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Optica

Experimental demonstration of continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution over optical fiber

Yan Tian, Pu Perry Wang, Jianqiang Liu, Shanna Du, Wenyuan Liu, Zhenguo Lu, Xuyang Wang, Yongmin Li

Published Mar 30, 2022• 91 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all side-channel attacks on detectors. In the context of the dramatic progress of discrete-variable MDI-QKD and twin-field QKD, owing to the critical challenge of continuous-variable (CV) Bell-state measurement (BSM) of two remote independent quantum states, experimental demonstration of CV-MDI-QKD over optical fiber has remained elusive. To solve this problem, a technology for CV-BSM of remote independent quantum states is developed that consists of optical phase locking, phase estimation, real-time phase feedback, and quadrature remapping in the present work. With this technology, CV-BSM is accurately implemented, and the first CV-MDI-QKD over optical fiber is demonstrated, to our knowledge. The achieved secret key rates are 0.43 (0.19) bits per pulse over a 5-km (10-km) optical fiber. Our work shows that it is feasible to build a CV-MDI-QKD system over optical fiber. Further, the results pave the way towards realization of a high secret key rate and low-cost metropolitan MDI-QKD network, and serve as a stepping stone to a CV quantum repeater.

DOI
10.1364/optica.450573

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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all side-channel attacks on detectors. In the context of the dramatic progress of discrete-variable MDI-QKD and twin-field QKD, owing to the critical challenge of continuous-variable (CV) Bell-state measurement (BSM) of two remote independent quantum states, experimental demonstration of CV-MDI-QKD over optical fiber has remained elusive. To solve this problem, a technology for CV-BSM of remote independent quantum states is developed that consists of optical phase locking, phase estimation, real-time phase feedback, and quadrature remapping in the present work. With this technology, CV-BSM is accurately implemented, and the first CV-MDI-QKD over optical fiber is demonstrated, to our knowledge. The achieved secret key rates are 0.43 (0.19) bits per pulse over a 5-km (10-km) optical fiber. Our work shows that it is feasible to build a CV-MDI-QKD system over optical fiber. Further, the results pave the way towards realization of a high secret key rate and low-cost metropolitan MDI-QKD network, and serve as a stepping stone to a CV quantum repeater.
Continuous-variable measurement-independent-device quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) can offer high secure key rate at metropolitan distance and remove all side channel loopholes of detection as well. However, there is no in-field experimental demonstration of CV-MDI-QKD due to the remote distance phase-locking techniques challenge. Here, we present a new optical scheme to overcome this difficulty and also removes the requirement of two identical independent lasers. Furthermore, we give an alternate but detailed proof of the minimized key rate condition to extract the secure key rate. We anticipate that our new scheme can be used to demonstrate the in-field CV-MDI-QKD experiment and build the CV-MDI-QKD network with untrusted source.
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) allows remote parties to share information-theoretical secure keys while defending all the side-channel attacks on measurement devices. However, the secure transmission distance and the secret key rate are quite limited due to the high untrusted equivalent excess noise in the Gaussian modulation. More particularly, extremely high-efficiency homodyne detections are required for even non-zero secure transmission distances, which directly restrict its practical realization. Here, we propose a CV-MDI-QKD protocol by encoding the key information into matched discrete phases of two groups of coherent states, which decreases the required detection efficiency for ideally asymmetric cases, and makes it possible to practically achieve secure key distribution with current low-efficiency homodyne detections. Besides, a proof-of-principle experiment with a locally generated oscillator is implemented, which, for the first time, demonstrates the realizability of CV-MDI-QKD using all fiber-based devices. The discrete-modulated phase-matching method provides an alternative direction of an applicable quantum key distribution with practical security.
Abstract Building scalable and secure quantum networks requires advanced quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that support multi-user connectivity. Continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD, which eliminates all detector side-channel attacks, is a promising candidate for creating various quantum network topologies-such as quantum access networks and star-type topologies-using standard technology and providing high secure key rates. However, its security has so far only been experimentally demonstrated in asymptotic regimes with limited secret key rates and complex experimental setups, limiting its practical applications. Here, we report an experimental validation of a CV MDI-QKD system, achieving a secure key rate of 2.6 Mbit s −1 against collective attacks in the finite-size regime over a 10 km fiber link. This is achieved using a new system design, incorporating a locally generated local oscillator, a new relay structure, a real-time phase locking system, and a well-designed digital-signal-processing pipeline for quantum state preparation and CV Bell measurements at a symbol rate of 20 MBaud. Our results set a new benchmark for secure key exchange and open the possibility of establishing high-performance CV MDI-QKD networks, paving the way toward a scalable quantum network.
Continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) can remove the feasible side-channel attacks on detectors based on the accurate Bell-state measurement (BSM), where an optical amplitude modulator (AM) plays a crucial role in managing the intensity of the transmitted light pulse. However, the AM-involved practical security has remained elusive as the operating frequency of the AM usually determines the actual secret key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD system. We find that an imperfect pulse generated from the AM at high speed can lead to a challenge to the practical security as a minor intensity change of the light pulse can bring about a potential information leakage. Taking advantage of this flaw, we suggest an attack strategy targeting the embedded AM in CV-MDI-QKD without sending the local oscillator (LO). This attack can damage the AM and thus decrease the estimated secret key rate of the system even when the orthogonal local LO (LLO) scheme is carried out. To assess the practical security risk resulting from the leaked information from the AM, we conduct numerical simulations to demonstrate the influence of the AM on the CVMDI-QKD system.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two legitimate parties to share a secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper. The unconditional security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. Original security proofs of QKD are based on a few assumptions, e.g., perfect single photon sources and perfect single-photon detectors. However, practical implementations of QKD systems do not fully comply with such assumptions due to technical limitations. The gap between theory and implementations leads to security loopholes in most QKD systems, and several attacks have been launched on sophisticated QKD systems. Particularly, the detectors have been found to be the most vulnerable part of QKD. Much effort has been put to build side-channel-free QKD systems. Solutions such as security patches and device-independent QKD have been proposed. However, the former are normally ad-hoc, and cannot close unidentified loopholes. The latter, while having the advantages of removing all assumptions on devices, is impractical to implement today. Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) turns out to be a promising solution to the security problem of QKD. In MDI-QKD, all security loopholes, including those yet-to-be discovered, have been removed from the detectors, the most critical part in QKD. In this thesis, we investigate issues related to the practical implementation and security of MDI-QKD. We first present a demonstration of polarization-encoding MDI-QKD. Taking finite key effect into account, we achieve a secret key rate of 0.005 bit per second (bps) over 10 km spooled telecom fiber, and a 1600-bit key is distributed. This work, together with other demonstrations, shows the practicality of MDI-QKD. Next we investigate a critical assumption of MDI-QKD: perfect state preparation. We apply the loss-tolerant QKD protocol and adapt it to MDI-QKD to quantify information leakage due to imperfect state preparation. We then present an experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD over 10 km and 40 km of spooled fiber, which for the first time considers the impact of inaccurate polarization state preparation on the secret key rate. This would not have been possible under previous security proofs, given the same amount of state preparation flaws.
The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol is immune to imperfect measurement devices. However, its practicality and performance when implemented in continuous-variable (CV) mode are still not satisfactory. We propose a CV-MDI-QKD protocol based on modulated squeezed states, and analyze its security against two-mode Gaussian attack. The results show that the protocol can achieve a higher secret key rate and transmission distance than previous coherent-state and squeezed-state protocols. A method to compensate the imperfection of a practical homodyne detector using phase-sensitive optical amplifiers is also presented. By setting an appropriate optical amplification gain, realistic detectors with ordinary quantum efficiency can be employed. In addition, we discuss the impact of finite-size effects on the secret key rate of the protocol. The methods presented may aid in the practical application of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.