Key Exchanges

Rachel Pei Chin Won

Amina Rashad, Magcd Ibrahim, Zaki Nossair

Authenticated key exchange protocols have an important role for building secure communications amongst two or more entities over the networks. Two party authenticated key exchange protocols where each pair of parties must share a secret with each other; a three-party protocol does not cause any key management problem for the parties. In this paper, an extension of two-party key exchange protocol, which is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. is proposed. In this protocol each user exchanges secret key with server then each user uses this secret key to exchange session key with each other. The efficiency and the security analysis of this new key exchange protocol are proven in this paper.

Jungsang Kim, Seema Somani, Y. Yamamoto

R.Pitch, S. Saranya

We propose two public-key schemes to achieve deniable authentication for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Authentication in security had is the essential factor in the key establishment over Internet. The Deniable Internet key exchange protocol gives more value to the IKE standard. Our schemes can in some situations be more efficient than existing IKE protocols as well as having stronger deniability properties. Key-exchange, in particular Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHKE), is among the core cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring network security. For key-exchange over the Internet, both security and privacy are desired. In this paper, we develop a family of privacy-preserving authenticated DHKE protocols named deniable Internet key-exchange (DIKE), both in the traditional PKI setting and in the identity-based setting. The newly developed DIKE protocols are of conceptual clarity and practical (online) efficiency. They provide useful privacy protection to both protocol participants, and add novelty and new value to the IKE standard.

Arash Atashpendar, Guru-Vamsi Policharla, Peter Browne Rønne +1 more

We revisit the notion of deniability in quantum key exchange (QKE), a topic that remains largely unexplored. In the only work on this subject by Donald Beaver, it is argued that QKE is not necessarily deniable due to an eavesdropping attack that limits key equivocation. We provide more insight into the nature of this attack and how it extends to other constructions such as QKE obtained from uncloneable encryption. We then adopt the framework for quantum authenticated key exchange, developed by Mosca et al., and extend it to introduce the notion of coercer-deniable QKE, formalized in terms of the indistinguishability of real and fake coercer views. Next, we apply results from a recent work by Arrazola and Scarani on covert quantum communication to establish a connection between covert QKE and deniability. We propose DC-QKE, a simple deniable covert QKE protocol, and prove its deniability via a reduction to the security of covert QKE. Finally, we consider how entanglement distillation can be used to enable information-theoretically deniable protocols for QKE and tasks beyond key exchange.

R. Shankar