Camellia, after AES, is one of the most competitive block cipher algorithms. It has been widely used in many fields of information security. Camellia's distinctive nonlinear component is the S-box. This paper studies how to build the quantum circuit of the Camellia S-box at lower costs. First, the multiplicative inversion in F_2^8can be obtained by the multiplicative inversion (and multiplication) in F_2^4via a mapping matrix, and the latter can be implemented by the automation tool LIGHTER-R. The affine transformation of the S-box is then implemented with CNOT and NOT gates using the PLU decomposition and elimination approach. Finally, the Camellia S-box quantum circuit is built with 20 qubits, 54 Toffoli gates, 196 CNOT gates, 13 NOT gates, and a Toffoli depth of 42. In comparison with the previous study, which required 23 qubits, 67 Toffoli, and 38 CNOT gates, and a Toffoli depth of 53, the S-box quantum circuit in this paper requires fewer resources. Furthermore, the S-box quantum circuit used in the study can reduce the quantum resources in implementing Camellia, reducing the quantum circuit scale required to attack Camellia by the Grover algorithm.Camellia, after AES, is one of the most competitive block cipher algorithms. It has been widely used in many fields of information security. Camellia's distinctive nonlinear component is the S-box. This paper studies how to build the quantum circuit of the Camellia S-box at lower costs. First, the multiplicative inversion in F_2^8can be obtained by the multiplicative inversion (and multiplication) in F_2^4via a mapping matrix, and the latter can be implemented by the automation tool LIGHTER-R. The affine transformation of the S-box is then implemented with CNOT and NOT gates using the PLU decomposition and elimination approach. Finally, the Camellia S-box quantum circuit is built with 20 qubits, 54 Toffoli gates, 196 CNOT gates, 13 NOT gates, and a Toffoli depth of 42. In comparison with the previous study, which required 23 qubits, 67 Toffoli, and 38 CNOT gates, and a Toffoli depth of 53, the S-box quantum circuit in this paper requires fewer resources. Furthermore, the S-box quantum circuit used in the study can reduce the quantum resources in implementing Camellia, reducing the quantum circuit scale required to attack Camellia by the Grover algorithm.

Zhongguo kexue. Wulixue Lixue TianwenxueMar 2, 20235 citations

Efficient Universal Quantum Circuits

Debajyoti Bera, Stephen Fenner, Frederic Green +1 more

Lecture notes in computer scienceJan 1, 20092 citations

Optimized Quantum Circuit Design and Grover Search Resource Estimation for the Camellia Block Cipher

Vandana B Patil

With the advancement of quantum computing, quantum circuit implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms are essential for evaluating their resistance to quantum attacks. As an ISO-standardized cipher, the efficient quantum circuit construction of Camellia is of great significance. Focusing on minimizing the DW-cost (qubits × Toffoli-depth) while balancing ancilla qubits and Toffoli-depth, this paper proposes an optimized quantum circuit design for Camellia. Specifically: (1) using a serial-multiplication and out-of-place inversion architecture under composite-field decomposition, combined with hierarchical screening for parallelizing bilinear multiplications, a compact in-place S-box quantum circuit is constructed with a DW-cost of 276, 28% lower than the state of the art; (2) a low-gate-count linear-layer circuit is obtained via heuristic search, and gate-sequence reordering then reduces the full depth from 9 to 7 without increasing the gate count; (3) Camellia-128/192/256 quantum circuits are constructed with DW-costs of 119,168, 257,664, and 257,664, achieving reductions of 48%, 52%, and 52% respectively over prior work. A pipelined Grover oracle is further designed and the total resources required for a full Grover search attacking Camellia are evaluated. For Camellia-128, the complete Grover search requires a T-depth of 2.10 × 2⁷⁶ and a total TDW-cost (qubits × T-depth) of 1.00 × 2⁸⁶, reducing T-depth by 75% and TDW-cost by 84% over prior work. The first full Grover search resource estimates for Camellia-192/256 are also presented, with T-depths of 7.20 × 2¹⁰⁸ and 8.11 × 2¹⁴⁰ and TDW-costs of 2.03 × 2¹²³ and 2.79 × 2¹⁵³, respectively. These results show that Grover's attack on Camellia requires fewer quantum resources than on AES at the 128-bit level, implying comparatively weaker post-quantum security at that key size, while the picture reverses at larger key sizes (Section 4).With the advancement of quantum computing, quantum circuit implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms are essential for evaluating their resistance to quantum attacks. As an ISO-standardized cipher, the efficient quantum circuit construction of Camellia is of great significance. Focusing on minimizing the DW-cost (qubits × Toffoli-depth) while balancing ancilla qubits and Toffoli-depth, this paper proposes an optimized quantum circuit design for Camellia. Specifically: (1) using a serial-multiplication and out-of-place inversion architecture under composite-field decomposition, combined with hierarchical screening for parallelizing bilinear multiplications, a compact in-place S-box quantum circuit is constructed with a DW-cost of 276, 28% lower than the state of the art; (2) a low-gate-count linear-layer circuit is obtained via heuristic search, and gate-sequence reordering then reduces the full depth from 9 to 7 without increasing the gate count; (3) Camellia-128/192/256 quantum circuits are constructed with DW-costs of 119,168, 257,664, and 257,664, achieving reductions of 48%, 52%, and 52% respectively over prior work. A pipelined Grover oracle is further designed and the total resources required for a full Grover search attacking Camellia are evaluated. For Camellia-128, the complete Grover search requires a T-depth of 2.10 × 2⁷⁶ and a total TDW-cost (qubits × T-depth) of 1.00 × 2⁸⁶, reducing T-depth by 75% and TDW-cost by 84% over prior work. The first full Grover search resource estimates for Camellia-192/256 are also presented, with T-depths of 7.20 × 2¹⁰⁸ and 8.11 × 2¹⁴⁰ and TDW-costs of 2.03 × 2¹²³ and 2.79 × 2¹⁵³, respectively. These results show that Grover's attack on Camellia requires fewer quantum resources than on AES at the 128-bit level, implying comparatively weaker post-quantum security at that key size, while the picture reverses at larger key sizes (Section 4).

Journal of Intelligent Decision Making and Information ScienceSep 16, 20260 citations

Quantum Circuits of SM4 and Camellia with Lower T $T$ ‐depth

Da Lin, Zhenqiang Li, Bing Sun +1 more

Abstract With the rapid development of quantum technology, modern cryptography is facing an increasing number of security threats. Given that the quantum circuit of symmetric‐key ciphers frequently serves as the core element of quantum attacks, it has attracted extensive attention. In this work, it is investigated that how the quantum circuit of SM4 and Camellia can be implemented with lower ‐depth. First, a general framework is proposed for designing Substitution‐box (S‐box) circuits with optimized ‐depth. Based on the framework, quantum circuits are respectively designed for SM4 S‐box and Camellia S‐box with ‐depth 4. Compared with existing quantum circuits requiring a ‐depth of 4, our circuits consume fewer qubits and quantum gates, as well as lower full depth. Besides, S‐box quantum circuits are introduced with ‐depth 3 for SM4 and Camellia for the first time. As an application, the designed S‐box circuits can reduce the ‐depth requiring for the subroutine and stand‐alone circuits of SM4 from 132 and 260 in the previous work to 99 and 195. Additionally, the ‐depth requiring for the subroutine and stand‐alone circuits of Camellia‐128/‐192/‐256 can be reduced from 92/126/126 and 108/150/150 in the previous work to 70/96/96 and 82/114/114, respectively.Abstract With the rapid development of quantum technology, modern cryptography is facing an increasing number of security threats. Given that the quantum circuit of symmetric‐key ciphers frequently serves as the core element of quantum attacks, it has attracted extensive attention. In this work, it is investigated that how the quantum circuit of SM4 and Camellia can be implemented with lower ‐depth. First, a general framework is proposed for designing Substitution‐box (S‐box) circuits with optimized ‐depth. Based on the framework, quantum circuits are respectively designed for SM4 S‐box and Camellia S‐box with ‐depth 4. Compared with existing quantum circuits requiring a ‐depth of 4, our circuits consume fewer qubits and quantum gates, as well as lower full depth. Besides, S‐box quantum circuits are introduced with ‐depth 3 for SM4 and Camellia for the first time. As an application, the designed S‐box circuits can reduce the ‐depth requiring for the subroutine and stand‐alone circuits of SM4 from 132 and 260 in the previous work to 99 and 195. Additionally, the ‐depth requiring for the subroutine and stand‐alone circuits of Camellia‐128/‐192/‐256 can be reduced from 92/126/126 and 108/150/150 in the previous work to 70/96/96 and 82/114/114, respectively.

Advanced Quantum TechnologiesJun 25, 20251 citation

Quantum Circuits and Computation

François Chapeau‐Blondeau

Springer eBooksJan 1, 20260 citations