We attempt to clarify the relationship between the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen analysis and Bell’s theorem in the context of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics. We conclude that despite certain claims, the statistical interpretation cannot reconcile the EPR notion of a local, objective reality with the prediction of quantum mechanics.
We attempt to clarify the relationship between the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen analysis and Bell’s theorem in the context of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics. We conclude that despite certain claims, the statistical interpretation cannot reconcile the EPR notion of a local, objective reality with the prediction of quantum mechanics.
In the 80 years since the seminal Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) paper, physicists and philosophers have mused about the `spooky action at a distance' aspect of quantum mechanics that so bothered Einstein. In his formal analysis of EPR-type entangled quantum states, Bell (1964) concluded that any hidden variable theory designed to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics must necessarily be nonlocal and allow superluminal interactions. This doesn't immediately imply that nonlocality is a characteristic feature of quantum mechanics let alone a fundamental property of nature; however, many physicists and philosophers of science do harbor this belief. Experts in the field often use the term `nonlocality' to designate particular non-classical aspects of quantum entanglement and do not confuse the term with superluminal interactions. However, many physicists seem to take the term more literally. I endeavor to disabuse the latter of this notion by emphasizing that the correlations of Bell-type entanglement are a result of ordinary quantum superposition with no need to introduce nonlocality. The conclusion of the EPR paper wasn't that quantum mechanics is nonlocal but rather that it is an incomplete description of reality. For different reasons, many physicists, including me, agree with Einstein that quantum mechanics is necessarily an incomplete description of reality.
Bell showed that assuming locality leads to a disagreement with quantum mechanics. Here the nature of the nonlocality that follows from quantum mechanics is investigated. Note by the Editor—Readers will recognize Professor Rosen, author of this paper, as one of the co-authors of the famous EPR paper, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, ‘‘Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be considered Complete?’’, Phys. Rev. 47, 770–780 (1935). Robert H. Romer, Editor
After summarising a previously given analysis of Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), this chapter endorses the claim made by Everett himself that Everettian quantum mechanics `in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr'. On the one hand, it shows how Everett's theory provides a reconstruction of Bohr's viewpoint of complementarity as applied to the EPR case and a justi�cation of his criticism of EPR's `criterion of reality'. On the other hand, it includes a notion of physical reality that is independent of any observational context, and suggests a remaining shortcoming of Bohr's reply.
This article seeks to clarify certain key theoretical, conceptual and philosophical issues in the foundations of microphysics which, to judge from certain recent publications, continue to cause misunderstandings. In particular, we examine the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations, underlining that they are not univocally interpretable and that, at least in the interpretation following directly from the quantum formalism, they are not the target of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen's criticism. We try to identify the essential goal and premises of this famous argument, with the help of a simple example. Finally, we examine briefly the Bell inequalities, emphasizing that, given their generality, the net consequence of their experimental violation cannot be circumvented neither by the abandonment of determinism nor by any local realistic reinterpretation of measurement results, as attempted in an article recently published in this journal.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.