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Scaffold: Quantum Programming Language

Ali Javadi-Abhari, Arvin I. Faruque, Mohammad Javad Dousti, Lukas Svec, O. Catu, Amlan Chakrabati, Chen-Fu Chiang, Seth Vanderwilt, John Black, Frederic T. Chong

Published Jul 24, 2012• 119 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation thereon. Dis-claimer: The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of IARPA, DoI/NBC, or the U.S. Government. 1

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One fundamental complexity measure of an MPC protocol is its round complexity. Asharov et al. recently constructed the first three-round protocol for general MPC in the CRS model. Here, we show how to achieve this result with only two rounds. We obtain UC security with abort against static malicious adversaries, and fairness if there is an honest majority. Additionally the communication in our protocol is only proportional to the input and output size of the function being evaluated and independent of its circuit size. Our main tool is indistinguishability obfuscation, for which a candidate construction was recently proposed by Garg et al. The technical tools that we develop in this work also imply virtual black box obfuscation of a new primitive that we call a dynamic point function. This primitive may be of independent interest. The second and third authors were supported by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) via Department of Interior National Business Center (DoI/NBC) contract number D11PC20202. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation thereon. Disclaimer: The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of IARPA, DoI/NBC, or the U.S. Government.
We present a general framework for efficient, universally composable oblivious transfer (OT) protocols in which a single, global, common reference string (CRS) can be used for multiple invocations of oblivious transfer by arbitrary pairs of parties. In addition: • Our framework is round-efficient. E.g., under the DLIN or SXDH assumptions we achieve round-optimal protocols with static security, or 3-round protocols with adaptive security (assuming erasure). • Our resulting protocols are more efficient than any known previously, and in particular yield protocols for string OT using O(1) exponentiations and communicating O(1) group elements. Our result improves on that of Peikert et al. (Crypto 2008), which uses a CRS whose length depends on the number of parties in the network and achieves only static security. Compared to Garay et al. (Crypto 2009), we achieve adaptive security with better round complexity and efficiency. ∗Columbia University. Email: sgchoi@cs.columbia.edu. Portions of this work were done at the University of Maryland. This work was supported in part by the Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA) via DoI/NBC contract Number D11PC20194. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of IARPA, DoI/NBC, or the U.S. Government. †Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland. Email: jkatz@cs.umd.edu. This work is supported in part by DARPA and by NSF awards #0447075, #1111599, and #1223623. ‡George Washington University. Email: hoeteck@alum.mit.edu. Supported by NSF CAREER award #1237429. §Dept. of Computer Science, Virginia Commonwealth University. Email: hszhou@vcu.edu. Work supported in part by an NSF CI postdoctoral fellowship, and done while at University of Maryland.
We present a constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for NP. Our protocol relies on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash functions, one-way permutations, and indistinguishability obfuscators for P/poly (with slightly super-polynomial security). ∗Academia Sinica, kmchung@iis.sinica.edu.tw †University of California, Santa Barbara, rachel.lin@cs.ucsb.edu. ‡Cornell University, rafael@cs.cornell.edu. Work supported in part by a Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship, Microsoft New Faculty Fellowship, NSF Award CNS-1217821, NSF CAREER Award CCF-0746990, NSF Award CCF-1214844, AFOSR YIP Award FA9550-10-1-0093, and DARPA and AFRL under contract FA8750-11-2-0211. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the US Government.