Abstract The measurement problem concerns an apparent conflict between the two fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, namely the Schrödinger equation and the measurement postulate. These principles describe inconsistent behavior for quantum systems in so‐called “measurement contexts.” Many theorists have thought that the measurement problem can only be resolved by proposing a mechanistic explanation of (genuine or apparent) wavefunction collapse that avoids explicit reference to “measurement.” However, I argue here that the measurement problem dissolves if we accept Humeanism about laws of nature. On a Humean metaphysics, there is no conflict between the two principles, nor is there any inherent problem with the concept of “measurement” figuring into the account of collapse.
Abstract The measurement problem concerns an apparent conflict between the two fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, namely the Schrödinger equation and the measurement postulate. These principles describe inconsistent behavior for quantum systems in so‐called “measurement contexts.” Many theorists have thought that the measurement problem can only be resolved by proposing a mechanistic explanation of (genuine or apparent) wavefunction collapse that avoids explicit reference to “measurement.” However, I argue here that the measurement problem dissolves if we accept Humeanism about laws of nature. On a Humean metaphysics, there is no conflict between the two principles, nor is there any inherent problem with the concept of “measurement” figuring into the account of collapse.
Ongoing disagreement about the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is a major obstacle for the project of scientific metaphysics, because there do not seem to be any universally accepted scientific standards that would let us decide what the true metaphysics of quantum mechanics is. One response by scientific metaphysicians has been the attempt to dissolve (rather than to solve) the measurement problem. After discussing one particular proposal in that spirit (due to Ladyman and Ross), I will explore the prospects of such an approach in general. The tentative lesson to be drawn seems to be the following: the more narrowly „scientific“ one’s approach to the measurement problem is, the more it is in conflict with the kind of scientific realism that is usually presupposed by the very project of scientific metaphysics.
Quantum mechanics famously posits two distinct evolution rules for the state of a system: a deterministic, unitary time evolution under the Schr¨odinger equation, and a probabilistic “collapse” of the wavefunction upon measurement as dictated by the Born rule. The apparent inconsistency of these two dynamical laws – one continuous and one discontinuous – constitutes the quantum measurement problem. This foundational problem, which underlies the emergence of definite outcomes from quantum superpositions, has persisted since the theory’s inception. In this review, we present a comprehensive and rigorous examination of the measurement problem and survey the leading approaches that seek to resolve or circumvent it. We begin by formulating the measurement problem and its conceptual challenges. We then discuss in detail the major interpretations of quantum mechanics and theoretical frameworks addressing the problem: the Copenhagen interpretation, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory, objective collapse models, the role of decoherence and environment-induced superselection, and epistemic approaches such as QBism. For each interpretation, we describe the core principles and mathematical formalism, assessing how (and whether) it attempts to solve the measurement problem. We also review modern developments and experiments relevant to quantum measurements, including tests of Bell inequalities, observations of decoherence and macroscopic superpositions, weak measurements and quantum eraser experiments, and thought experiments ‘a la Wigner’s friend. We highlight how these results inform the ongoing debate. Finally, we discuss open problems and challenges that remain in fully resolving the measurement problem.
ABSTRACT This essay aims at reviewing one of the major difficulties affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, that is, the well‐known measurement problem. As it will be explained, the latter originates as a consequence of the quantum theory's postulates. Referring to this, we analyze in particular the conceptual issues implied by the projection (or collapse) rule. After having presented the measurement problem, we then illustrate three possible solutions offered by major interpretations of/alternatives to quantum theory: Bohmian mechanics, Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theories, and the many‐worlds interpretation. As the reader will see, these theoretical frameworks solve this issue by virtue of their unambiguous ontologies and consistent dynamical laws. Finally, a synopsis of the open debates and future perspectives concerning the measurement problem in relativistic contexts concludes the paper.
Quantum physics confronts contemporary metaphysicians with a fascinating and frustrating puzzle. It appears to be telling us something novel and surprising about the nature of the physical world, but it is hard to pin down exactly what it tells us. Hidden variable theories constitute a second major class of solutions to the measurement problem. They differ from the standard theory and spontaneous collapse theories in eschewing collapse altogether; according to hidden variable theories, the wavefunction always evolves according to the Schrodinger equation. The simplest and most radical response to the measurement problem is to assert that standard quantum mechanics without wavefunction collapse constitutes a complete physical theory. The many worlds theory is more flexible in this regard; according to the standard contemporary version, no presupposition is made concerning precisely which physical properties form the basis of measurement results. There are several approaches to quantum mechanics, any or none of which might yield an acceptable physical theory.
Quantum physics provides us with a formalism with which we can try to understand the microscopic world. However, the underpinning concepts of the basic principles of quantum mechanics itself are surprisingly ill understood. Even the ubiquitous concept of the wavefunction collapsing post measurement, lives outside the formal theory of quantum mechanics and must be taken as a postulate. The Schr\"odinger equation, which governs the evolution of quantum systems, does not describe the system during the measurement process. This is referred to as the measurement problem, and has been debated since the inception of quantum theory. Many different interpretations of quantum mechanics try to elucidate what happens during wavefunction collapse, such as the famous many-worlds interpretation. However, these interpretations either give rise to the same physical outcome or simply are not testable, and so cannot be physically differentiated from one another. We attempt to gain insight into the measurement problem through experiments involving sequential measurements, both in the weak and strong regime. We find surprising outcomes such as the persistence of time-ordering asymmetry in the weak measurement limit, and the survival of coherence in the strong measurement limit.
Abstract The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is commonly framed as a conflict between unitary dynamics and the appearance of definite outcomes. This paper argues that the conflict arises from a misplaced assumption about what outcomes must be. In experimental practice, outcomes are not arbitrarily precise microscopic states or instantaneous events, but stable physical records produced in measurement interactions. Treating outcomes as such records allows them to be formalized as coarse-grained equivalence classes of physical states that persist in time and support consistent interaction across systems. On this basis, decoherence explains the stability of outcomes without selecting a unique global result or modifying quantum dynamics. Objectivity is recovered through the robustness of records rather than through absolute, observer-independent outcome facts. The measurement problem is thereby dissolved without invoking collapse mechanisms, branching universes, or observer-dependent postulates, while preserving all standard empirical predictions of quantum mechanics.