Quantum Understanding

James T. Cushing

Empirical adequacy, formal explanation and understanding are distinct goals of science. While no a priori criterion for understanding should be laid down, there may be inherent limitations on the way we are able to understand explanations of physical phenomena. I examine several recent contributions to the exercise of fashioning an explanatory discourse to mold the formal explanation provided by quantum mechanics to our modes of understanding. The question is whether we are capable of truly understanding (or comprehending) quantum phenomena, as opposed to simply accepting the formalism and certain irreducible quantum correlations. The central issue is that of understanding versus merely redefining terms to paper over our ignorance.

Vera Spillner

This paper presents a bundle definition for 'scientific understanding' through which the empirically equivalent interpretations of quantum mechanics can be evaluated with respect to the understanding they generate. This definition of understanding is based on a sufficient and necessary criterion, as well as a bundle of conditions ― where a theory can be called better understandable than others, whenever it fulfills a higher number of bundle criteria. Thereby the definition of understanding is based on the one hand on the objective number of criteria a theory fulfills, as well as, on the other hand, on the individual's preference of bundle criteria. Applying the definition onto three interpretations of quantum mechanics, the interpretation of David Bohm appears as most understandable, followed by the interpretation of Tim Maudlin and the Kopenhagen interpretation.

Peter Gibbins

Why should anyone think that what is so deeply puzzling about the quantum world is really a matter of logic? Why should anyone think that studying the logic of quantum mechanics should be a route to a proper understanding of quantum mechanics? There is a tradition in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, a tradition stronger among philosophical commentators than among physicists, which sees the subject as the business of understanding quantum mechanical language and the way that language relates to the world. It is an idea more strongly held by philosophers – it comes much more naturally to them – because the analytic tradition, in which most Anglo-American philosophers of science are raised, is generally much exercised about words and how they hook on to things. The analytic tradition in the philosophy of quantum mechanics is not unreasonable. Everyone admits that we cannot picture the microphysical world, that a graphic or iconic representation of quantum systems is impossible. Therefore understanding quantum mechanics must be a matter of understanding the logic of the words and the mathematics of quantum mechanics. If this seems implausible, it is because of an ambiguity in our use of the verb ‘to understand’. We understand the physical world, and we understand physics. But physics is not the physical world. It is something of an entirely different sort, a human product, a way of representing the world.

Jean‐Louis Calais, Osvaldo Goscinski, Jan Linderberg +1 more