In this paper (which is, at best, a work in progress), I discuss different modes of scientific explanation identified by philosophers (Hempel, Salmon, Kitcher, Friedman, Hughes) and examine how well or badly they capture the "explanations" of phenomena that modern quantum theory provides. I tentatively conclude that quantum explanation is best seen as "structural explanation", and spell out in detail how this works in the case of explaining vacuum correlations. Problems and prospects for structural explanation in quantum theory are also discussed.
The contemporary scientific and technological progress has been given fully by the results of classical mechanics from the 19th century when the so called European values were accepted practically by the whole educated world. The given results and conclusions were gained on the basis of causal ontological approach proposed in principle by Socrates and developed further by Aristotle. This approach has been, however, fully extruded by phenomenological approach (causality not required) in the 20th century, which has disallowed practically any further actual scientific progress. Three very different theories have been applied to physical reality: classical mechanics in standard macroscopic region, Copenhagen quantum mechanics in microscopic region, and special theory of reality (STR) in both the regions in the case of systems consisting of objects having high velocity values. Any explanation or description of transitions between different regions and between different theories have not been provided until now. The situation has been complicated when the existence of inertial mass increase with rising velocity (predicted by STR) was affirmed in the first half of the past century, while any more detailed comparison with experiment data has not been presented. In this paper this knowledge evolution in the modern period will be described. It will be shown, too, that some mistaking assumptions and statements contradicting to the earlier successful causal ontological approach have existed in the contemporary scientific system. It will be then demonstrated that practically all known knowledge pieces may be described by one common theory based on slightly generalized Hamilton equations for all regions of reality. All known observed characteristics of physical reality may be described in such a case on the basis of the causal ontological approach.
Abstract Scientific explanations should have a character that matches their subject matter: if a fact is not apt for causal explanation, it should not be explained causally. In this chapter, the author first reviews some cases where causal explanation has been extended beyond its proper limits, identifying a pattern of error termed the problem of causal overreach. The discussion then relates these considerations to the debate over causal locality in Everettian (many-worlds) quantum mechanics (EQM), in the context of three metaphysical distinctions central to recent discussions of locality: event causation vs. worldshaping causation, local branching vs. global branching, and overlapping worlds vs. diverging worlds. The author argues that worlds in EQM are not properly regarded as themselves subject to causal explanation; instead, causation should be understood as a wholly in-world matter. This approach avoids any nonlocal causal explanation; quantum entanglement instead supports a new category of noncausal worldshaping explanations. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of worldbound causation for principles of causal inference, in particular for the Causal Markov condition, and recommends the use of quantum causal models as a foundation for in-world causal inference.