Quantum theory is the soul of contemporary physics. It was discovered in an adventurous way, under the urge to solve the puzzles posed by atomic spectra and blackbody radiation. But after its invention, it immediately became clear that it was not just a theory of specific physical systems: it was rather a new language of universal applicability. Already in 1928, the theory had received solid mathematical foundations by Hilbert, von Neumann, and Nordheim, and this work was brought to completion in the monumental work of von Neumann, in the form that we still study nowadays. The theory is extraordinarily successful, and its predictions have been confirmed to an astonishing level of precision in a large spectrum of experiments. However, almost 90 years after von Neumann's book, quantum theory remains mysterious. Its mathematical formulation – based on Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators – is far from having an intuitive interpretation. The association of physical systems to Hilbert spaces whose unit vectors represent pure states, the representation of transformations by unitary operators and of observables by self-adjoint operators – all such postulates look artificial and ad hoc . A slightly more operational approach is provided by the C * -algebraic formulation of quantum theory – still, this formulation relies on the assumption that observables form an algebra , where the physical meanings of the multiplication and the sum are far from clear. In short, the postulates of quantum theory impose mathematical structures without providing any simple reason for this choice: the mathematics of Hilbert spaces is adopted as a magic blackbox that “works well” at producing experimental predictions. However, in a satisfactory axiomatization of a physical theory the mathematical structures should emerge as a consequence of postulates that have a direct physical interpretation. By this we mean postulates referring, e.g., to primitive notions like physical system, measurement, or process, rather than notions like, e.g., Hilbert space, C * -algebra, unit vector, or selfadjoint operator. The crucial question thus remains unanswered: why quantum theory? Which are the principles at the basis of the theory? A case that is often invoked in contrast is that of Special Relativity theory, which directly follows from the simple understandable principle of relativity.
Quantum theory is the soul of contemporary physics. It was discovered in an adventurous way, under the urge to solve the puzzles posed by atomic spectra and blackbody radiation. But after its invention, it immediately became clear that it was not just a theory of specific physical systems: it was rather a new language of universal applicability. Already in 1928, the theory had received solid mathematical foundations by Hilbert, von Neumann, and Nordheim, and this work was brought to completion in the monumental work of von Neumann, in the form that we still study nowadays. The theory is extraordinarily successful, and its predictions have been confirmed to an astonishing level of precision in a large spectrum of experiments. However, almost 90 years after von Neumann's book, quantum theory remains mysterious. Its mathematical formulation – based on Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators – is far from having an intuitive interpretation. The association of physical systems to Hilbert spaces whose unit vectors represent pure states, the representation of transformations by unitary operators and of observables by self-adjoint operators – all such postulates look artificial and ad hoc . A slightly more operational approach is provided by the C * -algebraic formulation of quantum theory – still, this formulation relies on the assumption that observables form an algebra , where the physical meanings of the multiplication and the sum are far from clear. In short, the postulates of quantum theory impose mathematical structures without providing any simple reason for this choice: the mathematics of Hilbert spaces is adopted as a magic blackbox that “works well” at producing experimental predictions. However, in a satisfactory axiomatization of a physical theory the mathematical structures should emerge as a consequence of postulates that have a direct physical interpretation. By this we mean postulates referring, e.g., to primitive notions like physical system, measurement, or process, rather than notions like, e.g., Hilbert space, C * -algebra, unit vector, or selfadjoint operator. The crucial question thus remains unanswered: why quantum theory? Which are the principles at the basis of the theory? A case that is often invoked in contrast is that of Special Relativity theory, which directly follows from the simple understandable principle of relativity.
The aim of this chapter is to present (in a compact way) the fundamentals of conventional quantum theory. We select the for- mulation of QM as an axiomatic theory in the complete accordance with the Hilbert’s program on axiomatization of physical theories. We remark that the first step toward the present formulation of QM was done in the seminal work of Hilbert, Nordheim, and von Neumann [112]. This work was substantially extended, completed, and clarified in the book of von Neumann [296]. Another version of the rigorous mathematical approach to QM was presented in the book of Dirac [74]. From the mathematical viewpoint, the main difference between the approaches of von Neumann and Dirac is that the first one is based on the theory of self-adjoint operators in complex Hilbert space and the second one is based on the theory of self-adjoint operators acting (by using the modern mathematical terminology) in rigged Hilbert spaces. This theory operates with generalized eigenvectors belonging to the spaces of distributions. Although the von Neumann’s formalization of QM became dominant in quantum mathematical physics, the Dirac’s formalization is widely used in the works on the physical level of rigorousness. Moreover, the Dirac’s terminology, bra-and ket- vectors, became the standard for quantum information theory. However, since quantum information is based on the castrated version of QM, namely, QM in finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, the so-called n-qubit spaces, the basic tool of the Dirac’s formalism, usage of generalized eigenvectors, is useless (since in the finite- dimensional case everything is reduced to manipulation with matrices). During the last 80 years, there were written hundreds of books on QM enlightening its foundational aspects. Unfortunately, the majority of these writings advertise exotic (and some of them really esoteric) views on QM and, in particular, on interpretation of the wave function. They are full of such terms as the collapse of the wave function, quantumnonlocality, manyworlds, thewave function of universe, the preparation of Schro¨dinger cats, influence of the future on the past, quantum teleportation. Of course, manipulations with such terminology create an atmosphere of mystery and a feeling that something unusual and impossible can happen. And this atmosphere plays a positive role in attracting young people to QM and especially to quantum foundations.
This chapter contains a brief introduction to mathematical formalism and QM axiomatics. It is oriented to non-physicists. Since QM is a statistical theory it is natural to start with the classical probability model (Kolmogorov [ 191 ], 1933). Then we present the basics of the theory of Hilbert spaces and Hermitian operators and the representation of pure and mixed states by normalized vectors and density operators. This introduction is sufficient to formulate the axiomatics of QM in the form of five postulates. The projection postulate (the most questionable postulate of QM) is presented in a separate section. We sharply distinguish between the cases of quantum observables represented by Hermitian operators with nondegenerate and degenerate spectra, von Neumann’s and Ltiders’s forms of the projection postulate. The axiomatics is completed by a short section on the main interpretations of QM. The projection postulate (LUders’s form) plays a crucial role in the definition of quantum conditional (transition) probability. By operating with the latter we consider interference of probabilities for two incompatible observables as a modification of the formula of total probability by adding the interference term. This viewpoint to interference of probabilities was elaborated in a series of works by Khrennikov. Since classical probability theory is based on the 142 Boolean algebra of events, a violation of the law of total probability can be treated as the probabilistic sign of a violation of the laws of the Boolean logics. From this viewpoint, quantum theory can be considered as representing a new kind of logic, so-called quantum logic. The latter is also briefly presented in a separate section. We continue this review with a new portion of quantum mathematics, namely the notion of the tensor product of Hilbert spaces and the tensor product of operators. After the section on Dirac’s notation with ket and bra vector, we discuss briefly the notion of qubit and entanglement of a few qubits. This chapter concludes with a presentation of the detailed analysis of the probabilistic structure of the two-slit experiment in a bunch of different experimental contexts. This contextual structure leads to a violation of the law of total probability and non-Kolmogorovean probabilistic structure of this experiment.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
Quantum mechanics is our most successful physical theory. It underlies our very detailed understanding of atomic physics, chemistry, and nuclear physics, and the many technologies to which physical systems in these regimes give rise. Additionally, relativistic quantum mechanics is the basis for the standard model of elementary particles, which very successfully gives a partial unification of the forces operating at the atomic, nuclear, and subnuclear levels. However, from its inception the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, and the fact that “quantum measurements” in the orthodox formulation appear to require the intervention of non-quantum mechanical “classical systems,” have led to speculations by many physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers of science that quantum mechanics may be incomplete. Among the Founding Fathers of quantum theory, Einstein and Schrödinger were both of the opinion that quantum mechanics is in some way unsatisfactory, and this view has been amplified in more recent profound work of John Bell, among others. In an opposing camp, many others in the physics, mathematics, and philosophy communities have attempted to provide an interpretational foundation in which quantum mechanics remains a complete and self-contained system. Among the Founding Fathers, Bohr, Born, and Heisenberg maintained that quantum mechanics is a complete system, and a number of recent proposals have been made to improve upon or to provide alternatives to their “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The debate continues, and has spawned an enormous literature.
Everybody agrees that quantum physics is strange, and that the world view it implies is elusive. However, it is rarely considered that the theory might be opaque because the mathematical language it employs is inarticulate. Perhaps, if a mathematical language were constructed specifically to handle the theory's subject matter, the theory itself would be clarified. This article explores that possibility. It presents a simple but rigorous language for the description of dynamics, experiments, and experimental probabilities. This language is then used to answer a compelling question: What is the set of allowed experiments? If an experiment is allowed, then the sum of the probabilities of its outcomes must equal 1. If probabilities are non-additive, there are necessarily sets of outcomes whose total probability is not equal to 1. Such experiments are therefore not allowed. That being the case, in quantum physics, which experiments are allowed, and why are the rest disallowed? What prevents scientists from performing the disallowed experiments? By phrasing these questions within our mathematical language, we will uncover answers that are complete, conceptually simple, and clearly correct. This entails no magic or sleight of hand. To write a rigorous mathematical language, all unnecessary assumptions must be shed. In this way, the thicket of ad hoc assumptions that surrounds quantum physics will be cleared. Further, in developing the theory, the logical consequences of the necessary assumptions will be laid bare. Therefore, when a question can be phrased in such a language, one can reasonably expect a clear, simple answer. In this way we will dispel much of the mystery surrounding quantum measurements, and begin to understand why quantum probabilities have their peculiar representation as products of Hilbert space projection operators.
Reference to quantum theory has become quite the fashion, and to base an expectation on an already receding episode with relativity theory, a great philosophical assault of interpretation of quanta is brewing in many quarters. The author of this series of studies would be content if by a plain statement of “what is the case” at this stage he could stem the more quixotic efforts, or rather reveal their unreal character to the spectators who may be enmeshed in the spell cast over such adventures. It is constantly necessary to restate the physicists' claims plainly in their positive content—as Einstein himself did once for relativity theory—so that one may know what is no-man's land and what is everyman's land in the new territory. This in itself is largely but a hope since there is no unanimity as to all the facts, and, worse, unanimity is no guarantee of stability. Nevertheless, the painstaking revision that is constantly going on on the experimental front enables us to arrange at least the data on a well-ordered scale of reliability. It then becomes much easier to detect false props to otherwise attractive theories, to discriminate live matter from the débris of progress, and to speculate on future growth. For such reasons the present examination of the various quantum theories will proceed from a presentation of facts and theories to their appraisal and then to a proposal concerning the organization of the facts, concepts and theories. The subject is very complex: There are several quantum theories, some of which are already referred to as “classical” although these themselves were anti-classical (anti-Newtonian); all have claimed success in their time; all have serious hiatuses, including the present. The author has chosen to hark back to some of the older issues before appraising the latest claims.