The quantum model has been considered to be advantageous over the Markov model in explaining irrational behaviors (e.g., the disjunction effect) during decision making. Here, we reviewed and re-examined the ability of the quantum belief–action entanglement (BAE) model and the Markov belief–action (BA) model in explaining the disjunction effect considering a more realistic setting. The results indicate that neither of the two models can truly represent the underlying cognitive mechanism. Thus, we proposed a more realistic Markov model to explain the disjunction effect in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In this model, the probability transition pattern of a decision maker (DM) is dependent on the information about the opponent’s action, Also, the relationship between the cognitive components in the evolution dynamics is moderated by the DM’s degree of subjective uncertainty (DSN). The results show that the disjunction effect can be well predicted by a more realistic Markov model. Model comparison suggests the superiority of the proposed Markov model over the quantum BAE model in terms of absolute model performance, relative model performance, and model flexibility. Therefore, we suggest that the key to successfully explaining the disjunction effect is to consider the underlying cognitive mechanism properly.
The quantum model has been considered to be advantageous over the Markov model in explaining irrational behaviors (e.g., the disjunction effect) during decision making. Here, we reviewed and re-examined the ability of the quantum belief–action entanglement (BAE) model and the Markov belief–action (BA) model in explaining the disjunction effect considering a more realistic setting. The results indicate that neither of the two models can truly represent the underlying cognitive mechanism. Thus, we proposed a more realistic Markov model to explain the disjunction effect in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In this model, the probability transition pattern of a decision maker (DM) is dependent on the information about the opponent’s action, Also, the relationship between the cognitive components in the evolution dynamics is moderated by the DM’s degree of subjective uncertainty (DSN). The results show that the disjunction effect can be well predicted by a more realistic Markov model. Model comparison suggests the superiority of the proposed Markov model over the quantum BAE model in terms of absolute model performance, relative model performance, and model flexibility. Therefore, we suggest that the key to successfully explaining the disjunction effect is to consider the underlying cognitive mechanism properly.
In cognitive psychology, some experiments of games were reported [1, 2, 3, 4], and these demonstrated that real players did not use the "rational strategy" provided by classical game theory. To discuss probabilities of such "irrational choice", recently, we proposed a decision-making model which is based on the formalism of quantum mechanics [5, 6, 7, 8]. In this paper, we briefly explain the above model and calculate the probability of irrational choice in several prisoner's dilemma (PD) games.
In classical game theory, the rational behavior for the player is to make the decision which is approaching Nash equilibrium. The Prisoner's Dilemma, which is a canonical game, is often used to present the rationality. In real experiment in cognitive psychology which were performed by Tversky and Shafir, the statistical data show the existence of the irrational behaviors in reality. The phenomenon is called disjunction effect. To explain why it probably happens, we review the Asano-Khrennikov-Ohya model which is the mathematical modeling of the process of decision making in the game of Prisoner's Dilemma. It applies only the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics to the decision making process rather than the quantum physical model. In this paper, we present several numerical simulations for the Asano-Khrennikov-Ohya model together with the graphs of the von Neumann entropy for the solutions. By analyzing the simulation results, we explicitly and numerically present the existence of the irrational behavior for the player which is generated by the Asano-Khrennikov-Ohya model.
The disjunction effect in human decision making is often taken to show that the classical law of total probability is violated, motivating quantum-like models. We re-examine this claim for the Prisoner's Dilemma disjunction effect. Under the mental-event reading of the opponent-choice events, the conventional classical decision-process model implicitly builds in a certainty-only premise: its standard partition assumptions leave no room for ambiguity, forcing every participant to be certain that the opponent will defect or will cooperate. We relax this by introducing a new classical model in which each participant carries a continuous expectation parameter representing the anticipated likelihood of opponent defection, and the participant pool is partitioned by expectation level; the resulting ambiguity set is precisely the union of the interior expectation bins. In contrast, under the quantum-like event semantics, ambiguous pure states are generic (dense and of full unitarily invariant measure on the unit sphere), so "certainty states" are mathematically exceptional. We prove that an instance of our classical model can realize any empirically observed triple of defection rates across the three information conditions, including strong disjunction-effect patterns, while strictly obeying the classical law of total probability. We further prove that for any such triple produced by a standard quantum-like model of the same experiment, there exists a classical instance reproducing it exactly. In this sense, classical and quantum-like approaches have the same observable-rate expressiveness; their substantive difference lies in how ambiguity is represented and in their respective event semantics, not in a breakdown of classical probability.
One of the most puzzling findings in decision research field is the disjunction effect. Several studies demonstrate that the disjunction effect exists in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma game. This effect violates the sure-thing principle and cannot be explained by classical decision-making models. During the recent decade, quantum decision making models have been established on the basis of the mathematical structure and methodologies of quantum mechanics. Owing to their special theoretical structures, quantum decision-making models are well suited for explaining the disjunction effect, although these models continue to encounter difficulties. This study aims to overcome the difficulties in existing quantum decision-making models by developing a modified model. To achieve this goal, the deficiencies of the previous models were analyzed. We concluded three deficiencies: 1) Although previous quantum decision-making models can account for the disjunction effect, they can also obtain findings that defy the experimental results and common sense. 2) They cannot explain the disjunction effect with large values in certain experiments (e.g., the experiment of Shafir & Tversky, 1992 ). 3) They cannot properly illustrate the relationship between the utility of decision maker’s pay off and the scale of the disjunction effect. The reasons for these difficulties were investigated. An important reason is that previous quantum decision-making models ignore that the decision maker may consider another’s pay off based on different decision conditions. Another reason is the over-simplicity of the utility function. With the above analyses as basis, we adopted the equate-to-differentiate method to rebuild the quantum decision-making model. In this new model, whether the decision maker considers another’s pay off or not based on a specific decision condition is determined with the equate-to-differentiate method. In addition, the utility function is redefined by value function and hyperbolic tangent transformation. Results revealed that the new quantum decision-making model overcomes the difficulties in previous quantum decision-making models. The proposed model is an integration of heuristic and computational or mathematical models. This ideal model integration deserves much attention and has good theoretical significance and application prospects.
We proceed towards an application of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to cognitive psychology — the problem of decision-making in games of the Prisoners Dilemma type. These games were used as tests of rationality of players. Experiments performed in cognitive psychology by Shafir and Tversky [1, 2], Croson [3], Hofstader [4, 5] demonstrated that in general real players do not use "rational strategy" provided by classical game theory; this psychological phenomenon was called the disjunction effect. We elaborate a model of quantum-like decision making which can explain this effect ("irrationality" of plays). Our model is based on quantum information theory. The main result of this paper is the derivation of Gorini-Kossakowski-Sudarshan-Lindblad equation whose equilibrium solution gives the quantum state used for decision making. It is the first application of this equation in cognitive psychology.
Recent results from cognitive psychology suggest that human behavior can be, in some situations, better described by laws known from physical quantum theory. This work responds to this development and seeks to answer the question of how quantum models of cognition and decision-making can contribute to our understanding of the social world. We introduce the approaches to the application of quantum theory in social sciences - quantum consciousness, quantum reasoning and quantum metaphor and further develop the second, in the context of strategic interaction in game theory. We show that the quantum model corresponds to both the psychological intuition and many empirically known anomalies such as the order effect, disjunction effect, or context effect. In this work, we derive a specific model of strategic interaction between two players, and we test it in the experimental Prisoner's Dilemma game. The model is based on the rational choice theory, which is nevertheless re-defined when it is shown how the strategic choice is changed if the quantum probability (C*-algebra) is used as the underlying theory instead of classical probability (σ-algebra). The results obtained support the quantum model and showed a different representation of the game among various groups of players. The quantum model of...