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Series on knots and everything

Linking Complementarity and The Meaning of “Is”

Published Aug 6, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

What follows takes a while to expound so pleased bear with me: With Spinoza and Clifford in mind I ask rhetorically, what can we say about The Meaning of “Is” and the way in which it relates to Complementarity ? In that regard, I would like to present the following “semi-axiomatic” chain of statements: Let us assume that the word “is” implies the existence of something rather than nothing , words whose meaning we purport to understand. (Axiom 1). Assume further that Spinoza was right: there is only one “ something ”, a, universal, absolutely infinite, fundamental substance . (Axiom 2). Now identify that “substance” with the Einstein/Minkowski Spacetime . Further, identify Clifford’s local disturbance of that spacetime with the solitonic “ particles ” of the Alternative Model. Note that, as Solitons , these entities display both particle-like and wave-like characteristics and thus manifest their own “ Complementarity ” as per Bohr. Note, also that the existence of the question as to The Meaning of “Is” implies the concomitant existence of a live, sentient questioner , which, at least in our world, implies the associated existence of cells, composed of molecules, composed, in turn of atoms, and, ultimately, elementary particles . Which in the present context, implies the Solitonic particles of the Alternative Model for which Complementarity was shown to be a fundamental attribute . The implication is thus that the Principle of Complementary is a necessary, unavoidable partner of The Meaning of “ Is ” where the latter is defined as per Axiom #1 as the existence of something rather than nothing : the two are inextricably linked and at a cosmological level!

DOI
10.1142/9789813278981_0033

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On the assumptions of completeness, conceptual economy, and universality of quantum mechanics, and taking into account the developments linked to decoherence, one concludes that physical reality has only an epistemic nature. It is fundamental then to make a distinction between ontological reality, constituted by everything that does not depend at all on the collectivity of human beings, nor on their decisions or limitations, nor on their existence, and empirical reality, constituted by everything that not being ontological is, however, intersubjective. The fact that the direct presence of consciousness is not required to complete a quantum phenomenon implies that quantum phenomena are not mere “appearances to consciousness”. Empirical reality, as conceived in this paper, is not reducible to mere “appearances to consciousness”. Complementarity, that was proposed by Niels Bohr as a conceptual framework to answer the problems presented by the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is considered here as a way of talking about the empirical reality that goes beyond the simple description of experimental results, or better still, the observer’s perceptions of such results. It aims to describe not ontological reality, but empirical reality. It is proposed that the state vector represents, in general, infinite potentialities that are actualized when a quantum phenomenon is completed. Such potentialities, unlike the Aristotelian and the one suggested by Heisenberg, are epistemic and not ontological. The infinite potentialities of empirical reality are taken as an argument to claim that ontological reality is infinite, complementarity being the manner in which infinite ontological reality is manifested to the finite mind. The possibility that complementarity constitutes a general framework that can be applied to other areas of knowledge is based on an analysis of the relationship between theory and observation. Two possible examples of the use of complementarity in areas different from quantum mechanics are presented, one in thermodynamics and another in biology. Given that logic does not impose the mutual exclusion of two complementary concepts, there isn’t any inconsistency implied by complementarity from the point of view of classical or ordinary logic: one uses ordinary logic in each experimentally defined context. Consequently, there is no need for any new logic.

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formalism, which, like propositional dictum, general and unmarked. In this understanding of interpretation, an interpreta tion always an example of more general preexisting truths, an ex emplary part for whole of truth. Moreover, this conception pre serves our common-sense idea of referential function of interpre tation and sign systems more generally: world to language refers preexists (objectively, substantially) language that de scribes it just as necessities of formal logic preexist phenom ena that exemplify those logical necessities. Interpretation, then, con sists of finding a language conforms to preexisting forms. The second concept of interpretation, Greimas and Courtes argue, is completely different. Within this perspective (which they identify with Saussurian linguistics, Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis—all intellectual movements contemporaneous with quantum theory), no longer a matter of attributing a given to a would otherwise lack one; rather, it a paraphrase formulates in another fashion equivalent con This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms 300 Ronald Schleifer tent of a element within a given semiotic (Semiot ics and Language, 159). In this second understanding of inter pretation, and are not distinct, but rather every form is, alternatively, a semantic content as well, a signifying form, so that offers an analogical paraphrase of something already within a system of signification. Such para phrases are alternatively and different from their model, and as such raise serious questions about referential truth value that seems to govern linguistic dicta and science. That is, alternativeness of paraphrase offers what Jacques Derrida calls without paradigm ... [in elements are] at once analogous (hence series) and utterly different, offering no guaran tee of (Living On, 130). The opposition between modality and dictum presents just this seriality without paradigm. This espe cially clear in extreme case of negation of modal articulation: negation of a statement taken to be modally inflected—e.g., It not true that atom in left half of box or It not true that multiplication of two negative numbers equals a number—presents metonymic iteration without paradigm, para phrase as Like Heisenberg's between quantum theory and levels of language, this understanding of interpretation presents form of an example, yet, by virtue of fact that what it exempli fies necessarily semanticized, it offers an analogy rather than an example. Even abstract formalism of mathematics, from vantage of classical logic without content, carries meanings that be translated and paraphrased. Although number i operates like any ordinary number, when apprehended modally—when understood as a paraphrase of \J-1—it alternatively seems to be no number at all. All these difficult definitions and dis tinctions, Heisenberg writes, can be avoided if one confines lan guage to description of facts, i.e., experimental results (Physics and Philosophy, 185). In this, Heisenberg suggesting that as soon as one interprets facts—and elsewhere he defines facts of quan tum mechanics positivistically as the black spots on a photographic plate or water droplets in a cloud chamber (Physics and Philoso phy, 179)—one enters realm of dualism of alternation and paraphrase. Positivism—in facts are assumed to be simple entities like water droplets in a cloud chamber—does not admit negation. The droplets are either present or absent, there or not there, and when they are not there nothing signifies. As Jacques La This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms Analogy and Example 301 says, the real, whatever upheaval we it to, always in its place,26 and it so precisely because, unlike symbolic systems (to Lacan opposes real), it does not admit negation. The ab sence of droplets only signifies in logic of semantics in ab sence takes on complex positive meaning within a symbolic system just as unmarked of engagement of vocal chords takes on meaning in phonological system of English in absence of voicing distinguishes phoneme /t/ from /d/. These two traditions of interpretation—one classical, other modernist—themselves present a complex double articulation in same way twentieth-century linguistics and Bohr's description of complementarity do. In this complexity, distinction between these traditions not absolute, but rather alternates as a function of questions asked so that interpretation itself remains undecided. Interpretation and understanding, in Emile Benveniste's terms, are cultural phenomena which have characteristic that they never be taken as simple or defined in order of their own na ture but must always be understood as double from fact that they are to something else, whatever their 'referent' may be.27 In an analogical way, nature of data of physics, at least at subatomic scales, cannot simply be defined in order of their own nature. 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From the preceding exposition it follows that not only physics but natural science as a whole is basically dependent on ordinary language. The complementarity of quantum physics displays the fundamental interdependence of observation and description of natural phenomena, and the very objectivity of natural science relies directly on the differentiation of experiences into external and private phenomena afforded by ordinary language. Because of the extreme smallness of the quantum of action the complementarity of physical phenomena is not experienced either in daily life or in classical physics. But the interdependence of observation and description of phenomena prevails as much in classical science as in quantum physics. The very aim of experimental investigation is to perform observations in those particular ways which make possible the communication of information sufficient for the reproduction of the observed phenomena. Concordantly the elementary physical variables, which are indispensable to any systematic analysis in natural science, are defined through reference to measuring arrangements constructed so as to be unambiguously describable in ordinary language. Thus no scientific formula, law, or result of measurement can be given objective significance independent of ordinary language. Through every hierarchy of descriptions in natural science ordinary language penetrates as the unambiguity of propositions.

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What follows takes a while to expound so pleased bear with me: With Spinoza and Clifford in mind I ask rhetorically, what can we say about The Meaning of “Is” and the way in which it relates to Complementarity ? In that regard, I would like to present the following “semi-axiomatic” chain of statements: Let us assume that the word “is” implies the existence of something rather than nothing , words whose meaning we purport to understand. (Axiom 1). Assume further that Spinoza was right: there is only one “ something ”, a, universal, absolutely infinite, fundamental substance . (Axiom 2). Now identify that “substance” with the Einstein/Minkowski Spacetime . Further, identify Clifford’s local disturbance of that spacetime with the solitonic “ particles ” of the Alternative Model. Note that, as Solitons , these entities display both particle-like and wave-like characteristics and thus manifest their own “ Complementarity ” as per Bohr. Note, also that the existence of the question as to The Meaning of “Is” implies the concomitant existence of a live, sentient questioner , which, at least in our world, implies the associated existence of cells, composed of molecules, composed, in turn of atoms, and, ultimately, elementary particles . Which in the present context, implies the Solitonic particles of the Alternative Model for which Complementarity was shown to be a fundamental attribute . The implication is thus that the Principle of Complementary is a necessary, unavoidable partner of The Meaning of “ Is ” where the latter is defined as per Axiom #1 as the existence of something rather than nothing : the two are inextricably linked and at a cosmological level!
On the assumptions of completeness, conceptual economy, and universality of quantum mechanics, and taking into account the developments linked to decoherence, one concludes that physical reality has only an epistemic nature. It is fundamental then to make a distinction between ontological reality, constituted by everything that does not depend at all on the collectivity of human beings, nor on their decisions or limitations, nor on their existence, and empirical reality, constituted by everything that not being ontological is, however, intersubjective. The fact that the direct presence of consciousness is not required to complete a quantum phenomenon implies that quantum phenomena are not mere “appearances to consciousness”. Empirical reality, as conceived in this paper, is not reducible to mere “appearances to consciousness”. Complementarity, that was proposed by Niels Bohr as a conceptual framework to answer the problems presented by the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is considered here as a way of talking about the empirical reality that goes beyond the simple description of experimental results, or better still, the observer’s perceptions of such results. It aims to describe not ontological reality, but empirical reality. It is proposed that the state vector represents, in general, infinite potentialities that are actualized when a quantum phenomenon is completed. Such potentialities, unlike the Aristotelian and the one suggested by Heisenberg, are epistemic and not ontological. The infinite potentialities of empirical reality are taken as an argument to claim that ontological reality is infinite, complementarity being the manner in which infinite ontological reality is manifested to the finite mind. The possibility that complementarity constitutes a general framework that can be applied to other areas of knowledge is based on an analysis of the relationship between theory and observation. Two possible examples of the use of complementarity in areas different from quantum mechanics are presented, one in thermodynamics and another in biology. Given that logic does not impose the mutual exclusion of two complementary concepts, there isn’t any inconsistency implied by complementarity from the point of view of classical or ordinary logic: one uses ordinary logic in each experimentally defined context. Consequently, there is no need for any new logic.
formalism, which, like propositional dictum, general and unmarked. In this understanding of interpretation, an interpreta tion always an example of more general preexisting truths, an ex emplary part for whole of truth. Moreover, this conception pre serves our common-sense idea of referential function of interpre tation and sign systems more generally: world to language refers preexists (objectively, substantially) language that de scribes it just as necessities of formal logic preexist phenom ena that exemplify those logical necessities. Interpretation, then, con sists of finding a language conforms to preexisting forms. The second concept of interpretation, Greimas and Courtes argue, is completely different. Within this perspective (which they identify with Saussurian linguistics, Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis—all intellectual movements contemporaneous with quantum theory), no longer a matter of attributing a given to a would otherwise lack one; rather, it a paraphrase formulates in another fashion equivalent con This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms 300 Ronald Schleifer tent of a element within a given semiotic (Semiot ics and Language, 159). In this second understanding of inter pretation, and are not distinct, but rather every form is, alternatively, a semantic content as well, a signifying form, so that offers an analogical paraphrase of something already within a system of signification. Such para phrases are alternatively and different from their model, and as such raise serious questions about referential truth value that seems to govern linguistic dicta and science. That is, alternativeness of paraphrase offers what Jacques Derrida calls without paradigm ... [in elements are] at once analogous (hence series) and utterly different, offering no guaran tee of (Living On, 130). The opposition between modality and dictum presents just this seriality without paradigm. This espe cially clear in extreme case of negation of modal articulation: negation of a statement taken to be modally inflected—e.g., It not true that atom in left half of box or It not true that multiplication of two negative numbers equals a number—presents metonymic iteration without paradigm, para phrase as Like Heisenberg's between quantum theory and levels of language, this understanding of interpretation presents form of an example, yet, by virtue of fact that what it exempli fies necessarily semanticized, it offers an analogy rather than an example. Even abstract formalism of mathematics, from vantage of classical logic without content, carries meanings that be translated and paraphrased. Although number i operates like any ordinary number, when apprehended modally—when understood as a paraphrase of \J-1—it alternatively seems to be no number at all. All these difficult definitions and dis tinctions, Heisenberg writes, can be avoided if one confines lan guage to description of facts, i.e., experimental results (Physics and Philosophy, 185). In this, Heisenberg suggesting that as soon as one interprets facts—and elsewhere he defines facts of quan tum mechanics positivistically as the black spots on a photographic plate or water droplets in a cloud chamber (Physics and Philoso phy, 179)—one enters realm of dualism of alternation and paraphrase. Positivism—in facts are assumed to be simple entities like water droplets in a cloud chamber—does not admit negation. The droplets are either present or absent, there or not there, and when they are not there nothing signifies. As Jacques La This downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:27:46 UTC All use to http://about.jstor.org/terms Analogy and Example 301 says, the real, whatever upheaval we it to, always in its place,26 and it so precisely because, unlike symbolic systems (to Lacan opposes real), it does not admit negation. The ab sence of droplets only signifies in logic of semantics in ab sence takes on complex positive meaning within a symbolic system just as unmarked of engagement of vocal chords takes on meaning in phonological system of English in absence of voicing distinguishes phoneme /t/ from /d/. These two traditions of interpretation—one classical, other modernist—themselves present a complex double articulation in same way twentieth-century linguistics and Bohr's description of complementarity do. In this complexity, distinction between these traditions not absolute, but rather alternates as a function of questions asked so that interpretation itself remains undecided. Interpretation and understanding, in Emile Benveniste's terms, are cultural phenomena which have characteristic that they never be taken as simple or defined in order of their own na ture but must always be understood as double from fact that they are to something else, whatever their 'referent' may be.27 In an analogical way, nature of data of physics, at least at subatomic scales, cannot simply be defined in order of their own nature. Instead, in same way that even most straight forward, self-evident literal propositions of a sentence—even pure informative (or non-modalized) utterances Greimas and Courtes describe (Semiotics and Language, 10)—can always also be taken to be a figure for something metonymically of them (such as being behind doing, force behind events, very subject articulating propositions that Nietzsche describes), so of quantum physics also always be taken to be connected to something else outside that data: of (modally in flected) knowledge, quality of spatial and temporal position, semiotic system that governs interpretation.
When metaphysicians pay attention to theories in fundamental physics, they are usually interested in their implications for fundamental metaphysics: they want to know what the theories imply or suggest concerning the ultimate structure of reality. This essay, by contrast, is concerned with the “derivative metaphysics” of quantum mechanics. I will be considering a certain hypothesis about the fundamental structure of reality, which I will call H. I am interested in H because it strikes me as embodying the most obvious, flat-footed way to read an account of the fundamental structure of reality off the mathematical apparatus of elementary quantum mechanics. But I won’t be defending this claim here, or trying to argue that the members of H are more plausible than other accounts of the fundamental structure of reality inspired by quantum mechanics. Instead, my question is: if H were true, could there be (non-fundamentally speaking, of course) such ordinary objects as plants, planets and people? More specifically: could there be such ordinary objects as ourselves and the things we are familiar with, having more or less the ordinary properties we take them to have? And more generally: given that the fundamental structure of a possible world is such as to make H true, what is its correct description in ordinary terms? Of course, I care about these questions in part because I want to explore the extent to which we might have good reason to believe H, or something akin to it. But even if H turned out to be consistent with our ordinary knowledge about the world of ordinary objects, it would obviously take a lot more work to show that it has any serious claim on our credence. At a minimum, one would have to say something about how likely we should regard our evidence as being, given H; one would want to make some sort of survey of alternative hypotheses; and one would want to take into account our specialised scientific knowledge as well as our ordinary knowledge, including the facts that make trouble for elementary quantum mechanics and force us to look beyond it to quantum field theory and ultimately towards some kind of theory of quantum gravity.
Ninety years ago in 1927, at an international congress in Como, Italy, Niels Bohr gave an address which is recognized as the first instance in which the term "complementarity", as a physical concept, was spoken publicly [1], revealing Bohr's own thinking about Louis de Broglie's "duality". Bohr had very slowly accepted duality as a principle of physics: close observation of any quantum object will reveal either wave-like or particle-like behavior, one or the other of two fundamental and complementary features. Little disagreement exists today about complementarity's importance and broad applicability in quantum science. Book-length scholarly examinations even provide speculations about the relevance of complementarity in fields as different from physics as biology, psychology and social anthropology, connections which were apparently of interest to Bohr himself (see Jammer [2], Murdoch [3] and Whitaker [4]). Confusion evident in Como following his talk was not eliminated by Bohr's article [1], and complementarity has been subjected to nine decades of repeated examination ever since with no agreed resolution. Semi-popular treatments [5] as well as expert examinations [6-9] show that the topic cannot be avoided, and complementarity retains its central place in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, recent approaches by our group [10-13] and others [14-20] to the underlying notion of coherence now allow us to present a universal formulation of complementarity that may signal the end to the confusion. We demonstrate a new relationship that constrains the behavior of an electromagnetic field (quantum or classical) in the fundamental context of two-slit experiments. We show that entanglement is the ingredient needed to complete Bohr's formulation of complementarity, debated for decades because of its incompleteness.
While physicists pursue the search for the Grand Unified Theory (GUT) and the expedition to find the Higgs that ought to solidify the Standard Model, philosophers keep inquiring as to what the nature of matter and mind might be and propose various theories. At first sight, the high energy physicist or the philosopher, both human, and the elementary particle seem to have nothing in common, however we contend and argue in this paper that we are looking at different scales of what constitutes universal behaviour and use Herman Dooyeweerd's theory of Modal Aspects to bridge the particle to the mind. To other than a physicist the dual nature of the atom or the so-called elementary particles may be difficult to comprehend and certainly appears unfathomable to intuit. This is due to the fact that the dual nature of matter finds its anchoring within the theoretical and mathematical frameworks provided by quantum mechanics, the latter tends to not be easily accessible to most individual's intuition. What would the consequences be if human nature itself had a dual character? We all know that human nature is both egoistic and altruistic, however it is not often that one considers the fact that egoism is an individual behaviour, while altruism is a collective behaviour. Likewise a particle is an individual manifestation of what we call matter, while wave nature can be considered characteristic of collective behaviour of the same matter. Recent advances in experimental physics—the queen of reductionist science—aimed at solving the mysteries of the quantum world has led to a deepening of the mystery rather than easing it, dispelling the EPR paradox and pointing out a conceptional error in this now famous gedanken experiment, while lending some authority and validation to quantum mechanics. The strange features of the quantum world are founded on what Bohr dubbed complementarity, or the way a sub-particle entity can behave either as a wave or as a particle; and on Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which says that a quantum entity such as an electron does not avail itself to a deterministic exact measurement of both position and momentum simultaneously. Such postulates seem to contradict deeply held assumptions by the deterministic and materialistically oriented world of experimental physics where everything, including the atom, can be reduced to a single aspect. There are mounting calls for newer ways of understanding reality that are capable of handling these apparently strange incomprehensible phenomena revealed through the classical observation of the microscopic quantum world. There is also fundamental progress made in bouncing cosmology theories that bridge general relativity to quantum mechanics and provide some insight into the nature of the universe and its transition and pre-history through the big bang. The thrust of this paper evolves around two pillars. One, is that that the apparent logical fissure emergent in reductionist thought, coming from orthodox science and the application of the scientific method that is manifest in what we know and do not understand in quantum mechanics, can be liaised to our intellectual understanding through the perspective offered by Herman Dooyeweerd's theory of Modal Aspects. The other, is the central and special role humans have in relation to the universe. Through this approach, we will argue that the dual nature of the atom or elementary particles is, rather than being a strange phenomenon, in fact an essential characteristic of what constitutes its nature
From the preceding exposition it follows that not only physics but natural science as a whole is basically dependent on ordinary language. The complementarity of quantum physics displays the fundamental interdependence of observation and description of natural phenomena, and the very objectivity of natural science relies directly on the differentiation of experiences into external and private phenomena afforded by ordinary language. Because of the extreme smallness of the quantum of action the complementarity of physical phenomena is not experienced either in daily life or in classical physics. But the interdependence of observation and description of phenomena prevails as much in classical science as in quantum physics. The very aim of experimental investigation is to perform observations in those particular ways which make possible the communication of information sufficient for the reproduction of the observed phenomena. Concordantly the elementary physical variables, which are indispensable to any systematic analysis in natural science, are defined through reference to measuring arrangements constructed so as to be unambiguously describable in ordinary language. Thus no scientific formula, law, or result of measurement can be given objective significance independent of ordinary language. Through every hierarchy of descriptions in natural science ordinary language penetrates as the unambiguity of propositions.