Security and Communication Networks

Deniable Key Establishment Resistance against eKCI Attacks

Łukasz Krzywiecki, Tomasz Wlisłocki

Published Jan 1, 2017• 4 citations

Abstract

In extended Key Compromise Impersonation (eKCI) attack against authenticated key establishment (AKE) protocols the adversary impersonates one party, having the long term key and the ephemeral key of the other peer party. Such an attack can be mounted against variety of AKE protocols, including 3-pass HMQV. An intuitive countermeasure, based on BLS (Boneh–Lynn–Shacham) signatures, for strengthening HMQV was proposed in literature. The original HMQV protocol fulfills the deniability property: a party can deny its participation in the protocol execution, as the peer party can create a fake protocol transcript indistinguishable from the real one. Unfortunately, the modified BLS based version of HMQV is not deniable. In this paper we propose a method for converting HMQV (and similar AKE protocols) into a protocol resistant to eKCI attacks but without losing the original deniability property. For that purpose, instead of the undeniable BLS, we use a modification of Schnorr authentication protocol, which is deniable and immune to ephemeral key leakages.

DOI: 10.1155/2017/7810352

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