Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences

Information Leakage Measurement in a Distributed Computation Protocol

Shinichi Kawamura

Published Jan 25, 1995• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

The Varieties of Secure Distributed Computation

Matthew K. Franklin, Moti M. Yung

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1993•15 citations

Prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution from a bound on information leakage

Abhishek Mishra, Michele Masini, Maria Balanzó-Juandó +2 more

Every quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol must limit the information available outside the users' laboratories. In device-independent QKD this is essentially the only assumption made on the devices. In a prepare-and-measure setting it cannot be imposed strictly, since the sender's device must emit a signal that depends on her private input. The natural replacement, and a minimal one, is a leakage bound: a bound on how much information about the input leaves the sender's laboratory, through the intended signal or through any side channel. We ask how far this unavoidable requirement can replace a detailed model of the source. We show that this single bound, quantified by the probability of guessing the input from everything the source emits, suffices to prove security against collective attacks. In our analysis, nothing is assumed about the precise form of the emitted states, their dimension, energy or purity, nor about the receiver's measurement device, beyond the standard requirement that it does not leak Bob's data. The standard B92 and BB84 protocols do not certify any key under this minimal leakage bound assumption. But closely related protocols can and, in the ideal limit, achieve one secret bit per key round. For noisy implementations, we compute key rates using semidefinite programming relaxations. Our best protocols tolerate visibilities down to 0.84, corresponding to an 8% quantum bit error rate, compared with the 11% threshold of standard device-dependent BB84.

quant-pharXiv:2610.37296•Oct 28, 2026•0 citations

Minimization of information leakage in continuous-variable quantum key distribution

Matthew S. Winnel, Nedasadat Hosseinidehaj, Timothy C. Ralph

The authors explore the information leakage in a continuous-variable communication protocol in quantum key distribution due to the asymmetry of the protocol. The proposed symmetric minimum-leakage heralding protocol asymptotically eliminates information leakage in a pure-loss channel and minimizes leakage in a noisy channel.

arXiv:2101.08965•Physical Review A•Jul 13, 2021•3 citations

On-Line/Off-Line Leakage Resilient Secure Computation Protocols

Chaya Ganesh, Vipul Goyal, Satya Lokam

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2012•1 citation

Leakage Benchmarking for Universal Gate Sets

Bujiao Wu, Xiaoyang Wang, Xiao Yuan +2 more

Errors are common issues in quantum computing platforms, among which leakage is one of the most-challenging to address. This is because leakage, i.e., the loss of information stored in the computational subspace to undesired subspaces in a larger Hilbert space, is more difficult to detect and correct than errors that preserve the computational subspace. As a result, leakage presents a significant obstacle to the development of fault-tolerant quantum computation. In this paper, we propose an efficient and accurate benchmarking framework called leakage randomized benchmarking (LRB), for measuring leakage rates on multi-qubit quantum systems. Our approach is more insensitive to state preparation and measurement (SPAM) noise than existing leakage benchmarking protocols, requires fewer assumptions about the gate set itself, and can be used to benchmark multi-qubit leakages, which has not been achieved previously. We also extended the LRB protocol to an interleaved variant called interleaved LRB (iLRB), which can benchmark the average leakage rate of generic n-site quantum gates with reasonable noise assumptions. We demonstrate the iLRB protocol on benchmarking generic two-qubit gates realized using flux tuning and analyzed the behavior of iLRB under corresponding leakage models. Our numerical experiments showed good agreement with the theoretical estimations, indicating the feasibility of both the LRB and iLRB protocols.

arXiv:2304.07884•Entropy•Jan 13, 2024•3 citations

Phase-error estimation for quantum key distribution with leaky receivers

Álvaro Navarrete, Margarida Pereira, Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo +3 more

Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) receivers may leak information about their measurement outcomes and settings to the channel (e.g., through detector backflashes or back-reflected Trojan-horse light) that could compromise the protocol's security. Here we present a simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes. The proof requires only a bound on the distinguishability of the side-channel states. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and compatible with existing security proofs that address detector and source imperfections, making it applicable to a wide range of practical QKD implementations.

quant-pharXiv:2608.09674•Aug 11, 2026•0 citations
Every quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol must limit the information available outside the users' laboratories. In device-independent QKD this is essentially the only assumption made on the devices. In a prepare-and-measure setting it cannot be imposed strictly, since the sender's device must emit a signal that depends on her private input. The natural replacement, and a minimal one, is a leakage bound: a bound on how much information about the input leaves the sender's laboratory, through the intended signal or through any side channel. We ask how far this unavoidable requirement can replace a detailed model of the source. We show that this single bound, quantified by the probability of guessing the input from everything the source emits, suffices to prove security against collective attacks. In our analysis, nothing is assumed about the precise form of the emitted states, their dimension, energy or purity, nor about the receiver's measurement device, beyond the standard requirement that it does not leak Bob's data. The standard B92 and BB84 protocols do not certify any key under this minimal leakage bound assumption. But closely related protocols can and, in the ideal limit, achieve one secret bit per key round. For noisy implementations, we compute key rates using semidefinite programming relaxations. Our best protocols tolerate visibilities down to 0.84, corresponding to an 8% quantum bit error rate, compared with the 11% threshold of standard device-dependent BB84.
Errors are common issues in quantum computing platforms, among which leakage is one of the most-challenging to address. This is because leakage, i.e., the loss of information stored in the computational subspace to undesired subspaces in a larger Hilbert space, is more difficult to detect and correct than errors that preserve the computational subspace. As a result, leakage presents a significant obstacle to the development of fault-tolerant quantum computation. In this paper, we propose an efficient and accurate benchmarking framework called leakage randomized benchmarking (LRB), for measuring leakage rates on multi-qubit quantum systems. Our approach is more insensitive to state preparation and measurement (SPAM) noise than existing leakage benchmarking protocols, requires fewer assumptions about the gate set itself, and can be used to benchmark multi-qubit leakages, which has not been achieved previously. We also extended the LRB protocol to an interleaved variant called interleaved LRB (iLRB), which can benchmark the average leakage rate of generic n-site quantum gates with reasonable noise assumptions. We demonstrate the iLRB protocol on benchmarking generic two-qubit gates realized using flux tuning and analyzed the behavior of iLRB under corresponding leakage models. Our numerical experiments showed good agreement with the theoretical estimations, indicating the feasibility of both the LRB and iLRB protocols.
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) receivers may leak information about their measurement outcomes and settings to the channel (e.g., through detector backflashes or back-reflected Trojan-horse light) that could compromise the protocol's security. Here we present a simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes. The proof requires only a bound on the distinguishability of the side-channel states. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and compatible with existing security proofs that address detector and source imperfections, making it applicable to a wide range of practical QKD implementations.