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Cryptanalysis of Robust E-Mail Protocols with Perfect Forward Secrecy

Eun Jun Yoon, Kee-Young Yoo

Recently, Kim et al. proposed two new robust E-mail protocols with perfect forward secrecy. The current letter shows that their protocol 2 is susceptible to two impersonation attacks

IEEE Communications LettersMay 1, 200718 citations

E-mail protocols with perfect forward secrecy

Duncan S. Wong, Xiaojian Tian

In IEEE Communication Letters, Kim et al. and Sun et al. proposed several e–mail protocols and claimed that they provide perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we show that under the assumption that the e–mail server is also malicious, Kim et al.'s two e–mail protocols do not provide perfect forward secrecy. While one of Sun et al.'s e–mail protocol provides perfect forward secrecy, it does not provide message authentication. We thus propose an improvement to Sun et al.'s e–mail protocol so that it provides both perfect forward secrecy and message authentication.In IEEE Communication Letters, Kim et al. and Sun et al. proposed several e–mail protocols and claimed that they provide perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we show that under the assumption that the e–mail server is also malicious, Kim et al.'s two e–mail protocols do not provide perfect forward secrecy. While one of Sun et al.'s e–mail protocol provides perfect forward secrecy, it does not provide message authentication. We thus propose an improvement to Sun et al.'s e–mail protocol so that it provides both perfect forward secrecy and message authentication.

International Journal of Security and NetworksJan 1, 20129 citations

Secure E-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy

Hung–Min Sun, Bin‐Tsan Hsieh, Hsin-Jia Hwang

Electronic mail, E-mail in short, has been used to transfer various types of electronic data on Internet. In order to deliver the E-mail from the sender to the receiver both efficiently and securely, the E-mail system usually employs both conventional and public key cryptographic systems. The basic protection in an E-mail system is to encrypt the bulk mail using a conventional cryptosystem with a short-term key and to protect the short-term key using a public-key cryptosystem with the receiver's public key. However this protection cannot provide perfect forward secrecy because once the receiver's secret key is disclosed, all previous used short-term keys will also be opened and hence all previous E-mails will be learned. Two new E-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy are proposed In this work.Electronic mail, E-mail in short, has been used to transfer various types of electronic data on Internet. In order to deliver the E-mail from the sender to the receiver both efficiently and securely, the E-mail system usually employs both conventional and public key cryptographic systems. The basic protection in an E-mail system is to encrypt the bulk mail using a conventional cryptosystem with a short-term key and to protect the short-term key using a public-key cryptosystem with the receiver's public key. However this protection cannot provide perfect forward secrecy because once the receiver's secret key is disclosed, all previous used short-term keys will also be opened and hence all previous E-mails will be learned. Two new E-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy are proposed In this work.

IEEE Communications LettersJan 1, 200546 citations

A new protocol of wide use for e-mail with perfect forward secrecy

Tzung‐Her Chen, Yan-Ting Wu

Recently, Sun et al. (2005) highlighted the essential property of perfect forward secrecy (PFS) for e-mail protocols when a higher security level is desirable. Furthermore, Sun et al. (2005)’s protocols take only a single e-mail server into account. Actually, it is much more common that the sender and the recipient register at different e-mail servers. Compared to existing protocols, the protocol proposed in this paper takes into account the scenario that the sender and the recipient register at different servers. The proposed protocol is skillfully designed to achieve PFS and end-to-end security as well as to satisfy the requirements of confidentiality, origin, integrity and easy key management. The comparison in terms of functionality and computational efficiency demonstrates the superiority of the present scheme.Recently, Sun et al. (2005) highlighted the essential property of perfect forward secrecy (PFS) for e-mail protocols when a higher security level is desirable. Furthermore, Sun et al. (2005)’s protocols take only a single e-mail server into account. Actually, it is much more common that the sender and the recipient register at different e-mail servers. Compared to existing protocols, the protocol proposed in this paper takes into account the scenario that the sender and the recipient register at different servers. The proposed protocol is skillfully designed to achieve PFS and end-to-end security as well as to satisfy the requirements of confidentiality, origin, integrity and easy key management. The comparison in terms of functionality and computational efficiency demonstrates the superiority of the present scheme.

Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic EngineeringDec 22, 20093 citations

A Practical Way to Provide Perfect Forward Secrecy for Secure E-Mail Protocols

Sangjin Kim, Chang‐Yong Lee, Dae-Young Kim +1 more

Springer eBooksNov 29, 20072 citations

An Improvement on Secure E-mail Protocols Providing Perfect Forward Secrecy

Iuon‐Chang Lin, Yang-Bin Lin, Chung-Ming Wang

Advances in intelligent systems research/Advances in Intelligent Systems ResearchJan 1, 20063 citations

Robust E-mail protocols with perfect forward secrecy

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Robust E-mail protocols with perfect forward secrecy

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