This article seeks to clarify certain key theoretical, conceptual and philosophical issues in the foundations of microphysics which, to judge from certain recent publications, continue to cause misunderstandings. In particular, we examine the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations, underlining that they are not univocally interpretable and that, at least in the interpretation following directly from the quantum formalism, they are not the target of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen's criticism. We try to identify the essential goal and premises of this famous argument, with the help of a simple example. Finally, we examine briefly the Bell inequalities, emphasizing that, given their generality, the net consequence of their experimental violation cannot be circumvented neither by the abandonment of determinism nor by any local realistic reinterpretation of measurement results, as attempted in an article recently published in this journal.
This article seeks to clarify certain key theoretical, conceptual and philosophical issues in the foundations of microphysics which, to judge from certain recent publications, continue to cause misunderstandings. In particular, we examine the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations, underlining that they are not univocally interpretable and that, at least in the interpretation following directly from the quantum formalism, they are not the target of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen's criticism. We try to identify the essential goal and premises of this famous argument, with the help of a simple example. Finally, we examine briefly the Bell inequalities, emphasizing that, given their generality, the net consequence of their experimental violation cannot be circumvented neither by the abandonment of determinism nor by any local realistic reinterpretation of measurement results, as attempted in an article recently published in this journal.
Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.
On the 50th anniversary of Bell's monumental 1964 paper, there is still widespread misunderstanding about exactly what Bell proved. This misunderstanding derives in turn from a failure to appreciate the earlier argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. I retrace the history and logical structure of these arguments in order to clarify the proper conclusion, namely that any world that displays violations of Bell's inequality for experiments done far from one another must be non-local. Since the world we happen to live in displays such violations, actual physics is non-local. This article is part of a special issue of Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical devoted to '50 years of Bell's theorem'.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
Bell inequalities are intended to formulate mathematically the argument of the thought-experiment proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) in the Einstein-Bohr Debate. Devised to test Bell inequalities against quantum mechanics for resolving the Einstein-Bohr debate, Bell experiments are purportedly modern versions of the EPR experiment. However, there exists a fatal logical flaw in Bell experiments. Because of the logical flaw, Bell experiments differ essentially from the EPR experiment, and quantum correlation in the EPR experiment is not "quantum entanglement" in Bell experiments; the latter is not physically meaningful. In addition to the logical flaw in Bell experiments, a physical constraint imposed on measuring individual quantum objects is violated by all Bell inequalities, which makes Bell inequalities physically meaningless. Unlike Bell experiments, the EPR experiment will not violate any physical constraint, and the EPR argument has no logical flaw. Consequently, the experimental invalidation of Bell inequalities is not evidence for falsifying the two fundamental hypotheses for scientific research, i.e., locality and realism, underlying the EPR experiment, and by no means can Bell experiments resolve the Einstein-Bohr debate. Stemming from abandoning either locality or realism or both, the so-called new applications of quantum mechanics, including various quantum information technologies, are all ineligible and doomed to failure, for they attempt to exploit physically meaningless "quantum superposition" or "quantum entanglement", treating them as physical resources "out there" in the real world.
An overview of the history of Bell’s inequality is given, beginning with the so-called EPR paradox originally put forward by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and the impossibility proof of von Neumann. Bell’s inequality, which ultimately shifted the discussion from arguments based on philosophically introduced postulates to the domain of experimental physics, is presented together with experimental attempts from the early 1970s to 2010s to violate this inequality. We introduce three historical loopholes in the experimental schemes which have prevented experimentalists from being able to fully disprove the possibility of a hidden-variables description of nature. Recent experimental data indicate that all the main loopholes are now closed for photons (albeit not simultaneously in one experiment). Besides the class of stochastic local realism that have been tested experimentally, some other possible classical interpretations are mentioned.
More than 70 years after its publication, the article by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) [88] is still cited hundreds of times every year in the literature; this is a very exceptional case of longevity for a scientific article! There is some irony in this situation since, for a long time, the majority of physicists did not pay much attention to the EPR reasoning. They considered it as historically interesting, but with no precise relevance to modern quantum mechanics; the argument was even sometimes completely misinterpreted. Astriking example is given in the Einstein-Born correspondence [89] where Born, even in comments that he wrote after Einstein's death, clearly shows that he never completely understood the nature of the objections raised by EPR. Born went on thinking that the point of Einstein was a stubborn rejection of indeterminism (“look, Albert, indeterminism is not so bad!”), while actually the major concern of EPR was locality and/or separability (we come back later to these terms, which are related to the notion of space-time). If giants like Born could be misled in this way, no surprise that, later on, many others made similar mistakes! This is why, in what follows, we will take an approach that may look elementary, but at least has the advantage of putting the emphasis on the logical structure of the arguments and their generality. Doing so, we will closely follow neither the historical development of the ideas nor the formulation of the original article, but rather will emphasize the generality of the EPR reasoning.