In 2011, Yamada et al. proposed CPA to CCA-secure conversions for attribute-based encryption (ABE) based on the properties, verifiability and delegation. Later, the verifiability-based conversion w...
In 2011, Yamada et al. proposed CPA to CCA-secure conversions for attribute-based encryption (ABE) based on the properties, verifiability and delegation. Later, the verifiability-based conversion was generalised from ABE to predicate encryption (PE) by Yamada et al. (2012) and Nandi et al. (2017). We observe that for bilinear-pairing based PE schemes, the cost of CCA-decryption blows up to the double of the cost of CPA-decryption due to verifiability testing. Therefore, the conversion based on delegation is mostly acceptable whenever a delegation-based conversion is available for the primitive PE scheme. In this paper, we investigate a generic delegation-based conversion from CPA to CCA-secure predicate encryption schemes. Our conversion generalises the delegation-based conversion of Yamada et al. (2011) from ABE to PE. We show that our conversion captures many subclasses of PE, e.g., (hierarchical) inner-product encryption, (doubly-)spatial encryption and functional encryption for regular languages.
In this paper, we construct the first efficient leakage-resilient CCA2 (LR-CCA2)-secure attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes. We also construct the first efficient LR-CCA2-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme with optimal leakage rate. To obtain our results, we develop a new quasi-adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge (QA-NIZK) argument for the ciphertext consistency of the LR-CPA-secure schemes. Our ABE schemes are obtained by boosting the LR-CPA-security of some existing schemes to the LR-CCA2-security by using our QA-NIZK arguments. The schemes are almost as efficient as the underlying LR-CPA-secure schemes.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an extension scheme of identity-based encryption and public-key encryption. It can achieve fine-grained access control and one-to-many encryption mode, suitable for practical applications. In addition to mathematical proofs, it is essential to verify its security properties using different protocols. This paper proposes two key exchange protocols to securely exchange the user secret keys in ABE. ProVerif is an automated cryptographic protocol verifier that we have used during protocol verification. We specifically aim to protect the confidentiality of the generated keys. The proposed protocols are formally analysed and their security property has been formally proved.