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Computer Communications

Information security in the post quantum era for 5G and beyond networks: Threats to existing cryptography, and post-quantum cryptography

Vinay Chamola, Alireza Jolfaei, Vaibhav Chanana, Prakhar Parashari, Vikas Hassija

Published May 31, 2021• 108 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.comcom.2021.05.019

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5G communication enables digital innovation by integrating a wide range of services, making security, especially primary authentication, critically important. To secure 5G communication, the 3GPP has designed the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol. However, current trends show a growing interest in post-quantum security, and 5G-AKA is not resistant to quantum-era threats due to several classical vulnerabilities. To address these limitations, various enhanced versions of 5G-AKA have been proposed, claiming to provide security against attacks that exploit its weaknesses. However, state-of-the-art research reveals that many of these versions remain susceptible to classical threats, such as attacks from malicious serving networks (SNs), ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks, and fail to provide perfect forward secrecy. Additionally, they are not secure against quantum attacks. In response to these challenges, we propose a Post-Quantum Secure, Lattice-Based 5G-AKA Protocol that is resistant to malicious serving networks and ensures perfect forward secrecy. Our proposed protocol is built on lattice-based cryptography, making it one of the first 5G-AKA variants designed with post-quantum security in mind. We validate the security of our protocol using formal verification techniques, including the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and the Scyther tool. Furthermore, we perform a comparative analysis with existing protocols to highlight the improvements. Finally, we implement our protocol in a testbed environment to demonstrate its practical feasibility for real-time 5G applications.
The development of quantum computers poses a new security threat to network infrastructures and services, as they will be powerful enough to break the most common forms of digital encryption. Existing encryption services based on Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman (DH), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and so on are vulnerable to attacks by quantum computers. Although the gap between today’s quantum computers and the threats they pose to current public-key cryptography is large, the telecommunications landscape should begin planning for the transition to the post-quantum era as early as possible. In this paper, we examine recent advances in Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms from the perspective of the networking and telecommunications industries. The efforts are categorized at three levels, namely communication, computation (consisting of design, implementation and Public Key System (PKS)), and network. Some of the existing challenges and future recommendations for securing communication networks in the post-quantum era are also listed at the end of the paper.