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Scientific Explanation in Quantum Theory

Rob Clifton

Published Jan 1, 1998• 8 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this paper (which is, at best, a work in progress), I discuss different modes of scientific explanation identified by philosophers (Hempel, Salmon, Kitcher, Friedman, Hughes) and examine how well or badly they capture the "explanations" of phenomena that modern quantum theory provides. I tentatively conclude that quantum explanation is best seen as "structural explanation", and spell out in detail how this works in the case of explaining vacuum correlations. Problems and prospects for structural explanation in quantum theory are also discussed.

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In semiclassical mechanics one finds explanations of quantum phenomena that appeal to classical structures. These explanations are prima facie problematic insofar as the classical structures they appeal to do not exist. Here I defend the view that fictional structures can be genuinely explanatory by introducing a model-based account of scientific explanation. Applying this framework to the semiclassical phenomenon of wavefunction scarring, I argue that not only can the fictional classical trajectories explain certain aspects of this quantum phenomenon, but also that an explanation that does not make reference to these classical structures is, in a certain sense, deficient. 1. Introduction2. The Case of Wavefunction Scarring3. Model Explanations, or How Fictional Structures Can Explain4. Putting Understanding Back into Explanation

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Abstract Quantum mechanics (QM) has led to spectacular technological developments, including the discovery of new constituents of matter and new materials: however, there is still no consensus regarding its interpretation and limitations. Some scientists and scientific writers promote some exotic interpretations and evoke quantum magic. In this paper we point out that magical explanations mean the end of the science. Magical explanations are misleading and counterproductive. We explain how a simple probabilistic local causal model is able to reproduce quantum correlations in Bell tests. We also discuss the difficulties of mathematical modeling of the physical reality and dangers of incorrect mental images. We examine in detail when and how a probabilistic model may completely describe a random experiment. We give some arguments in favor of the contextual statistical interpretation of QM. We conclude that we still do not know whether quantum theory provides a complete description of physical phenomena and we explain how it may be tested. We also point out, that there remain several open questions and challenges in QM, in quantum field theory and in the Standard Model. Moreover, there is still no consensus about how to reconcile quantum theory with general relativity and cosmology.

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Scientific Realism and the Quantum

French, Steven, Saatsi, Juha

Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?

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Abstract The distinctively quantum mechanical phenomena of interference and entanglement are explained. The theory of quantum mechanics that accounts for these phenomena is presented in its two forms: matrix mechanics and wave mechanics. It is argued that while these accounts have some of the superficial trappings of scientific explanation, they fail to provide an explanation in the sense of a description of the entities or properties responsible for the phenomena. In fact, the theory is remarkably silent regarding the physical states represented by the theory. The need for an interpretation of the quantum formalism—a way of understanding it as descriptive of the world—is defended.

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Structures and Models of Scientific Theories: A Discussion on Quantum Non-Individuality

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Realism and metaphysics in quantum mechanics

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.

arXiv:2012.03071•Dec 5, 2020•0 citations
In this paper (which is, at best, a work in progress), I discuss different modes of scientific explanation identified by philosophers (Hempel, Salmon, Kitcher, Friedman, Hughes) and examine how well or badly they capture the "explanations" of phenomena that modern quantum theory provides. I tentatively conclude that quantum explanation is best seen as "structural explanation", and spell out in detail how this works in the case of explaining vacuum correlations. Problems and prospects for structural explanation in quantum theory are also discussed.
In semiclassical mechanics one finds explanations of quantum phenomena that appeal to classical structures. These explanations are prima facie problematic insofar as the classical structures they appeal to do not exist. Here I defend the view that fictional structures can be genuinely explanatory by introducing a model-based account of scientific explanation. Applying this framework to the semiclassical phenomenon of wavefunction scarring, I argue that not only can the fictional classical trajectories explain certain aspects of this quantum phenomenon, but also that an explanation that does not make reference to these classical structures is, in a certain sense, deficient. 1. Introduction2. The Case of Wavefunction Scarring3. Model Explanations, or How Fictional Structures Can Explain4. Putting Understanding Back into Explanation
Abstract Quantum mechanics (QM) has led to spectacular technological developments, including the discovery of new constituents of matter and new materials: however, there is still no consensus regarding its interpretation and limitations. Some scientists and scientific writers promote some exotic interpretations and evoke quantum magic. In this paper we point out that magical explanations mean the end of the science. Magical explanations are misleading and counterproductive. We explain how a simple probabilistic local causal model is able to reproduce quantum correlations in Bell tests. We also discuss the difficulties of mathematical modeling of the physical reality and dangers of incorrect mental images. We examine in detail when and how a probabilistic model may completely describe a random experiment. We give some arguments in favor of the contextual statistical interpretation of QM. We conclude that we still do not know whether quantum theory provides a complete description of physical phenomena and we explain how it may be tested. We also point out, that there remain several open questions and challenges in QM, in quantum field theory and in the Standard Model. Moreover, there is still no consensus about how to reconcile quantum theory with general relativity and cosmology.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Abstract The distinctively quantum mechanical phenomena of interference and entanglement are explained. The theory of quantum mechanics that accounts for these phenomena is presented in its two forms: matrix mechanics and wave mechanics. It is argued that while these accounts have some of the superficial trappings of scientific explanation, they fail to provide an explanation in the sense of a description of the entities or properties responsible for the phenomena. In fact, the theory is remarkably silent regarding the physical states represented by the theory. The need for an interpretation of the quantum formalism—a way of understanding it as descriptive of the world—is defended.
Abstract. In this paper we consider the notions of structure and models within the semantic approach to theories. To highlight the role of the mathematics used to build the structures which will be taken as the models of theories, we review the notion of mathematical structure and of the models of scientific theories. Then, we analyse a case-study and argue that if a certain metaphysical view of quantum objects is adopted, namely, that which sees them as non-individuals, then there would be strong reasons to ask for a different mathematical framework for describ-ing the structures that would be the models of the corresponding theory. In departing from the standard frameworks (that is, worked on within standard mathematics), we hope to bring to the scene, within the scope of the semantic approach, the importance of paying attention to some fundamental concepts usually only superficially touched by philosophers of science (if touched).
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.