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The Causal Role of Macroscopic Objects

Alyssa Ney

Published May 19, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers and critiques some strategies for solving the macro-object problem for wave function realism. This is the problem of how a wave function understood as a field on a high-dimensional space may come to make up or constitute the low-dimensional, macroscopic objects of our experience. It is first noted that simply invoking correspondences between particle configurations and states of the wave function will not suffice to solve the macro-object problem, following issues noted previously by Maudlin and Monton. More sophisticated strategies are considered that appeal to functionalism. It is argued that these functionalist strategies for recovering low-dimensional macroscopic objects from the wave function also do not succeed.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780190097714.003.0006

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Abstract This chapter considers and critiques some strategies for solving the macro-object problem for wave function realism. This is the problem of how a wave function understood as a field on a high-dimensional space may come to make up or constitute the low-dimensional, macroscopic objects of our experience. It is first noted that simply invoking correspondences between particle configurations and states of the wave function will not suffice to solve the macro-object problem, following issues noted previously by Maudlin and Monton. More sophisticated strategies are considered that appeal to functionalism. It is argued that these functionalist strategies for recovering low-dimensional macroscopic objects from the wave function also do not succeed.
Abstract This chapter proposes a solution to the macro-object problem for wave function realism. This is the problem of how a wave function in a high-dimensional space may come to constitute the low-dimensional, macroscopic objects of our experience. The solution takes place in several stages. First, it is argued that how the wave function’s being invariant under certain transformations may give us reason to regard three-dimensional configurations corresponding symmetries with ontological seriousness. Second it is shown how the wave function may decompose into low-dimensional microscopic parts. Interestingly, this reveals mereological relationships in which parts and wholes inhabit distinct spatial frameworks. Third, it is shown how these parts may come to compose macroscopic objects.
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Abstract The Problem of Macro-Objects concerns how three-dimensional, middle-sized objects, such as scientists and their measuring devices, can exist in a quantum world. This paper discusses the problem for wave function realism and the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, focussing on Alyssa Ney’s recent two-stage solution, in which macro-objects are functionally reduced to micro-objects and micro-objects are parts of a whole in which they are grounded (the wave function field). It raises metaphysical difficulties with this proposal which a hylomorphic account of wholes may be able to address, noting possible implications for one’s philosophy of mind depending on one’s preferred solution to the Measurement Problem.
Abstract This chapter discusses the project of reducing the objects of our manifest image to a wave function ontology. Although there are prima facie difficulties about viewing ourselves and objects like tables and chairs as somehow being constituted out of an object like the wave function, several philosophers have appealed to functionalism to argue that there is no special issue for reduction to this sort of ontology. I argue that even assuming functionalism, substantial difficulties remain, and I consider what is needed to accomplish a successful reduction.
Abstract This chapter considers and responds to criticism that wave function realism is only plausible as an approach to the interpretation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics and not relativistic quantum theories and quantum field theories. This critique gains traction as wave function realism has until now been formulated and defended solely within the context of idealized, nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The chapter considers five such arguments and responds to each. An important lesson is that wave function realists should only adopt the wave-function-in-configuration-space picture as part of an interpretation of an idealized nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. More generally, the space the wave function inhabits will vary as the quantum theory the wave function realist is developing an interpretation of varies. The chapter develops a sketch of what wave function realism looks like in one relativistic context. It then discusses the issue of the interpretation of quantum theories in the limit of physical theorizing.
Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.