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Advances in intelligent systems research/Advances in Intelligent Systems Research

An Improvement on Secure E-mail Protocols Providing Perfect Forward Secrecy

Iuon‐Chang Lin, Yang-Bin Lin, Chung-Ming Wang

Published Jan 1, 2006• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.2991/jcis.2006.102

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Perfect-Mail: A Secure E-mail Protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy

Baoyuan Kang, Danhui Xu

With the rapid development of Internet, e-mail has become an essential communication tool. But, the security of e-mail communications is an important issue. Recently, Chen et al. [6] proposed a new protocol of wide use for e-mail. Chen et al. claimed that the proposed protocol is skillfully designed to achieve perfect forward secrecy and end to end security as well as to satisfy the requirements of confidentiality, origin, integrity and easy key management. But, in this paper, we show that Chen et al.’s protocol suffers from the e-mail server impersonation attack, mail content confidentiality attack and replay attack. Moreover, we give an improvement on Chen et al.’s protocol to overcome its security weaknesses, and propose the perfect-mail, a secure e-mail protocol with perfect forward secrecy. It is concluded by analysis that the improved protocol provides the perfect forward secrecy and resists replay attack, impersonation attack, and mail content confidentiality attack. But the communication cost of improved protocol is equal to that of Chen et al.’s protocol, and the computing cost of improved protocol is only added by two signature verification.

British Journal of Mathematics & Computer Science•Nov 14, 2015•1 citation

Secure E-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy

Hung–Min Sun, Bin‐Tsan Hsieh, Hsin-Jia Hwang

Electronic mail, E-mail in short, has been used to transfer various types of electronic data on Internet. In order to deliver the E-mail from the sender to the receiver both efficiently and securely, the E-mail system usually employs both conventional and public key cryptographic systems. The basic protection in an E-mail system is to encrypt the bulk mail using a conventional cryptosystem with a short-term key and to protect the short-term key using a public-key cryptosystem with the receiver's public key. However this protection cannot provide perfect forward secrecy because once the receiver's secret key is disclosed, all previous used short-term keys will also be opened and hence all previous E-mails will be learned. Two new E-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy are proposed In this work.

IEEE Communications Letters•Jan 1, 2005•46 citations
With the rapid development of Internet, e-mail has become an essential communication tool. But, the security of e-mail communications is an important issue. Recently, Chen et al. [6] proposed a new protocol of wide use for e-mail. Chen et al. claimed that the proposed protocol is skillfully designed to achieve perfect forward secrecy and end to end security as well as to satisfy the requirements of confidentiality, origin, integrity and easy key management. But, in this paper, we show that Chen et al.’s protocol suffers from the e-mail server impersonation attack, mail content confidentiality attack and replay attack. Moreover, we give an improvement on Chen et al.’s protocol to overcome its security weaknesses, and propose the perfect-mail, a secure e-mail protocol with perfect forward secrecy. It is concluded by analysis that the improved protocol provides the perfect forward secrecy and resists replay attack, impersonation attack, and mail content confidentiality attack. But the communication cost of improved protocol is equal to that of Chen et al.’s protocol, and the computing cost of improved protocol is only added by two signature verification.
Electronic mail, E-mail in short, has been used to transfer various types of electronic data on Internet. In order to deliver the E-mail from the sender to the receiver both efficiently and securely, the E-mail system usually employs both conventional and public key cryptographic systems. The basic protection in an E-mail system is to encrypt the bulk mail using a conventional cryptosystem with a short-term key and to protect the short-term key using a public-key cryptosystem with the receiver's public key. However this protection cannot provide perfect forward secrecy because once the receiver's secret key is disclosed, all previous used short-term keys will also be opened and hence all previous E-mails will be learned. Two new E-mail protocols providing perfect forward secrecy are proposed In this work.