Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

物理学前沿:英文版

Twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack on Li et al.'s fault-tolerant quantum private comparison and the improved scheme

季赛, 王芳, 刘文杰, 袁晓敏

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Fault-tolerant Quantum Private Comparison Protocol

Min Xiao, ChunAn Ma

International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Feb 1, 2022•4 citations

Same Initial States Attack in Yang et al.’s Quantum Private Comparison Protocol and the Improvement

Wenjie Liu, Chao Liu, Zhihao Liu +2 more

arXiv:1312.5562•International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Sep 11, 2013•26 citations

Intercept–resend attacks on Chen et al.'s quantum private comparison protocol and the improvements

Jason Lin, Hsin-Yi Tseng, Tzonelih Hwang

Optics Communications•Jan 13, 2011•82 citations

Fault-Tolerate Quantum Private Comparison Based on GHZ States and ECC

Yanbing Li, Tian‐Yin Wang, Huiyan Chen +2 more

International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Apr 1, 2013•32 citations

Twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack on Li et al.’s fault-tolerant quantum private comparison and the improved scheme

Sai Ji, Wang Sheng Fang, Wenjie Liu +1 more

Recently, Li et al. presented a two-party quantum private comparison scheme using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states and error-correcting code (ECC) [ Int. J. Theor. Phys. 52, 2818 (2013)], claiming it is fault-tolerant and could be performed in a non-ideal scenario. However, there exists a fatal loophole in their private comparison scheme under a special attack, namely the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack. Specifically, a malicious party may intercept the other party’s particles and execute Hadamard operations on the intercepted particles as well as on his or her own particles. Then, the malicious party could sequentially perform a controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation between intercepted particles and the auxiliary particles, as well as between his or her own particles and the auxiliary particles prepared in advance. By measuring the auxiliary particles, the secret input will be revealed to the malicious party without being detected. For resisting this special attack, a feasible improved scheme is proposed by introducing a permutation operator before the third party (TP) sends the particle sequences to each participant.

Frontiers of Physics•Feb 17, 2015•6 citations

Comment on "Fault-Tolerate Quantum Private Comparison Based on GHZ States and ECC"

Sai Ji, Wang Sheng Fang, Wenjie Liu +2 more

A two-party quantum private comparison scheme using GHZ states and error-correcting code (ECC) was introduced in Li et al.'s paper [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 52: 2818-2815, 2013], which holds the capability of fault-tolerate and could be performed in a none-ideal scenario. However, this study points out there exists a fatal loophole under a special attack, namely the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack. A malicious party may intercept the other's particles, firstly executes the Hadamard operations on these intercepted particles and his (her) own ones respectively, and then sequentially performs twice CNOT operations on them and the auxiliary particles prepared in advance. As a result, the secret input will be revealed without being detected through measuring the auxiliary particles. For resisting this special attack, an improvement is proposed by applying a permutation operator before TP sends the particle sequences to all the participants.

arXiv:1405.6765•May 27, 2014•0 citations
Recently, Li et al. presented a two-party quantum private comparison scheme using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states and error-correcting code (ECC) [ Int. J. Theor. Phys. 52, 2818 (2013)], claiming it is fault-tolerant and could be performed in a non-ideal scenario. However, there exists a fatal loophole in their private comparison scheme under a special attack, namely the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack. Specifically, a malicious party may intercept the other party’s particles and execute Hadamard operations on the intercepted particles as well as on his or her own particles. Then, the malicious party could sequentially perform a controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation between intercepted particles and the auxiliary particles, as well as between his or her own particles and the auxiliary particles prepared in advance. By measuring the auxiliary particles, the secret input will be revealed to the malicious party without being detected. For resisting this special attack, a feasible improved scheme is proposed by introducing a permutation operator before the third party (TP) sends the particle sequences to each participant.
A two-party quantum private comparison scheme using GHZ states and error-correcting code (ECC) was introduced in Li et al.'s paper [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 52: 2818-2815, 2013], which holds the capability of fault-tolerate and could be performed in a none-ideal scenario. However, this study points out there exists a fatal loophole under a special attack, namely the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack. A malicious party may intercept the other's particles, firstly executes the Hadamard operations on these intercepted particles and his (her) own ones respectively, and then sequentially performs twice CNOT operations on them and the auxiliary particles prepared in advance. As a result, the secret input will be revealed without being detected through measuring the auxiliary particles. For resisting this special attack, an improvement is proposed by applying a permutation operator before TP sends the particle sequences to all the participants.