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Science China Information Sciences

An enhanced key exchange protocol exhibiting key compromise impersonation attacks resistance in mobile commerce environment

Ting Chen, Xinghua Li, Qingfeng Cheng

Published May 24, 2021• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11432-019-2645-x

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