So far, there have been many attempts to interpret experimental facts from the field of quantum mechanics but all these attempts were made because the models intended to logically resolve the contradictions at the level of the already established notions without interfering with the geneses of these notions. Here the grounds for the possible solution of quantum mechanics problems are given using the psychosemantic approach.
So far, there have been many attempts to interpret experimental facts from the field of quantum mechanics but all these attempts were made because the models intended to logically resolve the contradictions at the level of the already established notions without interfering with the geneses of these notions. Here the grounds for the possible solution of quantum mechanics problems are given using the psychosemantic approach.
Bohr is said to have remarked that anybody who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it. No physicist, however, challenges its practical usefulness in predicting experimental results and providing an explanatory framework for an enormous range of study. Nevertheless, more thoughtful physicists have been astonished and disturbed by what is implied when attempts are made to interpret its meaning. As a result a variety of ingenious, and sometimes bizarre, schemes have been devised since its inception in order to make these implications more acceptable to the scientific mind. Some of these schemes have resulted in proposals which appear stranger than the problems they have been designed to resolve. After some sixty years there is no consensus of opinion upon the solution of the epistemological problems posed. Indeed the debate keeps on resurfacing in the scientific literature and continues to generate library shelves of books. Some progress, however, has been made and the late John Bell himself and the experimental work of Alain Aspect have demonstrated that some epistemological positions cannot be sustained.
Quantum mechanics is our most successful physical theory. It underlies our very detailed understanding of atomic physics, chemistry, and nuclear physics, and the many technologies to which physical systems in these regimes give rise. Additionally, relativistic quantum mechanics is the basis for the standard model of elementary particles, which very successfully gives a partial unification of the forces operating at the atomic, nuclear, and subnuclear levels. However, from its inception the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, and the fact that “quantum measurements” in the orthodox formulation appear to require the intervention of non-quantum mechanical “classical systems,” have led to speculations by many physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers of science that quantum mechanics may be incomplete. Among the Founding Fathers of quantum theory, Einstein and Schrödinger were both of the opinion that quantum mechanics is in some way unsatisfactory, and this view has been amplified in more recent profound work of John Bell, among others. In an opposing camp, many others in the physics, mathematics, and philosophy communities have attempted to provide an interpretational foundation in which quantum mechanics remains a complete and self-contained system. Among the Founding Fathers, Bohr, Born, and Heisenberg maintained that quantum mechanics is a complete system, and a number of recent proposals have been made to improve upon or to provide alternatives to their “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The debate continues, and has spawned an enormous literature.
The modern physics is characterized by deeper and deeper penetration into the laws of the world of atoms and other minute particles of matter. These laws require not only new experimental techniques to be developed, but also new notions to formulate them. To describe atomic phenomena new methods that are completely different from those used to investigate larger objects of our world are required. The new problem of description of atomic objects is of particular practical importance since the arising notions could be applied to other fields of knowledge. Therefore on the ground of the modern physics some questions of the philosophical character arise. We are going to consider them here.
Entertaining the possibility of time travel will invariably challenge dearly-held concepts in fundamental physics. It becomes relatively easy to construct multiple logical contradictions using differing starting points from various well-established fields of physics. Sometimes, the interpretation is that only a full theory of quantum gravity will be able to settle these logical contradictions. Even then, it remains unclear if the multitude of problems could be overcome. Yet as definitive as this seems to the notion of time travel in physics, such recourse to quantum gravity comes with its own, long-standing challenge to most of these counter-arguments to time travel: These arguments rely on time, while quantum gravity is (in)famously stuck with the problem of time. One attempt to answer this problem within the canonical framework resulted in the Page–Wootters formalism, and its recent gauge-theoretic reinterpretation as an emergent notion of time. Herein, we will begin a program to study toy models implementing the Hamiltonian constraint in quantum theory, with an aim toward understanding what an emergent notion of time can tell us about the (im)possibility of time travel.
Entertaining the possibility of time travel will invariably challenge dearly-held concepts in fundamental physics. It becomes relatively easy to construct multiple logical contradictions using differing starting points from various well-established fields of physics. Sometimes, the interpretation is that only a full theory of quantum gravity will be able to settle these logical contradictions. Even then, it remains unclear if the multitude of problems could be overcome. Yet as definitive as this seems to the notion of time travel in physics, such recourse to quantum gravity comes with its own, long-standing challenge to most of these counter-arguments to time travel: These arguments rely on time, while quantum gravity is (in)famously stuck with the problem of time. One attempt to answer this problem within the canonical framework resulted in the Page–Wootters formalism, and its recent gauge-theoretic reinterpretation as an emergent notion of time. Herein, we will begin a program to study toy models implementing the Hamiltonian constraint in quantum theory, with an aim toward understanding what an emergent notion of time can tell us about the (im)possibility of time travel.