In device-independent (DI) quantum protocols, security statements are agnostic to the internal workings of the quantum devices-they rely solely on classical interactions with the devices and specific assumptions. Traditionally, such protocols are set in a non-local scenario, where two non-communicating devices exhibit Bell inequality violations. Recently, a new class of DI protocols has emerged that requires only a single device. In this setting, the assumption of no communication is replaced by a computational one: the device cannot solve certain post-quantum cryptographic problems. Protocols developed in this single-device computational setting-such as for randomness certification-have relied on ad hoc techniques, making their guarantees difficult to compare and generalize. In this work, we introduce a modular proof framework inspired by techniques from the non-local DI literature. Our approach combines tools from quantum information theory, including entropic uncertainty relations and the entropy accumulation theorem, to yield both conceptual clarity and quantitative security guarantees. This framework provides a foundation for systematically analyzing DI protocols in the single-device setting under computational assumptions. It enables the design and security proof of future protocols for DI randomness generation, expansion, amplification, and key distribution, grounded in post-quantum cryptographic hardness.
The quantum cryptographic conferencing (QCC) protocol, which distributes identical secure keys to user groups, is a crucial component of the quantum network. Previous experimental works have implemented the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QCC, of which the key rate in an N-user network scales as
R∼O(ηN). Building on the MDI QCC protocol, the asynchronous MDI QCC protocol theoretically integrates the mode-pairing scheme into QCC, significantly boosting the key rate to
R∼O(η) in the ideal case, which is independent of the number of users, thus demonstrating greater application potential. Experimentally, in this Letter, we implement the three-user asynchronous MDI QCC network without phase locking by adopting the fast Fourier transform-based frequency difference estimation and the phase drift compensation technique. Finally, we achieve a key rate of about
4.470×10−9 bits per pulse under a maximum overall loss of about 59.6 dB. This Letter provides a scalable solution for the development of large-scale quantum communication networks in the future.
With the practical implementation of continuous-variable quantum cryptographic protocols, security problems resulting from measurement-device loopholes are being given increasing attention. At present, research on measurement-device independency analysis is limited in quantum key distribution protocols, while there exist different security problems for different protocols. Considering the importance of quantum digital signature in quantum cryptography, in this paper, we attempt to analyze the measurement-device independency of continuous-variable quantum digital signature, especially continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature. Firstly, we calculate the upper bound of the error rate of a protocol. If it is negligible on condition that all measurement devices are untrusted, the protocol is deemed to be measurement-device-independent. Then, we simplify the calculation by using the characteristics of continuous variables and prove the measurement-device independency of the protocol according to the calculation result. In addition, the proposed analysis method can be extended to other quantum cryptographic protocols besides continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature.