With the practical implementation of continuous-variable quantum cryptographic protocols, security problems resulting from measurement-device loopholes are being given increasing attention. At present, research on measurement-device independency analysis is limited in quantum key distribution protocols, while there exist different security problems for different protocols. Considering the importance of quantum digital signature in quantum cryptography, in this paper, we attempt to analyze the measurement-device independency of continuous-variable quantum digital signature, especially continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature. Firstly, we calculate the upper bound of the error rate of a protocol. If it is negligible on condition that all measurement devices are untrusted, the protocol is deemed to be measurement-device-independent. Then, we simplify the calculation by using the characteristics of continuous variables and prove the measurement-device independency of the protocol according to the calculation result. In addition, the proposed analysis method can be extended to other quantum cryptographic protocols besides continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature.
With the practical implementation of continuous-variable quantum cryptographic protocols, security problems resulting from measurement-device loopholes are being given increasing attention. At present, research on measurement-device independency analysis is limited in quantum key distribution protocols, while there exist different security problems for different protocols. Considering the importance of quantum digital signature in quantum cryptography, in this paper, we attempt to analyze the measurement-device independency of continuous-variable quantum digital signature, especially continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature. Firstly, we calculate the upper bound of the error rate of a protocol. If it is negligible on condition that all measurement devices are untrusted, the protocol is deemed to be measurement-device-independent. Then, we simplify the calculation by using the characteristics of continuous variables and prove the measurement-device independency of the protocol according to the calculation result. In addition, the proposed analysis method can be extended to other quantum cryptographic protocols besides continuous-variable quantum homomorphic signature.
Digital signatures play an important role in software distribution, modern communication, and financial transactions, where it is important to detect forgery and tampering. Signatures are a cryptographic technique for validating the authenticity and integrity of messages, software, or digital documents. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational assumptions. Quantum digital signatures (QDS), on the other hand, provide information-theoretic security based on the laws of quantum physics. Recent work on QDS Amiri et al., Phys. Rev. A 93, 032325 (2016); Yin, Fu, and Zeng-Bing, Phys. Rev. A 93, 032316 (2016) shows that such schemes do not require trusted quantum channels and are unconditionally secure against general coherent attacks. However, in practical QDS, just as in quantum key distribution (QKD), the detectors can be subjected to side-channel attacks, which can make the actual implementations insecure. Motivated by the idea of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), we present a measurement-device-independent QDS (MDI-QDS) scheme, which is secure against all detector side-channel attacks. Based on the rapid development of practical MDI-QKD, our MDI-QDS protocol could also be experimentally implemented, since it requires a similar experimental setup.
The continuous-variable quantum digital signature (CV-QDS) scheme relies on the components of quantum key generation protocol (KGP) to negotiate classical signature, which is more compatible with optical fibers. Nevertheless, the measurement angular error of heterodyne detection or homodyne detection will cause security issues when performing KGP in the distribution stage. For that, we propose to utilize unidimensional modulation in KGP components, which only requires to modulate single quadrature and without the process of basis choice. Numerical simulation results show that the security under collective attack, repudiation attack and forgery attack can be guaranteed. We expect that the unidimensional modulation of KGP components could further simplify the implementation of CV-QDS and circumvent the security issues caused by the measurement angular error.
The continuous-variable quantum key distribution with entanglement in the middle, a semi-device-independent protocol, places the source at the untrusted third party between Alice and Bob, and thus has the advantage of high levels of security with the purpose of eliminating the assumptions about the source device. However, previous works considered the collective-attack analysis, which inevitably assumes that the states of the source has an identical and independently distributed (i.i.d) structure, and limits the application of the protocol. To solve this problem, we modify the original protocol by exploiting an energy test to monitor the potential high energy attacks an adversary may use. Our analysis removes the assumptions of the light source and the modified protocol can therefore be called source-device-independent protocol. Moreover, we analyze the security of the continuous-variable source-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol with a homodyne-homodyne structure against general coherent attacks by adapting a state-independent entropic uncertainty relation. The simulation results indicate that, in the universal composable security framework, the protocol can still achieve high key rates against coherent attacks under the condition of achievable block lengths.
A continuous-variable measurement-device-independent multiparty quantum communication protocol is investigated in this paper. Utilizing the distributed continuous-variable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state, this protocol can implement both quantum cryptographic conference and quantum secret sharing. We analyze the security of the protocol against both the entangling cloner attack and the coherent attack. The entangling cloner attack is a practical individual attack, and the coherent attack is the optimal attack Eve can implement. Simulation results show that the coherent attack can greatly reduce the secret key rate. Different kinds of entangled attacks are compared and we finally discuss the optimal coherent attacks.
Cryptography is essential for secure communication in the digital era. Today, public-key cryptography is widely employed, and has provided an efficient method for encrypting content and ensuring both confidentiality and authenticity of electronic communications. However, the security of these systems is based on assumptions of computational hardness within the constraints of current computing capability. Thus, as quantum computing becomes a reality, public-key algorithms will be genuinely vulnerable to attack. By contrast, quantum cryptography, which is based on quantum physics instead of mathematical assumptions, is able to achieve information-theoretic security. \n \nAdvances in practical quantum cryptographic systems have not kept pace with theory, where an eavesdropper can relatively easily exploit loopholes in practical implementations to compromise theory-proved security. Bridging the gap between perfect theory and imperfect practice has become a priority for the growing field of quantum key distribution (QKD), which has strived to strengthen the practical security of QKD systems. Among all the countermeasures against quantum hacking, the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocol is promising because it is immune to all side-channel attacks on measurement devices. However, the MDI QKD protocol has some limitations that critically restrict its practical usefulness. Technically, the MDI scheme is not compatible with existing QKD systems, and produces a low key rate. In addition, the theory underlying MDI QKD security is based on the use of trusted source stations. Thus, this protocol is not a universal solution. This thesis further investigates the practical security of quantum cryptography in and beyond MDI quantum cryptography. \n \nTo overcome the technical limitations of MDI QKD, we first evaluate two other countermeasures against imperfect detections. The first is an industrial patch based on random detection efficiency, recently implemented by ID Quantique in the commercial Clavis2 QKD system. While powerful, experimental testing shows that this countermeasure is not sufficient to defeat the detector blinding attack. The second countermeasure aims to achieve a higher key rate than MDI QKD while maintaining the same security properties. However, our research shows that detector-device-independent (DDI) QKD security is not equivalent to that of MDI QKD and, further, that DDI QKD is insecure against detector side-channel attacks. \n \nWhile this initial work points to the superior performance of MDI QKD systems, core challenges remain. The fundamental security assumption adopted for MDI QKD systems, regarding the exclusive use of trustable source stations, cannot always be satisfied in practice. Our study revealed several side channels of source devices. The first is disclosed from the implementation of a decoy-state protocol, which is widely used in QKD systems with weak coherent sources. The pump-current-modulated intensities result in a timing mismatch between the signal and decoy states, violating the key assumption in the decoy-state QKD protocol. Moreover, an active Eve can break the basic assumption about photon numbers in the QKD system. In this work, we experimentally demonstrate a laser seeding attack on the laser source, which shows that Eve can increase the emission power of the laser diode. Furthermore, by shining a high-power laser into an optical attenuator, Eve can decrease the attenuation values. The increase in laser emission power and the decrease in attenuation leads to an increase in mean photon numbers. \n \nIn summary, MDI QKD is a milestone in quantum cryptography. However, this thesis indicates the importance of continued investigations into the practical security of MDI QKD. The analysis of practical security should be extended to other countermeasures against side-channel attacks and the source stations in MDI QKD systems. Practical quantum hacking and security analysis promote the development of quantum cryptographic systems, which will eventually achieve the unconditional security claimed in theory.
Ensuring the security of digital communication and data transfer has become essential in the modern era. Classical cryptographic techniques are increasingly vulnerable due to advances in quantum technologies and algorithms. Consequently, quantum computers and quantum communication offer promising solutions for secure data transfer and encryption. This study explores the generation of Quantum Digital Signatures (QDS) using Quantum Continuous Variables (QCV), providing a novel approach to secure digital signature technologies. The paper outlines the core principles of QDS generation with QCV, detailing the signature creation and verification processes. It highlights the advantages of this technology in secure communication and data transfer and discusses potential security vulnerabilities and future development prospects. Quantum Continuous Variables (QCVs), typically used in quantum optical systems, represent physical quantities with continuous spectra, such as the wavelength or phase of light. These variables enable efficient and secure quantum information processing and communication. Despite significant progress in quantum cryptography protocols using QCVs, practical application and optimization of these technologies face numerous challenges. These include complexities in preparing and measuring quantum states, managing quantum errors, and achieving higher efficiency and security standards. Moreover, the practical applications of QCV in industrial contexts remain limited, highlighting the need for further experimental and applied research. The methodology for generating QDS using QCVs involves employing specific quantum states, such as coherent and squeezed states. The process includes key distribution, signature creation and verification, and addressing potential quantum attacks. The system model comprises a sender (Alice), a receiver (Bob), and an arbiter (Charlie), facilitating secure and authenticated message transmission.