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Springer eBooks

Is it True; or is it False; or Somewhere in Between? The Logic of Quantum Theory

Christopher John Isham

Published Nov 2, 2006• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/1-4020-4876-9_8

Related papers

Is it true; or is it false; or somewhere in between? The logic of quantum theory

Christopher John Isham

The paper contains a relatively non-technical summary of some recent work by the author and Jeremy Butterfield. The goal is to find a way of assigning meaningful truth values to propositions in quantum theory: something that is not possible in the normal, instrumentalist interpretation. The key mathematical tool is presheaf theory where multi-valued, contextual truth values arise naturally. We show how this can be applied to quantum theory, with the ‘contexts’ chosen to be Boolean subalgebras of the set of all projection operators.

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In the proposed non-Aristotelian finitary logic (NAFL), truths for formal propositions can exist only with respect to axiomatic theories, essentially as temporary axiomatic declarations in the human mind. An undecidable proposition P in a consistent NAFL theory T is true/false with respect to T if and only if it has been axiomatically declared as true/false by virtue of its provability/refutability in an interpretation T* of T. In the absence of any such axiomatic declarations, P is in a superposed state of 'neither true nor false' and the consistency of T requires the existence of a non-classical model for T in which P&¬P is the case. Here T* is an axiomatic NAFL theory that, like T, resides in the human mind and acts as the 'truth-maker' for (a model of) T. Quantum superposition is justified by identifying 'axiomatic declarations' for the truth/falsity of P (by virtue of its provability/refutability in T*) with 'measurement' in the real world. NAFL also explains and de-mystifies the phenomenon of entanglement. NAFL severely restricts classical infinitary reasoning, but possibly provides sufficient machinery for a consistent axiomatization of quantum mechanics.

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The paper contains a relatively non-technical summary of some recent work by the author and Jeremy Butterfield. The goal is to find a way of assigning meaningful truth values to propositions in quantum theory: something that is not possible in the normal, instrumentalist interpretation. The key mathematical tool is presheaf theory where multi-valued, contextual truth values arise naturally. We show how this can be applied to quantum theory, with the ‘contexts’ chosen to be Boolean subalgebras of the set of all projection operators.
In the proposed non-Aristotelian finitary logic (NAFL), truths for formal propositions can exist only with respect to axiomatic theories, essentially as temporary axiomatic declarations in the human mind. An undecidable proposition P in a consistent NAFL theory T is true/false with respect to T if and only if it has been axiomatically declared as true/false by virtue of its provability/refutability in an interpretation T* of T. In the absence of any such axiomatic declarations, P is in a superposed state of 'neither true nor false' and the consistency of T requires the existence of a non-classical model for T in which P&¬P is the case. Here T* is an axiomatic NAFL theory that, like T, resides in the human mind and acts as the 'truth-maker' for (a model of) T. Quantum superposition is justified by identifying 'axiomatic declarations' for the truth/falsity of P (by virtue of its provability/refutability in T*) with 'measurement' in the real world. NAFL also explains and de-mystifies the phenomenon of entanglement. NAFL severely restricts classical infinitary reasoning, but possibly provides sufficient machinery for a consistent axiomatization of quantum mechanics.