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Communications in computer and information science

Two Types of Key-Compromise Impersonation Attacks against One-Pass Key Establishment Protocols

Konstantinos Chalkias, Foteini Baldimtsi, Dimitrios Hristu‐Varsakelis, George Stephanides

Published Jan 1, 2008• 33 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-88653-2_17

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Abstract: Key establishment protocols are among the most important security mechanisms via which two or more parties can generate a common session key to in order to encrypt their communications over an otherwise insecure network. This paper is concerned with the vulnerability of one-pass two-party key establishment protocols to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks. The latter may occur once an adversary has obtained the long-term private key of an honest party, and represents a serious — but often underestimated — threat. This is because an entity may not be aware that her computer has been compromised and her private key is exposed, and because a successful impersonation attack may result in far greater harm than the reading of past and future conversations. Our aim is to describe two main classes of K-CI attacks that can be mounted against all of the best-known one-pass protocols, including MQV and HMQV. We show that one of the attacks described can be somewhat avoided (though not completely eliminated) through the combined use of digital signatures and time-stamps; however, there still remains a class of K-CI threats for which there is no obvious solution. 1

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Abstract: Key establishment protocols are among the most important security mechanisms via which two or more parties can generate a common session key to in order to encrypt their communications over an otherwise insecure network. This paper is concerned with the vulnerability of one-pass two-party key establishment protocols to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks. The latter may occur once an adversary has obtained the long-term private key of an honest party, and represents a serious — but often underestimated — threat. This is because an entity may not be aware that her computer has been compromised and her private key is exposed, and because a successful impersonation attack may result in far greater harm than the reading of past and future conversations. Our aim is to describe two main classes of K-CI attacks that can be mounted against all of the best-known one-pass protocols, including MQV and HMQV. We show that one of the attacks described can be somewhat avoided (though not completely eliminated) through the combined use of digital signatures and time-stamps; however, there still remains a class of K-CI threats for which there is no obvious solution. 1
In extended Key Compromise Impersonation (eKCI) attack against authenticated key establishment (AKE) protocols the adversary impersonates one party, having the long term key and the ephemeral key of the other peer party. Such an attack can be mounted against variety of AKE protocols, including 3-pass HMQV. An intuitive countermeasure, based on BLS (Boneh–Lynn–Shacham) signatures, for strengthening HMQV was proposed in literature. The original HMQV protocol fulfills the deniability property: a party can deny its participation in the protocol execution, as the peer party can create a fake protocol transcript indistinguishable from the real one. Unfortunately, the modified BLS based version of HMQV is not deniable. In this paper we propose a method for converting HMQV (and similar AKE protocols) into a protocol resistant to eKCI attacks but without losing the original deniability property. For that purpose, instead of the undeniable BLS, we use a modification of Schnorr authentication protocol, which is deniable and immune to ephemeral key leakages.