This paper presents a bundle definition for 'scientific understanding' through which the empirically equivalent interpretations of quantum mechanics can be evaluated with respect to the understanding they generate. This definition of understanding is based on a sufficient and necessary criterion, as well as a bundle of conditions ― where a theory can be called better understandable than others, whenever it fulfills a higher number of bundle criteria. Thereby the definition of understanding is based on the one hand on the objective number of criteria a theory fulfills, as well as, on the other hand, on the individual's preference of bundle criteria. Applying the definition onto three interpretations of quantum mechanics, the interpretation of David Bohm appears as most understandable, followed by the interpretation of Tim Maudlin and the Kopenhagen interpretation.
This paper presents a bundle definition for 'scientific understanding' through which the empirically equivalent interpretations of quantum mechanics can be evaluated with respect to the understanding they generate. This definition of understanding is based on a sufficient and necessary criterion, as well as a bundle of conditions ― where a theory can be called better understandable than others, whenever it fulfills a higher number of bundle criteria. Thereby the definition of understanding is based on the one hand on the objective number of criteria a theory fulfills, as well as, on the other hand, on the individual's preference of bundle criteria. Applying the definition onto three interpretations of quantum mechanics, the interpretation of David Bohm appears as most understandable, followed by the interpretation of Tim Maudlin and the Kopenhagen interpretation.
This paper introduces an overview of a new perspective to understanding the notion of scientific theory\n"interpretation". The main thesis proposes that interpretation should consist of a certain kind of articulation between the theory to be interpreted and those theories providing a mathematical and conceptual framework as well as empirical meaning to their\nterms. In the conclusion, and in relation to the historical example of Maxwell's electrodynamics\nre-interpretation, the authors point at some of the conditions and interpretation should fulfill to be "adequate". Lastly, the authors provide a perspective on\nhow these ideas could be applied to analyze Quantum Mechanics interpretation problems.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.
Quantum mechanics is empirically unrivalled, yet the origin of its distinctive non-classical features remains a foundational question. This paper proves, within the unchanged standard quantum formalism, that these features—collectively termed “quantumness”—arise if and only if certain configurations of the system are indistinguishable in principle. Quantumness is defined as any deviation from classical probability distributions, i.e., probabilities that require coherent amplitude addition rather than incoherent probability addition. Three theorems are established using only the standard Hilbert-space formalism and unitary evolution: 1. Indistinguishability of configurations is necessary and sufficient for quantumness.2. Indistinguishability of identical particles is neither necessary nor sufficient.3. An equivalent restatement in precise operational terms: quantumness occurs exactly when a variable lacks physical definition (distinguishability in principle by macroscopic outcomes). These results are presented and interpreted within the Logical Interpretation of quantum mechanics, a minimalist framework that adds no new postulates and applies classical logic strictly to physically defined facts. The interpretation provides the conceptual tools—particularly the precise notion of “indistinguishability in principle”—that make the theorems sharp and unified. This work unifies the origin of quantumness and serves as the conceptual prequel to the full Logical Interpretation developed in the author’s companion paper.
Utility: The condition, quality, or fact of being useful or beneficial (The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) Bohmian mechanics-the causal interpretation of quantum mechanics first introduced in completed form by David Bohm in 1952 [1,2]—is generally believed to be empirically equivalent to “standard” quantum mechanics. In principle, any result obtainable in one should be obtainable in the other. It need not be true, however, that equivalent results may be obtained with equivalent ease in the two interpretations, or that they always render equally valuable physical insights.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.