Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Towards a Provably Secure DoS-Resilient Key Exchange Protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy

Lakshmi Kuppusamy, Jothi Rangasamy, Douglas Stebila, Colin Boyd, Juan González Nieto

Published Jan 1, 2011• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_27

Related papers

Tightly-Secure Group Key Exchange with Perfect Forward Secrecy

Emanuele Di Giandomenico, Doreen Riepel, Sven Schäge

Lecture notes in computer science•Dec 8, 2024•0 citations

An Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

SeongHan Shin, Kazukuni Kobara, Hideki Imai

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Dec 14, 2004•0 citations

eCK Secure Single Round ID-based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols with Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (Extended Version)

Tapas Pandit, Rana Barua, Somanath Tripathy

Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols that covers many attacks on existing models. An ID-based AKE protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) (respectively Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS)) ensures that revelation of the static keys of the parties (respectively the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. In our preliminary version [18] we have proposed, without proofs, ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. To achieve this, we also have constructed ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. In this full version, we provide proofs to show that all of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.

Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks Ubiquitous Computing and Dependable Applications•Jan 1, 2014•1 citation

Provable efficient certificateless group key exchange protocol

Chunjie Cao, Jianfeng Ma, SangJae Moon

Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) avoids the inherent escrow of identity-based cryptography and does not require certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. Based on CL-PKC, we present an efficient constant-round group key exchange protocol, which is provably secure under the intractability of computation Diffie-Hellman problem. Our protocol is a contributory key exchange with perfect forward secrecy and has only two communication rounds. So it is more efficient than other protocols. Moreover, our protocol provides a method to design efficient constant-round group key exchange protocols and most secret sharing schemes could be adopted to construct our protocol.

Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences•Jan 1, 2007•16 citations

On security analysis of an after-the-fact leakage resilient key exchange protocol

Zheng Yang, Shuangqing Li

Information Processing Letters•Sep 6, 2015•12 citations

A secure two-party key agreement protocol with key escrow and perfect forward secrecy

Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu

To provide secure communications in open and distributed environments, authenticated key agreement protocol is an important primitive for establishing session key. So far, great deals of identity-based protocols have been proposed to provide robust mutual authentication and key establishment in two-party setting. Majority of the existing escrowable identitybased key agreement protocols, however, only provide partial forward secrecy. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require a stronger sense of forward secrecy -- perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we present a secure two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol, which was inspired on an identity-based encryption scheme first proposed by Gentry (Eurocrypt'06). The proposed protocol achieves most of the required security attributes and can be used properly in the escrow mode. We show that the scheme achieves the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the perfect forward secrecy attribute.

IEEE International Conference on Anti-counterfeiting, Security, and Identification (ASID)•Aug 1, 2009•1 citation
Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols that covers many attacks on existing models. An ID-based AKE protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) (respectively Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS)) ensures that revelation of the static keys of the parties (respectively the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. In our preliminary version [18] we have proposed, without proofs, ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. To achieve this, we also have constructed ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. In this full version, we provide proofs to show that all of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) avoids the inherent escrow of identity-based cryptography and does not require certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. Based on CL-PKC, we present an efficient constant-round group key exchange protocol, which is provably secure under the intractability of computation Diffie-Hellman problem. Our protocol is a contributory key exchange with perfect forward secrecy and has only two communication rounds. So it is more efficient than other protocols. Moreover, our protocol provides a method to design efficient constant-round group key exchange protocols and most secret sharing schemes could be adopted to construct our protocol.
To provide secure communications in open and distributed environments, authenticated key agreement protocol is an important primitive for establishing session key. So far, great deals of identity-based protocols have been proposed to provide robust mutual authentication and key establishment in two-party setting. Majority of the existing escrowable identitybased key agreement protocols, however, only provide partial forward secrecy. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require a stronger sense of forward secrecy -- perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we present a secure two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol, which was inspired on an identity-based encryption scheme first proposed by Gentry (Eurocrypt'06). The proposed protocol achieves most of the required security attributes and can be used properly in the escrow mode. We show that the scheme achieves the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the perfect forward secrecy attribute.