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Must an Ontology for Quantum Theories Contain Local Beables?

Alyssa Ney

Published May 19, 2021• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers and responds to the objection that a wave function in a high-dimensional space cannot ultimately constitute the low-dimensional macroscopic objects of experience. It discusses two forms this objection takes: one based on the putative fact that our evidence for quantum theories consists of low-dimensional objects, and another based on the putative fact that quantum theories are about low-dimensional objects, that they have primitive ontologies of local beables. Even admitting that there may be something straightforward and comprehensible about the fundamental ontologies for quantum theories proposed by the wave function realist, the philosophers who raise these objections see a problem with these ontologies in that they cannot serve as the constitutive foundation for the world as we experience it. And this undermines the promise of wave function realism to serve as a framework for the interpretation of quantum theories.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780190097714.003.0005

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Abstract This chapter considers and responds to the objection that a wave function in a high-dimensional space cannot ultimately constitute the low-dimensional macroscopic objects of experience. It discusses two forms this objection takes: one based on the putative fact that our evidence for quantum theories consists of low-dimensional objects, and another based on the putative fact that quantum theories are about low-dimensional objects, that they have primitive ontologies of local beables. Even admitting that there may be something straightforward and comprehensible about the fundamental ontologies for quantum theories proposed by the wave function realist, the philosophers who raise these objections see a problem with these ontologies in that they cannot serve as the constitutive foundation for the world as we experience it. And this undermines the promise of wave function realism to serve as a framework for the interpretation of quantum theories.
Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.
The purpose of the present chapter is to respond to a thread of recent criticism against one candidate framework for interpreting quantum theories, a framework introduced and defended by David Albert and Barry Loewer: wave function realism, a framework for interpreting the ontology of quantum theories according to which what appears to be a nonseparable metaphysics ofentangled objects acting instantaneously across spatial distances is a manifestation of a more fundamental separable and local metaphysics in higher dimensions. Thechapterconsiders strategies for extending the wave function realist interpretation of quantum mechanics to the case of relativistic quantum theories, responding to arguments that this cannot be done.
Primitive ontology is a program which seeks to make explicit the ontological commitments of physical theories in terms of a distribution of matter in ordinary space-time. This program targets wave-function realism, which interprets the high-dimensional configuration space on which wave-functions are defined as our fundamental physical space. Wave-function realism allegedly fails to account for a correspondence between the ontology it postulates and the ‘manifest image’ of the world in which experimental tests of the theory are performed, and therefore the wave-function must be completed with an additional structure which describes what fundamentally exists in ordinary space-time: the ‘primitive ontol- ogy’. However primitive ontologies face some difficulties, in particular concerning the ontological status of the wave-function. In this paper, I defend a realist inter- pretation of the wave-function as describing objects in ordinary space-time, which does not require supplementing the theory with additional structure. The main dif- ference between this proposal and other primitive ontology proposals is that the fundamental constituents of reality are not conceived of as localised objects, but as primitive relations. This interpretation purports to share the advantages of both wave-function realism and primitive ontologies without facing the same difficulties. I argue that the need for an additional structure stems from a commitment to the locality of the fundamental constituents of reality, and that such commitment is unnecessary for recovering the manifest image of the world.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
Abstract This chapter considers and critiques some strategies for solving the macro-object problem for wave function realism. This is the problem of how a wave function understood as a field on a high-dimensional space may come to make up or constitute the low-dimensional, macroscopic objects of our experience. It is first noted that simply invoking correspondences between particle configurations and states of the wave function will not suffice to solve the macro-object problem, following issues noted previously by Maudlin and Monton. More sophisticated strategies are considered that appeal to functionalism. It is argued that these functionalist strategies for recovering low-dimensional macroscopic objects from the wave function also do not succeed.
Wave function realism is an interpretational framework for quantum theories that has been defended for its ability to provide a clear and natural metaphysics for quantum theories, one that is fundamentally both separable and local. This is in contrast to competitor primitive ontology frameworks that while they could be separable, are not local, and holist or structuralist approaches that while they could be local, are not separable. The claim that wave function realist metaphysics is local, however, is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been assumed to be (nor as straightforward as the sense in which wave function realist metaphysics are separable). This paper distinguishes different senses in which a metaphysics for physics may be local, what may be the virtues of a metaphysics local in these senses, and the capacity of wave function realism to deliver such a metaphysics.