with the construction of the Bohm's theory. He introduces particle positions as the hidden variables. The particle positions play a special role in Bohm theory. The particle trajectories are guided by the wavefunction. The Bohm theory is deterministic. The probability enters through a special assumption, ``quantum equilibrium'' hypothesis, for the initial conditions on the ensemble of particle trajectories. The ``wave or particle'' dilemma is resolved by a ``wave and particle'' resolution. The measurements in Bohm theory can be described without mysticism. Bohm's theory is however nonlocal.
Quantum theory is open to different interpretations, and this paper reviews some of the points of contention. The standard interpretation of quantum physics assumes that the quantum world is characterized by absolute indeterminism and that quantum systems exist objectively only when they are being measured or observed. David Bohm's ontological interpretation of quantum theory rejects both these assumptions. Bohm's theory that quantum events are party determined by subtler forces operating at deeper levels of reality ties in with John Eccles ' theory that our minds exist outside the material world and interact with our brains at the quantum level. Paranormal phenomena indicate that our minds can communicate with other minds and affect distant physical systems by nonordinary means. Whether such phenomena can be adequately explained in terms of nonlocality and the quantum vacuum or whether they involve superphysical forces and states of matter as yet unknown to science is still an open question, and one which merits further experimental study.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.
Of all the many rival interpretations of quantum mechanics, none is more important or influential than the Copenhagen interpretation. Unfortunately, there is no one Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. If one uses the expression, and everyone does, one should not think of the Copenhagen interpretation as a single consistent interpretation of the theory. Philosophers of physics tend to use the expression ‘the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics’ as a label covering a variety of different interpretations all of which either originate with Niels Bohr or were invented by him, his colleagues and guests at the Institute for Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen beginning in the middle 1920s. Perhaps one should say that the Copenhagen interpretation in this diffuse sense goes back farther than this, back even before the rise of the new quantum mechanics. Heisenberg tells the story of a boat trip he, Bohr, and some friends took from Copenhagen to the island of Fyn around the time when the then new quantum mechanics was being developed. Bohr, ‘full of the new interpretation of quantum theory’, talked of ‘the difficulties of language, of the limitations of all our means of expressing ourselves’ and of how these limitations had been expressed ‘in the foundation of atomic theory in a mathematically lucid way’. ‘Finally,’ Heisenberg ends the story, ‘one of the friends remarked drily, “But, Niels, this is not really new, you said exactly the same ten years ago”
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