Niels Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics is often cast as positivist and sometimes explicitly claimed to be influenced by logical positivists due to some similarities in their thinking. While it is certainly the case that some logical positivists attempted to recruit Bohr, this paper argues that Bohr had interests of his own in the logical positivists. Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics focuses on observation, the use of classical concepts in quantum mechanics, and indeterminacy of quantum processes as opposed to uncertainty of measurement. His view thereby shares some common ground with the logical positivists' views on verification, the observation language, and anti-metaphysics. But Bohr also emphasized complementarity: that certain pairs of concepts - such as position and momentum - are mutually exclusive in quantum mechanics since they, according to Bohr, are only meaningful relative to different experimental arrangements. Bohr believed that complementary brought a general epistemological lesson for all of science that an objective description of nature is not separable from the observational and experimental conditions under which we explore nature. Motivated by the common ground between himself and logical positivism, Bohr tried to persuade the logical positivists and Carnap in particular to adopt and champion complementarity as well as part of their unity of science program. Though his efforts ultimately proved in vain, Bohr's attempts to influence logical positivism disprove the claim that his engagement with them was reluctant and purposefully limited.
Niels Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics is often cast as positivist and sometimes explicitly claimed to be influenced by logical positivists due to some similarities in their thinking. While it is certainly the case that some logical positivists attempted to recruit Bohr, this paper argues that Bohr had interests of his own in the logical positivists. Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics focuses on observation, the use of classical concepts in quantum mechanics, and indeterminacy of quantum processes as opposed to uncertainty of measurement. His view thereby shares some common ground with the logical positivists' views on verification, the observation language, and anti-metaphysics. But Bohr also emphasized complementarity: that certain pairs of concepts - such as position and momentum - are mutually exclusive in quantum mechanics since they, according to Bohr, are only meaningful relative to different experimental arrangements. Bohr believed that complementary brought a general epistemological lesson for all of science that an objective description of nature is not separable from the observational and experimental conditions under which we explore nature. Motivated by the common ground between himself and logical positivism, Bohr tried to persuade the logical positivists and Carnap in particular to adopt and champion complementarity as well as part of their unity of science program. Though his efforts ultimately proved in vain, Bohr's attempts to influence logical positivism disprove the claim that his engagement with them was reluctant and purposefully limited.
This chapter explores the relation between logical positivism and the early development and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Despite frequent claims to the contrary, we find that logical positivism did not influence physicists’ view of quantum mechanics until well into the 1930s, if at all. Special emphasis is given to Niels Bohr due to his central role in the understanding of the new physics. While Bohr was in contact with several central figures of logical positivism and on several occasions expressed his agreement with them, we find that Bohr developed his main ideas concerning quantum mechanics well before this contact was made. Instead, this chapter speculates that it was Bohr who tried to influence logical positivism: Bohr believed that understanding quantum mechanics provided us with a general philosophical lesson to which the logical positivist would be responsive. Because of similarities in viewpoints, Bohr apparently had hoped that this might compel the logical positivists to join him in the attempt to extend his ideas of complementarity and contextualism beyond quantum mechanics.
Niels Bohr thought that what quantum mechanics has taught us is not only to understand something new, but also a new meaning of the term “to understand”. Bohr wanted to free himself from ontology by putting emphasis on epistemology; i.e. on certain conditions for observation and description. He believed that the epistemological lesson of quantum mechanics was a crucial one. Basically it has two important aspects. 1. Bohr's philosophy leads to a break with the so-called correspondence theory for truth and meaning. It states that true propositions are descriptions of a world that is independent of our observations; i.e. that on a regular basis one can compare with reality, that is, in compare the two areas against each other. Bohr believed that this did not make sense, since in many situations cannot add meaning to a world that has a sich structure (the thing-in-itself), which in turn can be depicted when observed. 2. All knowledge is attained under certain conditions for description. Bohr thought that the long-lasting criterion for valid knowledge is that can communicate it unambiguously to each other. When Bohr emphasised that we are suspended in language in the sense that all knowledge determines what can say about the world in an understandable way, and not what the world actually is, this must be understood in the sense that only know the world as recognised; i.e., structured on the basis of the conditions for description, to which are, as part of the world, necessarily are subjected to. Bohr's emphasis on conditions for descriptions invalidates the well-known distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. An important feature of the descriptive use of ordinary language, as well as in classical physics, is that description is based on a dividing line between subject and object. This results in idealism and materialism not being tenable positions. Furthermore, it is such that cannot use the designation of things independently of the designation of time and space. Logical principles are only meaningfully applied in situations relating to our conditions for observation. So based on inspiration from Bohr, Favrholdt developed a more adequate and comprehensive philosophy, where he, among other things, states that all humans possess a fundamental language, underlying all languages. This constitutes a number of concepts – the core – where the correct use is dictated by the structure of the world, which humans learn through sensory perception and action.
Introduction In order to develop the insight that is worked out by Brock (Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Logos, 2003), that the philosophy of quantum mechanics should parallel Kant's philosophy of natural science, some preliminary analyses of key concepts need to be done. Initiated by Niels Bohr (Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, John Wiley and Sons, 1958), the concept of ‘complementarity’ has played a major role in the interpretation of quantum theory. However, the exact place it occupies in respect of the logical form of the relation of complementarity between descriptive predicates has not been spelled out in detail to my knowledge. Complementary predicates exclude one another as simultaneous attributions to the same subject. Exactly what form does this exclusion take? How is it related to the basic exclusion-of-predicates principle, the logical law of non-contradiction?
Niels Bohr, considered one of the fathers of quantum mechanics, formulated a complex interpretation \nof quantum mechanics that guided his understanding of quantum experiments. The contemporary dispute \nbetween realism and anti-realism, the two main approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, \nis often based on different attitudes towards or even readings of Bohr. We propose that a better \nunderstanding of Bohr’s philosophical thought can contribute to the contemporary reconciliation of \nthese opposing philosophical views and thus to a better understanding of the quantum world. Unfortunately, \nin many contemporary interpretations, Bohr’s philosophical approach to quantum mechanics \nhas been misunderstood, re-interpreted or labelled as ambiguous. This is mostly due to the dispersion \nof Bohr’s complex and unique interpretation through different texts, never united in a single systematically \nconceptualized work. To comprehensively explain Bohr’s philosophical approach and his main \nphilosophical concepts, we consider the many similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical \napproach to science. Husserl developed his philosophical standpoint in a cultural context similar to \nBohr’s and shared Bohr’s objects of philosophical consideration as well as his approach to these objects. \nParallel reading of Bohr’s and Husserl’s texts reveals the closeness between Bohr’s ontological realism— \nepistemological anti-realism standpoint and Husserl’s phenomenological standpoint. This explains \ntheir similar views on the relationship between mathematical language, scientific method and Nature. \nWhile Bohr’s use of the term phenomenon is not equal to Husserl’s, Husserl’s rigorous philosophical \nexplanation of the term helps us to better understand Bohr’s use. Furthermore, the parallel reading \nfacilitates better understanding of one of Bohr’s main philosophical theses, often labelled as ambiguous \nand interpreted in different ways, that it is necessary to use classical concepts to describe quantum phenomena. \nWe claim that the thesis is connected with the advance of epistemological reconsideration of \nscience at the time of Bohr’s writing. Thus, Bohr considers some parts of argumentation as self-evident, \nwhile they are not evident to the contemporary reader. Husserl’s analysis of the relationship between science and the life-world offers a much-needed background for a comprehensive understanding of \nBohr’s thesis. The insight into the similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical approach \nto science and scientific phenomena enables a philosophically rigorous reading of Bohr’s texts; it can \neliminate some of the disagreements between realists and anti-realists and provide a firmer philosophical \nground for a dialog between them.
Niels Bohr, the founding father of modern atomic physics and quantum theory, was as original a philosopher as he was a physicist. This study explores several dimensions of Bohr's vision: the formulation of quantum theory and the problems associated with its interpretation, the notions of complementarity and correspondence, the debates with Einstein about objectivity and realism, and his sense of the infinite harmony of nature. The author's chief attention is given to Bohr's epistemological lesson, the conviction that all our description of nature is dependent on the words we use and the ways we can unambiguously use them. Against those who would view Bohr as a vague positivist, the author argues here that Bohr is best understood as using transcendental arguments and shaping a kind of descriptive metaphysics in his defence of our abilities to offer a description of the world we live in.
This article explores Bohr's argument, advanced under the heading of 'complementarity,' concerning quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, and its physical and philosophical implications.In Bohr, the term complementarity designates both a particular concept and an overall interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, in part grounded in this concept.While the argument of this article is primarily philosophical, it will also address, historically, the development and transformations of Bohr's thinking, under the impact of the development of quantum theory and Bohr's confrontation with Einstein, especially their exchange concerning the EPR experiment, proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935.Bohr's interpretation was progressively characterized by a more radical epistemology, in its ultimate form, which was developed in the 1930s and with which I shall be especially concerned here, defined by his new concepts of phenomenon and atomicity.According to this epistemology, quantum objects are seen as indescribable and possibly even as inconceivable, and as manifesting their existence only in the effects of their interactions with measuring instruments upon those instruments, effects that define phenomena in Bohr's sense.The absence of causality is an automatic consequence of this epistemology.I shall also consider how probability and statistics work under these epistemological conditions.