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Philosophy of Science

Are Our Best Physical Theories (Probably and/or Approximately) True?

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Dec 1, 2003• 58 citations
Publisher

Abstract

There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories are false: In addition to its own internal problems, the standard formulation of quantum mechanics is logically incompatible with special relativity. I will also argue that we have no concrete idea what it means to claim that these theories are approximately true.
DOI
10.1086/377401

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A system of quantum reasoning for a closed system is developed by treating nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory. The sample space corresponds to a decomposition, as a sum of orthogonal projectors, of the identity operator on a Hilbert space of histories. Provided a consistency condition is satisfied, the corresponding Boolean algebra of histories, called a framework, can be assigned probabilities in the usual way, and within a single framework quantum reasoning is identical to ordinary probabilistic reasoning. A refinement rule, which allows a probability distribution to be extended from one framework to a larger (refined) framework, incorporates the dynamical laws of quantum theory. Two or more frameworks which are incompatible because they possess no common refinement cannot be simultaneously employed to describe a single physical system. Logical reasoning is a special case of probabilistic reasoning in which (conditional) probabilities are 1 (true) or 0 (false). As probabilities are only meaningful relative to some framework, the same is true of the truth or falsity of a quantum description. The formalism is illustrated using simple examples, and the physical considerations which determine the choice of a framework are discussed. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.
Abstract We argue that there is a simple, unique, reason for all quantum paradoxes, and that such a reason is not uniquely related to quantum theory. It is rather a mathematical question that arises at the intersection of logic, probability, and computation. We give our ‘weirdness theorem’ that characterises the conditions under which the weirdness will show up. It shows that whenever logic has bounds due to the algorithmic nature of its tasks, then weirdness arises in the special form of negative probabilities or non-classical evaluation functionals. Weirdness is not logical inconsistency, however. It is only the expression of the clash between an unbounded and a bounded view of computation in logic. We discuss the implication of these results for quantum mechanics, arguing in particular that its interpretation should ultimately be computational rather than exclusively physical. We develop in addition a probabilistic theory in the real numbers that exhibits the phenomenon of entanglement, thus concretely showing that the latter is not specific to quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics has enjoyed a multitude of successes since its formulation in the early twentieth century. At the same time, it has generated puzzles that persist to this day. These puzzles have inspired a large literature in physics and philosophy. There are two distinct approaches. One is to assume that quantum theory is exact, but that the interpretive postulates need modification, to eliminate apparent contradictions. The second approach is to assume that quantum mechanics is not exact, but instead is a very accurate approximation to a deeper level theory, which reconciles the deterministic and probabilistic aspects. We will focus on this second approach.
According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false; they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I construct a lattice of future-tense propositions, with truth values in the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of a history.