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Worlds in a Stochastic Universe: On the Emergence of World Histories in Minimal Bohmian Mechanics

Alexander Ehmann

Published Jan 1, 2020• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

This thesis develops a detailed account of the emergence of for all practical purposes continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the discontinuous, stochastic micro dynamics of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics (MBM). MBM is a non-relativistic quantum theory. It results from excising the guiding equation from standard Bohmian Mechanics (BM) and reinterpreting the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a stochastic guidance law for the random actualization of configurations of Bohmian particles. On MBM, there are no continuous trajectories linking up individual configurations. Instead, individual configurations are actualized independently of each other, carving out the decoherence-induced branching structure of the universal wave function. Yet, by contrast to the Everett interpretation, branches of the universal wave function are not actualized in parallel, i.e. all at the same time. Rather, world branches, on MBM, are actualized sequentially. For an introduction to MBM, the transition from BM to MBM is described, and their empirical equivalence is established. I present the conditions under which MBM can be classified as a primitive ontology (PO) theory, regarded as crucial for the acceptance of a theory as Bohmian by many proponents of BM. While rendering MBM compatible with the PO approach, it must not fall prey to the problem of communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. The issue of temporal solipsism, identified by Bell as a serious problem for his “Everett (?) theory” – the historic predecessor of MBM – is discussed. I argue that Barbour’s time capsule approach does not provide a satisfactory solution. In particular, his adopting a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism between brain processes and experience of macroscopic change is argued to be reasonable in light of our current best neuroscience, yet problematic for theories relying solely on time capsules, understood as highly structured, individual, internally static configurations. As a solution, I introduce worlds, and world histories, as key concepts in providing a link between MBM’s micro dynamics and macroscopic phenomena. Worlds, other than time capsules, are coarse-grained regions in phase- or configuration space, defined as sets of possible micro states satisfying a relation of sufficient similarity from a macroscopic perspective, with respect to a given micro state. Hence, worlds may overlap. I argue that worlds thus construed are a reasonable option for replacing the disjoint macro regions of phase space, resulting from the usual way of partitioning phase space in the standard framework of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. This move solves the issue of discontinuous change of macro variables upon the micro state crossing the boundary between different macro regions. I adapt this move for MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics in configuration space. Issues revolving around the microscopic-macroscopic distinction, particle identity, impenetrability and haecceity in light of the desideratum of particle number conservation, etc., are discussed. I provide a detailed explanation of how overlapping worlds in MBM form world histories, thereby linking up macroscopically distinct worlds. Thus, the problem of temporal solipsism is resolved in a way that is compatible with a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism.

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This thesis develops a detailed account of the emergence of for all practical purposes continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the discontinuous, stochastic micro dynamics of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics (MBM). MBM is a non-relativistic quantum theory. It results from excising the guiding equation from standard Bohmian Mechanics (BM) and reinterpreting the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a stochastic guidance law for the random actualization of configurations of Bohmian particles. On MBM, there are no continuous trajectories linking up individual configurations. Instead, individual configurations are actualized independently of each other, carving out the decoherence-induced branching structure of the universal wave function. Yet, by contrast to the Everett interpretation, branches of the universal wave function are not actualized in parallel, i.e. all at the same time. Rather, world branches, on MBM, are actualized sequentially. For an introduction to MBM, the transition from BM to MBM is described, and their empirical equivalence is established. I present the conditions under which MBM can be classified as a primitive ontology (PO) theory, regarded as crucial for the acceptance of a theory as Bohmian by many proponents of BM. While rendering MBM compatible with the PO approach, it must not fall prey to the problem of communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. The issue of temporal solipsism, identified by Bell as a serious problem for his “Everett (?) theory” – the historic predecessor of MBM – is discussed. I argue that Barbour’s time capsule approach does not provide a satisfactory solution. In particular, his adopting a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism between brain processes and experience of macroscopic change is argued to be reasonable in light of our current best neuroscience, yet problematic for theories relying solely on time capsules, understood as highly structured, individual, internally static configurations. As a solution, I introduce worlds, and world histories, as key concepts in providing a link between MBM’s micro dynamics and macroscopic phenomena. Worlds, other than time capsules, are coarse-grained regions in phase- or configuration space, defined as sets of possible micro states satisfying a relation of sufficient similarity from a macroscopic perspective, with respect to a given micro state. Hence, worlds may overlap. I argue that worlds thus construed are a reasonable option for replacing the disjoint macro regions of phase space, resulting from the usual way of partitioning phase space in the standard framework of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. This move solves the issue of discontinuous change of macro variables upon the micro state crossing the boundary between different macro regions. I adapt this move for MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics in configuration space. Issues revolving around the microscopic-macroscopic distinction, particle identity, impenetrability and haecceity in light of the desideratum of particle number conservation, etc., are discussed. I provide a detailed explanation of how overlapping worlds in MBM form world histories, thereby linking up macroscopically distinct worlds. Thus, the problem of temporal solipsism is resolved in a way that is compatible with a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism.
The paper takes up Bell's (1987) "Everett (?) theory" and develops it further. The resulting theory is about the system of all particles in the universe, each located in ordinary, 3-dimensional space. This many-particle system as a whole performs random jumps through 3N-dimensional configuration space - hence "Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics" (TBM). The distribution of its spontaneous localisations in configuration space is given by the Born Rule probability measure for the universal wavefunction. Contra Bell, the theory is argued to satisfy the minimal desiderata for a Bohmian theory within the Primitive Ontology framework (for which we offer a metaphysically more perspicuous formulation than is customary). TBM's formalism is that of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics (BM), without the postulate of continuous particle trajectories and their deterministic dynamics. This "rump formalism" receives, however, a different interpretation. We defend TBM as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum theory. Objections voiced by Bell and Maudlin are rebutted. The "for all practical purposes"-classical, Everettian worlds (i.e. quasi-classical histories) exist sequentially in TBM (rather than simultaneously, as in the Everett interpretation). In a temporally coarse-grained sense, they quasi-persist. By contrast, the individual particles themselves cease to persist.
There appear to be multiple mathematically and physically distinct theories that successfully reproduce the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics, so-called "interpretations" of quantum mechanics. This dissertation uses the tools of formal epistemology (prominently, the concept of self-locating uncertainty) to investigate which of the theories that have been put forward really are empirically adequate and what alternatives can be devised. The first chapter introduces a novel theory that incorporates aspects of two well-developed alternatives, Bohmian mechanics and the many-worlds interpretation. The quantum wave function can be represented as a field on configuration space, the space of possible ways particles can be arranged. According to Bohmian mechanics a single point in this space is special; it represents the way all of the particles actually are arranged. The newly introduced theory holds that many of the points in configuration space are special; for each, there is a world in which particles are arranged that way. In general, there will be multiple worlds that are so similar that an agent cannot tell directly from experience which they are in; self-locating uncertainty is unavoidable. The next chapter argues for the empirical adequacy of the many-worlds interpretation. In this version of quantum mechanics, processes like quantum measurements cause agents to split into multiple copies and enter periods of self-locating uncertainty. An epistemic principle demarcating which facts about the world one's credences might reasonably depend on (only facts about what's happening around here) is used to derive probabilistic predictions from the many-worlds interpretation. In the third chapter self-locating uncertainty is employed in evaluating another version of quantum mechanics, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory. In this theory, random collapse events prevent our world from splitting into many. If the collapse events are rare, this prevention fails. Other worlds have time to form but most are short-lived. Our survival provides evidence against that kind of theory. The final chapter is an original introduction to relativistic quantum field theory which lays groundwork for evaluating the prospects of extending various interpretations of quantum mechanics to this more sophisticated theory.
It is argued that in Bohmian mechanics the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe does not encode the influences of other par-ticles on the subsystem. This suggests that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics does not consist only in Bohmian particles and their posi-tions. It is nonetheless pointed out that since the wave function in configuration space may represent the state of ergodic motion of non-Bohmian particles in three-dimensional space, the ontology of Bohmian mechanics may still consist only in particles. Bohmian mechanics, which is also called the de Broglie-Bohm theory, is a realistic alternative to standard quantum mechanics initially proposed by de Broglie (1928) and later developed by Bohm (1952). According to the theory, a complete realistic description of a quantum system is provided by the configuration defined by the positions of its particles together with its wave function. It has been a hot topic of debate how to interpret the wave function in the theory. Recently Esfeld et al (2013) further developed the nomological interpretation of the wave function, as suggested by Dürr, Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (1997), Goldstein and Teufel (2001) and Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2012). They argued that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics consists only in Bohmian particles and their positions, and in particular, the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe encodes the influences of other particles in the universe on the subsystem. In this note, we will argue that this interesting view may be problematic. The Bohmian law of motion is expressed by two equations, a guiding equation for the configuration of particles in three-dimensional space and the Schrödinger equation, describing the time evolution of the wave function, which enters the guiding equation. The law can be formulated as follows: dQ(t) dt = vΨ(t)(Q(t)). (1)
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
The extension of Bohmian mechanics to the relativistic domain, and to quantum field theory presents specific theoretical difficulties. The non-local nature of the pilot-wave guidance equations inherently requires a temporal ordering of spacelike separated events. Historically, this requirement has been satisfied by introducing an arbitrary preferred foliation of spacetime, which leads to covariance concerns. Furthermore, the standard Bohmian particle model struggles to accommodate particle creation and annihilation events, which are characteristic of quantum field theory (QFT). This paper constructs a theoretical framework that is rigorously Lorentz-invariant, and compatible with QFT. The proposed synthesis couples the Tomonaga-Schwinger equation for the relativistic wave functional with a hypersurface Bohm-Dirac model (HBDM). To ensure Lorentz invariance without adding absolute spatiotemporal structure, the necessary foliation is covariantly determined by the universal wave function. To address particle non-conservation, the deterministic trajectories are supplemented by a Bell-type stochastic Markov jump process defined on Fock space, utilizing minimal jump rates derived directly from the interaction Hamiltonian. A hybrid model is adopted, assigning localized particle beables to fermions, and continuous field beables to bosons. The exact equivariance of the probability distributions across the covariantly defined leaves of the foliation is proven, demonstrating that the model reproduces the empirical predictions of standard regularized QFT. In an appendix, we discuss the modeling of neutrinos. Finally, this framework is interpreted with the multi-fold theory. In this context, the covariantly determined foliation emerges physically from a discrete, non-commutative spacetime concretized by 2D random walks of massless Higgs bosons. The multi-fold mechanism and the E/G conjecture (entanglement is gravity) provide a local, physical model for the non-local Bohmian guidance equations, while space-time matter induction and scattering explain the origin of the proposed hybrid field-particle beables as patterns and condensates of these random walks. Sizes or scales also align with multi-fold modeling of QFT with 2D random walks, and spacetime non-commutativity to support Quantum Physics and Fermions. These add to many examples where the multi-fold preons as massless Higgs bosons can microscopically interpretate Quantum Physics behaviors.
Bohmian mechanics is endowed with an ontological package that supposedly allows to solve the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. We are concerned in this work by the emergence of classicality from the quantum mechanical substrate. We will argue that although being superficially attractive, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation does not shed new light on the quantum-to-classical transition. This is due to nature of the dynamical law of Bohmian mechanics by which the particles follow the streamlines of the probability flow. As a consequence, Bohmian trajectories can be highly non-classical even when the wavefunction propagates along classical trajectories, as happens in semiclassical systems. In order to account for classical dynamics, Bohmian mechanics needs non-spreading and non-interfering wave packets: this is achieved for practical purposes by having recourse to decoherence and dense measurements. However one then faces the usual fundamental problems associated with the meaning of reduced density matrices. Moreover the specific assets of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation – in particular the existence of point-like particles pursuing well-defined trajectories – would play no role in accounting for the emergence of classical dynamics.