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Quantum Key Distribution: Attacks and Solutions

Vimal Gaur, Devika Mehra, Anchit Aggarwal, Raveena Kumari, Srishti Rawat

Published Jan 1, 2020• 8 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.3563118

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A QKD network provides an additional security layer for IT-secure cryptographic key distribution that is added to existing conventional networks. Thus, QKD network components must be resilient to security challenges from conventional network environments. This paper provided solutions for realizing a Key Management System to avoid DoS attacks, and our solution allows applications to function securely in environments with a reduced amount of keys. In addition, we have provided approaches for allocating and managing QKD resources to avoid malicious key reservations. Simulation experiments verified the proposed solutions.
In this paper, we introduce the extended mean king's problem and its solutions. Also, we show a quantum key distribution (QKD) using the extended mean king's problem. By using the quantum key distribution, a sender can share a secret key with each of receivers. Besides, we consider the tolerance to an eavesdropper who makes intercept-resend attacks. As a result, in the case of two receivers, we indicate that the quantum key distribution is robust against the intercept-resend attacks by showing that the error occurs between the secret keys of a sender and receivers.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables the generation of secure keys between two distant users. Security proof of QKD against general coherent attacks is challenging, while the one against collective attacks is much easier. As an effective and general solution, the postselection method tries to extend security analyses of collective attacks to be against coherent attacks. However, it gives a bad performance. To overcome this drawback, instead of directly calculating key rate by postselection method, we propose a method correlating the failure probabilities of phase error estimation against collective and coherent attacks, enabling the use of the independent and identically distributed assumption in parameter estimation against coherent attacks. Then the key rate can be obtained by uncertainty relation of entropy. Our method can be applied to various QKD protocols, providing better performance compared with the traditional postselection method. For instance, we give the finite-key analyses of the side-channel-secure (SCS) QKD and the no-phase-postselection (NPP) twin-field (TF) QKD to show their performance improvements with the proposed method.