Event-Based Quantum Theory

Ph. Blanchard, Arkadiusz Jadczyk

Dick J. Hoekzema

Koji Nagata, Tadao Nakamura

Malley and Fine (Phys. Rev. A 2006 73 066102) discussed that all quantum observables would commute simultaneously if we accept a realistic theory of the Bell type (a local realistic theory) for quantum events, provided that all quantum events, including every quantum state and every observable (including every projector), are reproduced by a realistic theory of the Bell type for quantum events. We point out that their claim leads us to a contradiction. We study the relation between a local realistic theory and commutativity of quantum observables in a finite-dimensional space. We show that a realistic theory of the Bell type for quantum events does not impose the commutative algebraic structure into the set of all quantum observables if all quantum events are reproduced by a local realistic theory. We discuss that a violation of Bell locality is derived within a realistic theory of the Kochen?Specker type within quantum events.

Vyacheslav I. Yukalov, Didier Sornette

Theory of quantum measurements is often classified as decision theory. An event in decision theory corresponds to the measurement of an observable. This analogy looks clear for operationally testable simple events. However, the situation is essentially more complicated in the case of composite events. The most difficult point is the relation between decisions under uncertainty and measurements under uncertainty. We suggest a unified language for describing the processes of quantum decision making and quantum measurements. The notion of quantum measurements under uncertainty is introduced. We show that the correct mathematical foundation for the theory of measurements under uncertainty, as well as for quantum decision theory dealing with uncertain events, requires the use of positive operator-valued measure that is a generalization of projection-valued measure. The latter is appropriate for operationally testable events, while the former is necessary for characterizing operationally uncertain events. In both decision making and quantum measurements, one has to distinguish composite nonentangled events from composite entangled events. Quantum probability can be essentially different from classical probability only for entangled events. The necessary condition for the appearance of an interference term in the quantum probability is the occurrence of entangled prospects and the existence of an entangled strategic state of a decision maker or of an entangled statistical state of a measuring device.

A. O. Barut

Andreas Bartels

The recent work of Paul Teller and Sunny Auyang in the philosophy of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has stimulated the search for the fundamental entities in this theory. In QFT, the classical notion of a particle collapses. The theory does not only exclude classical, i.e., spatiotemporally identifiable particles, but it makes particles of the same type conceptually indistinguishable. Teller and Auyang have proposed competing ersatz-ontologies to account for the ‘loss of particles’: field quanta vs. field events. Both ontologies, however, suffer from serious defects. While quanta lack numerical identity, spatiotemporal localizability, and independence of basis-representations, events—if understood as concrete measurement events—are related to the theory only statistically. I propose an alternative solution: The entities of QFT are events of the type ‘Quantum system, S, is in quantum state, Ψ‘. These are not point events, but Davidsonian events, i.e., they can be identified by their location within thecausalnet of the world.