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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

How many properties of spin does a particle have?

Alberto Corti, Marco Sanchioni

Published Oct 5, 2021• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A common assumption in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is that self-adjoint operators mathematically represent properties of quantum systems. Focusing on spin, we argue that a natural view considers observables as determinable properties and their eigenvalues as their corresponding determinates. We provide a taxonomy of the different views that one can hold, once it is accepted that spin can be modelled with the determinable-determinate relation. In particular, we present the two main families of views, dubbed Spin Monism and Pluralism, and we show that the current literature does not take a stance between the two. Then we put forward two arguments in favour of the former. Finally, we present a new account of Spin Monism, that is absent in current literature; such a view is worth discussing, or so we contend, because several compelling considerations support it, and it opens new ways of thinking about the ontology of quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.09.004

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A common assumption in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is that self-adjoint operators mathematically represent properties of quantum systems. Focusing on spin, we argue that a natural view considers observables as determinable properties and their eigenvalues as their corresponding determinates. We provide a taxonomy of the different views that one can hold, once it is accepted that spin can be modelled with the determinable-determinate relation. In particular, we present the two main families of views, dubbed Spin Monism and Pluralism, and we show that the current literature does not take a stance between the two. Then we put forward two arguments in favour of the former. Finally, we present a new account of Spin Monism, that is absent in current literature; such a view is worth discussing, or so we contend, because several compelling considerations support it, and it opens new ways of thinking about the ontology of quantum mechanics.
The purpose of the paper is to study the foundations of the main axioms of Quantum Mechanics. From a general study of the mathematical properties of the models used in Physics to represent systems, we prove that the states of a system can be represented in a Hilbert space, that a self-adjoint operator is associated to any observable, that the result of a measure must be the eigen value of the operator and appear with the usual probability. Furthermore an equivalent of the Wigner's theorem holds, which leads to the Schr{ö}dinger equation. These results are based on well known mathematics, and do not involve any specific hypothesis in Physics. They validate and explain the methods currently used, which are made simpler and safer, and open new developments. In the third edition of this paper developments have been added about the estimation of physical anomalies.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via scientifically-informed philosophical analysis. It has two parts. The first part deals with metaphysical claims that turn out to be, in effect, very general empirical claims extracted from our (supposed, but rationally-accredited) knowledge of the world. I here compare two approaches: a) the Leibniz-Quine view of identity as a derivative relation, and, relatedly, of individuality as dependent on the qualities of things; and b) the view that identity is a non-analysable primitive, and, relatedly, that the individuality of things is not reducible to anything else. The former position, based on the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles as a criterion of individuation, might appear prima facie more plausible. However, I argue that it runs into difficulties both at the level of a priori analysis and in terms of 'fit' with the evidence described by our best science. It is, in fact, not even as compelling from the empiricist point of view as is commonly believed. I therefore argue that the position that identity and individuality are primitive may be preferred. In the second part of the thesis - under the assumption that the proper role of metaphysics is to characterise the best solutions to issues that are left open by current science - I deal with the question regarding whether and how the ultimate constituents of reality can actually be conceived of as primitive individuals. I argue in favour of an ontology of tropes, develop the view in detail and defend it against various criticisms. The fundamental tropes that constitute the basic 'building blocks' of reality are identified with the state-independent properties of elementary particles. The way in which these constitute complex particulars is described, and certain peculiarities having to do with quantum statistics are accounted for. I conclude by suggesting possible avenues for further research.
Abstract Conventional methods for teaching spin at a university level generally follow four main approaches. The first introduces spin into the Schrödinger equation artificially, leaving its physical meaning unclear. The second connects spin to the representation of the rotation group, which clarifies its nature but requires knowledge of group theory. The third approach derives from field theory, separating angular momentum into orbital and intrinsic parts, the latter corresponding to spin; however, this cannot be done within quantum mechanics alone. The fourth derives electron spin from Dirac’s 1928 relativistic equation, which, though correct, has led to the misconception that spin is a purely relativistic effect. A detailed analysis of Dirac’s 1928 papers shows that the concept of spin arises from the need to construct an equation linear in both energy and momentum to preserve Born’s probabilistic interpretation. This linearization of the Klein–Gordon equation reveals that spin is conceptually independent of relativity. Historical and pedagogical perspectives can together clarify conceptual difficulties and promote a deeper understanding of fundamental ideas in physics. Drawing on selected passages from Dirac’s original work, the present discussion offers broader conceptual and cultural considerations that introduce the notion of spin with limited mathematical requirements and can be applied independently of the didactic approach adopted.
Abstract There are two main styles of interpreting the quantum state: either focusing on the fundamentality of the quantum state (a state or wavefunction realist view), or on how projection operators represent observable properties (an observable-first approach). Rather than being incompatible, I argue that these correspond to taking a 3rd person and 1st person perspective respectively. I further contend that the 1st person perspective - and the observable-first approach that goes with it - is better suited to explain measurement, based on the way that the metrology literature characterises measurement through the quantifiable properties of a system. Finally, I show how the 1st person, observable-first approach can emerge in the world through the process of decoherence, hence showing the compatibility of the two approaches and resolving the need to choose absolutely between them.