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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences

Adaptive-ID Secure Hierarchical ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions without Random Oracles

Ren Ishibashi, Kazuki Yoneyama

Published Mar 23, 2022• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Hierarchical ID-based authenticated key exchange (HID-AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to establish a common session key between parties with authentication based on their IDs with the hierarchical delegation of key generation functionality. All existing HID-AKE schemes are selective ID secure, and the only known standard model scheme relies on a non-standard assumption such as the q-type assumption. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of HID-AKE that is adaptive ID secure in the HID-eCK model (maximal-exposure-resilient security model) without random oracles. One of the concrete instantiations of our generic construction achieves the first adaptive ID secure HID-AKE scheme under the (standard) k-lin assumption in the standard model. Furthermore, it has the advantage that the computational complexity of pairing and exponentiation operations and the communication complexity do not depend on the depth of the hierarchy. Also, the other concrete instantiation achieves the first HID-AKE scheme based on lattices (i.e., post-quantum).

DOI
10.1587/transfun.2021dmp0002

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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences•Jan 1, 2013•8 citations
Hierarchical ID-based authenticated key exchange (HID-AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to establish a common session key between parties with authentication based on their IDs with the hierarchical delegation of key generation functionality. All existing HID-AKE schemes are selective ID secure, and the only known standard model scheme relies on a non-standard assumption such as the q-type assumption. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of HID-AKE that is adaptive ID secure in the HID-eCK model (maximal-exposure-resilient security model) without random oracles. One of the concrete instantiations of our generic construction achieves the first adaptive ID secure HID-AKE scheme under the (standard) k-lin assumption in the standard model. Furthermore, it has the advantage that the computational complexity of pairing and exponentiation operations and the communication complexity do not depend on the depth of the hierarchy. Also, the other concrete instantiation achieves the first HID-AKE scheme based on lattices (i.e., post-quantum).
ID-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) is a cryptographic tool to establish a common session key between parties with authentication based on their IDs. If IDs contain some hierarchical structure such as an e-mail address, hierarchical ID-AKE (HID-AKE) is especially suitable because of scalability. However, most of existing HID-AKE schemes do not satisfy advanced security properties such as forward secrecy, and the only known strongly secure HID-AKE scheme is inefficient. In this paper, we propose a new HID-AKE scheme which achieves both strong security and efficiency. We prove that our scheme is eCK-secure (which ensures maximal-exposure-resilience including forward secrecy) without random oracles, while existing schemes is proved in the random oracle model. Moreover, the number of messages and pairing operations are independent of the hierarchy depth; that is, really scalable and practical for a large-system.
ID-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) is a cryptographic tool to establish a common session key between parties with authentication based on their IDs. If IDs contain some hierarchical structure such as an email address, hierarchical ID-AKE (HID-AKE) is especially suitable because of scalability. However, most of existing HID-AKE schemes do not satisfy advanced security properties such as forward secrecy, and the only known strongly secure HID-AKE scheme is inefficient. In this paper, we propose a new HID-AKE scheme which achieves both strong security and efficiency. We prove that our scheme is eCK-secure (which ensures maximal-exposure-resilience including forward secrecy) without random oracles, while existing schemes is proved in the random oracle model. Moreover, the number of messages and pairing operations are independent of the hierarchy depth; that is, really scalable and practical for a large-system.
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to share a common session key among multiple parties. Usually, PKI-based AKE schemes are designed to guarantee secrecy of the session key and mutual authentication. However, in practice, there are many cases where mutual authentication is undesirable such as in anonymous networks like Tor and Riffle, or difficult to achieve due to the certificate management at the user level such as the Internet. Goldberg et al. formulated a model of anonymous one-sided AKE which guarantees the anonymity of the client by allowing only the client to authenticate the server, and proposed a concrete scheme. However, existing anonymous one-sided AKE schemes are only known to be secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose generic constructions of anonymous one-sided AKE in the random oracle model and in the standard model, respectively. Our constructions allow us to construct the first post-quantum anonymous one-sided AKE scheme from isogenies in the standard model.
Abstract. An unresolved problem in research on authenticated key exchange (AKE) is to construct a secure protocol against advanced attacks such as key compromise impersonation and maximal exposure attacks without relying on random oracles. HMQV, a state of the art AKE protocol, achieves both efficiency and the strong security proposed by Krawczyk (we call it the CK + model), which includes resistance to advanced attacks. However, the security proof is given under the random oracle model. We propose a generic construction of AKE from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). The construction is based on a chosen-ciphertext secure KEM, and the resultant AKE protocol is CK + secure in the standard model. The construction gives the first CK + secure AKE protocols based on the hardness of integer factorization problem, code-based problems, or learning problems with errors. In addition, instantiations under the Diffie-Hellman assumption or its variant can be proved to have strong security without non-standard assumptions such as πPRF and KEA1. Furthermore, we extend the CK + model to identity-based (called the id-CK + model), and propose a generic construction of identity-based AKE (ID-AKE) based on identity-based KEM, which satisfies id-CK + security. The construction leads first strongly secure ID-AKE protocols under the hardness of integer factorization problem, or learning problems with errors.
A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.